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ABSTRACT 
The Southern African Development Community Tribunal (the Tribunal) is the only judicial organ 
of the Southern African Development Community (the SADC). Its mandate includes ensuring 
“adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of the Southern African 
Development Community Treaty” (the Treaty). The decisions of the Tribunal are final and 
binding in the territories of member states party to a dispute before it.  
The responsibility to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced lies with the 
Southern African Development Community Summit (the Summit). The Summit is the supreme 
policy-making body of the SADC. It comprises the Heads of State or Government of all SADC 
member states. The decisions of the Summit are binding on all member states and, upon 
referral from the Tribunal, it has the power to take appropriate action against a member state 
who refuses to honour a decision of the Tribunal.  
The Tribunal was established primarily to deal with disputes emanating from the SADC’s 
economic and political units and not with human rights. A dispute concerning allegations of 
human rights violations in Zimbabwe was brought before the Tribunal by farmers affected by the 
country’s land-reform policy. The Tribunal, through reliance on the doctrine of implied powers, 
and the principles and objectives of the SADC as contained in the Treaty, extended its 
jurisdiction. In particular, the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to hear cases involving 
human rights violations and that there had indeed been human rights violations in the case 
before it. It consequently ruled against Zimbabwe. This decision has been welcomed by many 
within the SADC region as showing the Tribunal’s commitment to interpreting the Treaty in a 
way that does not run counter the rights of SADC citizens. However, the Tribunal’s decision has 
met with resistance from Zimbabwe and has not been implemented on the ground, inter alia, 
that the Tribunal acted beyond its mandate.  
The Tribunal has on several occasions referred cases of non-compliance to the Summit for 
appropriate action against Zimbabwe. The Summit, however, has done nothing concrete to 
ensure that the Tribunal’s decisions are enforced in Zimbabwe. Instead, in an unexpected move 
that sent shockwaves through the SADC region and beyond, the Summit suspended the 
Tribunal and resolved that it should neither receive nor adjudicate any cases. During the SADC 
summit in August 2014, a Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development 
Community was adopted and signed (the 2014 Protocol). In terms of this Protocol the 
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jurisdiction of the (new) Tribunal will be limited to inter-state disputes. Unfortunately, it also does 
not provide any transitional measures to address issues such as the manner to deal with 
pending cases and the enforcement of judgments. When it comes to the execution and 
enforcement of judgments, it can be argued that the 2014 Protocol is largely a replica of the 
original 2000 Tribunal Protocol. The reason for this is that the envisaged mechanisms to enforce 
the decisions of the new Tribunal is to a large extent similar to the previous one. 
Unsatisfied over the non-compliance with the decision by Zimbabwe, the litigants approached 
the South African courts to enforce the Tribunal’s decision in South Africa.1 The South African 
courts found that South Africa is obliged under the SADC Treaty to take all the necessary 
measures to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced, and ruled against 
Zimbabwe. However, the decision is yet to be enforced.  
The non-compliance with the judgments and a lack of mechanisms to enforce the decisions of 
the Tribunal, are crucial issues as they undermine the authority of the Tribunal. This thesis 
explores whether the Tribunal acted within its mandate in receiving and hearing a human rights 
case. It further considers whether, in the absence of a human rights mandate, the Tribunal 
enjoys implied powers under international law to invoke the powers necessary for the fulfilment 
of the objectives set out in the Treaty. It also reviews the concept of state sovereignty and the 
extent to which it has been affected by human rights norms post-World War II; regionalism; and 
globalisation.  
An important aspect examined, is the relationship between SADC Community law and the 
national law of member states. The relationship between national courts and the Tribunal also 
receives attention. Ultimately, the discourse addresses compliance and enforcement of the 
Tribunal’s decisions in the context of international law. To the extent relevant, I draw on other 
regional (the European Court of Justice) and sub-regional (the ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice, and the East African Court of Justice) courts to establish how they have dealt with 
human rights jurisdiction and the enforcement of their judgments. 
                                                          
1
  Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others (657/11) [2012] ZASCA 122 (20 
September 2012); Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others (47954/2011, 
72184/2011, 77881/2009) [2011] ZAGPPHC 76 (6 June 2011)). 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 EMERGENCE OF SUB-REGIONAL COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MANDATE OVER 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The creation of an African regional organisation can be traced back to 25 May 1963 when the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.1 The OAU’s 
main objectives included the promotion of unity among African states and resistance to 
colonisation and apartheid.2 On 9 July 2002, the OAU was replaced by a new regional body, the 
African Union (AU), established in terms of the Constitutive Act3 of the African Union.4 This 
move has been hailed as putting “human rights firmly on the African agenda”.5 The AU was 
inaugurated in Durban, South Africa. Its Secretariat is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.6  
Over the past decades, apart from the creation of the AU, Africa has witnessed the emergence 
of several sub-regional communities such as the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) (formerly the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference 
(SADCC)).7 In this thesis I focus specifically on the sub-regional level. The sub-regional 
                                                          
1
   See the AU website http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (Date of use: 23 July 2012). 
2
   Article II of the OAU Charter. The full text can be accessed on the African Union website at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf. (Date of use: 23 July 2012). For 
a detailed discussion of the OAU, see Gawanas B “The African Union: Concepts and 
implementation mechanisms relating to human rights” available at: 
http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Human_Rights_in_Africa/6_Gawanas.pdf 
(Date of use: 23 July 2012). 
3
  The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted at the 36
th
 Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on 11 July 2000 in Togo. The AU 
consists of 54 member states. The full text can be accessed at 
http://au.int/en/content/constitutive-act-african-union (Date of use: 20 July 2012).  
4
  Dugard International Law 540; see also the website of the AU available at 
http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (Date of use: 23 July 2012); Murray Human Rights in Africa 
31.  
5
  Dugard International Law 552; Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 178-179; 
Gawanas available at 
http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Human_Rights_in_Africa/6_Gawanas.pd 
(Date of use: 23 July 2012). 
6
  Dugard International Law 542.  
7
  These were formed under various treaties such as the Treaty Establishing the East African 
Community which was adopted in 1999 and became operational on 18 July 2010; Treaty of the 
Economic Community of Western African States which was founded on 28 May 1975 (Treaty of 
ECOWAS); the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community which was adopted on 
17 August 1999. Other sub-regional organisations officially recognised by the AU Assembly are: 
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communities above have their own tribunals established in terms of their respective constitutive 
documents. These tribunals are responsible for interpreting and applying treaty provisions when 
a dispute arises as a result of sub-regional economic integration.8 The sub-regional 
communities’ main objective is to “facilitate a process of economic convergence through closer 
economic and financial cooperation and harmonisation of policies and programmes”.9 In this 
way states may, through sharing resources such as water and agriculture, work together and 
close the ethnic divides resulting from colonisation.10 One of the advantages of these sub-
regional communities is that member states become part of an economic community thereby 
strengthening their role and competiveness in the global market.11  It is clear, therefore, that the 
protection of human rights was not originally one of the objectives of the sub-regional 
community tribunals.12  
 
In recent years, however, the mandates of these sub-regional tribunals appear to have been 
extended to deal with the promotion and protection of human rights, the rule of law, and 
democracy.13 The integration of a human rights mandate into the mandates of the sub-regional 
tribunals creates, inter alia, an appropriate “investment climate that is critical in furthering 
economic development [and] establish[ing] confidence for investors and trading partners”.14 This 
is both a new step and a shift away from the original mandate which focused solely on 
economic issues with no thought for issues related to human rights. Apart from the justifications 
for the extension of these tribunals’ mandates noted above, the adoption of the African Charter 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the 
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). In all, 
there are eight officially recognised sub-regional organisations in Africa which include the 
ECOWAS, the SADC and the EAC. See Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 488. 
See also the discussion by Moller B “Africa’s sub-regional organizations: Seamless web or 
patchwork?” available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28486/1/WP56.2MollerRO.pdf (Date of use: 27 
July 2012); Decision on the moratorium on the recognition of regional economic communities 
(RECs) Doc EX.CL/278/(IX) Assembly/AU/Dec.112(VII) available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Conferences/Past/2006/july/summit/doc/Decisions_and_Declarations/Assembly
-AU-Dec.pdf (Date of use: 27 July 2012). 
8
  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 503. 
9
  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 495; Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 (7) Human 
Rights Law Journal 119.   
10
  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 495. 
11
  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 485. 
12
  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 485. 
13
  Ebobrah 2009 (17) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 80; Murungi and 
Gallinetti 2010 (7) International Journal on Human Rights 119. 
14
  Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 (7) International Journal on Human Rights 121. 
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on Human and Peoples’ Rights has raised human rights to a common feature in interstate 
relations on the continent.15 These tribunals could play an indispensable role in the protection 
and promotion of human rights through the adjudication of human rights cases. However, 
certain authors have raised concerns about the absence of explicit jurisdiction authorising sub-
regional tribunals to adjudicate human rights issues.16 This is the result of various factors, 
including the lack of explicit empowerment of certain of the tribunals with a human rights 
mandate or direct human rights obligations.  
 
There are, however, several advantages to including human rights in the mandates of sub-
regional tribunals. As observed by certain writers, sub-regional tribunals are better placed to 
respond to the specific human rights concerns of the region.17 This view is supported to an 
extent, but ultimately it remains up to the political will of a member state to uphold human rights. 
Lasseko raises concerns as to “whether there exists sufficient political will in the [SADC] region 
to guarantee the success of the enforcement mechanisms present for human rights litigation”.18 
Where member states of a particular region are committed to upholding human rights as their 
main priority, they will fulfil this obligation. However, where these states are in one way or 
another shielding their allies who are involved in human rights violations, this may create an 
obstacle in the way of victims demanding respect and protection for their human rights. An 
example of a sub-regional community that has arguably been too lenient in acting against its 
members is the SADC which has remained silent on the serious allegations of human rights 
abuses in countries such as Zimbabwe and Swaziland.  
 
When it comes to access to courts, certain sub-regional tribunals allow individuals access as 
opposed to the traditional limitation of jurisdiction to states only.19 Some of the tribunals allow 
individuals to institute cases without first having to exhaust local remedies.20 This is 
                                                          
15
  Ebobrah 2009 (17) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 80. 
16
   Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 (7) International Journal on Human Rights 124; Nkhata 2012 (20) 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law 93; Ebobrah ST “A critical analysis of the 
human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice” available at http://www.escr-
net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf (Date of use: 20 April 2012).  
17
  Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 (7) International Journal on Human Rights 127. 
18
  Lasseko M “Avenues for access to information litigation: The legitimacy of supra-national judicial 
bodies in Southern Africa” available at http://www.southernafricalawcenter.org/library/folder/39 
(Date of use: 19 July 2012). 
19
  Viljoen International Human Rights in Africa 507. 
20
  See art 10(d) of the Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 Amending Protocol A/P.1/7/91 of the 
Community Court of Justice (ECOWAS CCJ). 
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advantageous to those seeking protection of their rights, especially where local mechanisms are 
ineffective. However, international or sub-regional tribunals should always be seen as tribunals 
of last resort in that national courts are arguably better placed (and more easily accessible) to 
deal with cases involving human rights abuses.  
Other than the concerns surrounding the seemingly new human rights mandate of sub-regional 
tribunals, there are also concerns regarding the enforcement of the decision of the tribunals. 
The question remains whether the decisions of international tribunals such as the SADC 
Tribunal (the Tribunal) will be respected and implemented by the respondent state.21 The 
difficulty in enforcing decisions of international tribunals which arises from the consensual 
nature of international law, also faces sub-regional tribunals.22 Furthermore, the lack of 
enforcement agencies, such as a regional police force, is cause for concern.23 The resources 
expended on initial litigation in national courts, subsequent litigation at sub-regional level (if 
unsuccessful at the national level), and re-litigation at the national level to enforce a community 
judgment will in all likelihood be prohibitive and constitute a barrier to justice. In addition, certain 
tribunals have stated unequivocally that they will not comply with the decisions of sub-regional 
tribunals. An example of a state which has followed this route as regards the Tribunal, is the 
Republic of Zimbabwe24 with the courts in Zimbabwe ruling that decisions of the Tribunal are not 
binding in Zimbabwe. In the case of Gramara v the Republic of Zimbabwe,25 the High Court of 
Zimbabwe ruled that the recognition and enforcement of the Tribunal’s decision in Zimbabwe 
would be “fundamentally contrary to the public policy” as it would, inter alia, seek to nullify 
Zimbabwe’s constitutionally-mandated, land-reform programme.26 In another ruling in the matter 
between Etheredge v Minister of National Security27 the Zimbabwean High Court held, inter alia, 
that the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal and its Rules of Procedure28 (2000 Tribunal Protocol) 
did not intend to create a sub-regional forum that would be superior to the courts in the member 
                                                          
21
  Mutangi T “Executing judgments of the SADC Tribunal rendered under its human rights-related 
jurisdiction by utilizing the foreign judgments (registration and enforcement) procedure: Prospects 
and challenges” available at http://ssrn.com/abstarct=1907891 (Date of use: 16 June 2012). 
22
  Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 (7) International Journal on Human Rights 15. 
23
  Hans-Peter 2007 (6) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 578. 
24
  Adeleke 2011 (1) SADC Law Journal 209. 
25
  HC 33/09 [2010] ZWHHC 1 (26 January 2010). 
26
  Gramara (Private) Limited & Another v Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe HC 33/09 at 18 
- 20. 
27
  HC 3295/08 [2009] ZWHCC 1 (4 February 2009) (hereafter the Etheredge decision). 
28
   SADC Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure thereof (2000/2001) available at 
http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/163 (Date of use: 1 November 2011).   
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states. The Court also ruled that its jurisdiction is superior to that of the Tribunal.29 The result of 
these defiant statements and decisions is that the individual who has obtained judgment in his 
or her favour from the Tribunal, will be unable to enforce the judgment against the Zimbabwean 
state.  
A month after the Etheredge decision by the Zimbabwean Court, the South African High Court 
recognised and registered the Tribunal’s judgment in the matter between the Government of the 
Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others and issued an order for the attachment of non-
diplomatic property owned by Zimbabwe in South Africa.30 This move may be viewed as a step 
forward and indicates the willingness of certain SADC member states to uphold human rights in 
the region.31 However, the judgment also begs the question of whether the other national courts 
in the SADC region will follow South Africa’s example. The South African court failed to provide 
substantive reasons for its decision, stating merely that it had relied on the documents before it 
to arrive at its conclusion.32 The Government of Zimbabwe appealed the decision of the North 
Gauteng High Court. The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed Zimbabwe’s appeal against the 
order of the North Gauteng High Court, thereby clearing the way for the attachment of certain 
property of the Zimbabwean government which will be sold on auction in order to satisfy the 
debt owed to the farmers. 
The Government of Zimbabwe unsuccessfully approached the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa challenging the bases upon which a South African court can assume jurisdiction and 
enforce the SADC Tribunal’s decision when South Africa has not incorporated the SADC Treaty 
into its domestic law.33  
 
The concerns raised by the Zimbabwean courts, and the questions left open by certain of the 
Tribunal’s judgments – such as the failure convincingly and adequately to justify the exercise of 
jurisdiction over human rights cases – cannot be ignored. These are further examined in the 
thesis in relation to the future of the Tribunal with specific reference to its jurisdiction, the 
                                                          
29
  Etheredge decision at 9. 
30
  2009 Case No 77881/2009 North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria (6 June 2011).  
31
   See Southern African Litigation Centre and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions 
and Others Case No 77150/09 North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria (8 May 2012). This ruling 
illustrates the commitment of South Africa as a SADC member state, to fulfil its international 
obligation to investigate and prosecute Zimbabwean officials for alleged human rights violations 
committed outside South Africa.  
32
  See Government of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others Case No 657/11 (20 September 2012).  
33
  Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others 2013 (10) BCLR 1103 (CC). 
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sovereignty of member states, the enforcement of its judgments, and its effectiveness in 
protecting human rights in the region. 
 
2  ROAD LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
The apartheid system in South Africa united many African states, influenced the regional 
integration of Southern African countries, and moved them to work together in the fight against 
the then white-minority rule in South Africa.34 This sense of unity resulted in the establishment of 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (the SADCC) on 1 April 1980 
under the Lusaka Declaration: Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation.35  
 
The SADCC’s main aim was to “coordinat[e] development projects in order to lessen economic 
dependence on the then apartheid South Africa”.36 Other objectives were to forge links for 
equitable regional coordination, to mobilise resources for regional investment, and to secure 
international cooperation within its stated strategy of cooperation and economic liberation.37 It is 
clear from these objectives that the motive behind the formation of the SADCC was to defeat 
apartheid and to reduce Southern Africa’s economic dependence on South Africa. The SADCC 
is silent on the protection and promotion of human rights in the region – save for the pursuit of 
economic independence from South Africa. There is a relationship between economic growth 
and human rights. The protection and promotion of human rights, such as education and access 
to housing, requires resources which are difficult to access in low-income countries.38 Therefore, 
                                                          
34
   Saurombe 2010 (5) Journal of International Law and Technology 124; Viljoen International 
Human Rights Law in Africa 492; Lieberman ES “Organizational cloaking in Southern Africa, 
South Africa and the SADCC after apartheid transformation” (1997) available at  
http://www.princeton.edu/~esl/esl/papers_&_publications_files/Lieberman%20Organizational%20
Cloaking%20in%20Southern%20Africa.pdf (Date of use: 24 April 2012); Schoeman M “From 
SADCC to SADC and beyond: The politics of economic integration” available at 
http://www.alternativeregionalisms.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/07/schoemar_fromsadcctosadc.p
df  (Date of use: 24 April 2012). 
35
  See the SADC website http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/52 (Date of use: 24 April 2012). 
The SADCC was formed by nine countries namely; Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia became the SADCC’s tenth 
member. 
36
  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 492; Saurombe 2010 (5) Journal of International 
Law and Technology 124; Bowen 1990 Trocaire Development Review 33. 
37
  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 492. 
38
  McKay A and Vizard P “Rights and economic growth: Inevitable conflict or ‘common ground’?” 
available at http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4353.pdf 
(Date of use: 16 October 2015). 
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it was important for the SADCC countries to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa 
in order to grow their economies and fulfil the rights of their citizens. There is no gainsaying that 
the struggle against apartheid was simultaneously a broader call for human rights to be 
acknowledged, respected and promoted. 
During its existence, the SADCC was able to access external aid and embarked on several 
projects that were allocated39 to various SADCC member states.40 However, the attempts to 
realise its main objective of reversing the economic dependence of its members on South Africa 
failed.41 Various factors gave rise to a major challenge to the existence and functioning of the 
SADCC. For example, members of the SADCC were expected to provide funds for their 
coordination activities on behalf of the SADCC. Due to poverty and the lack of resources in 
many SADCC member states, certain sectors – for example, the human resources development 
sector which was the responsibility of Swaziland – were neglected.42 The organisation was 
largely dependent on donor funding sourced by the individual sectors for their specific 
projects.43 This raised problems of uneven performance in various sectors and different 
approaches to meeting the organisation’s objectives. It also opened the door to manipulation 
and undue influence by donors as they were, by implication, dealing with the SADCC on a 
bilateral basis.44 Furthermore, donors were reluctant to “provide financial assistance that they 
had pledged, because the relevant sectors did not have the capacity to utilize such aid, a 
problem that has also plagued the Southern African Development Community”.45 During this 
period clear signs that South Africa was rapidly moving towards democracy and the rule of law 
also started to emerge. In Saurombe’s words: 
                                                          
39
  Angola was responsible for Energy, Botswana was responsible for Livestock Production and 
Animal Disease Control, Lesotho was responsible for Tourism, Mozambique was responsible for 
Transport and Communications, Swaziland was responsible for Manpower Development, 
Tanzania was responsible for Industry and Trade, Zambia was responsible for Mining and 
Zimbabwe was responsible for Food Security. 
40
  Saurombe 2012 (5) Journal of International Law and Technology 125; Moyo Towards a 
Supranational Order for Southern Africa 53.  
41
  Schoeman http://www.alternative-regionalisms.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/07/schoemar_fromsadcctosadc.pdf (Date of use: 24 April 2012). 
42
  Schoeman http://www.alternative-regionalisms.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/07/schoemar_fromsadcctosadc.pdf (Date of use: 24 April 2012). 
43
  Schoeman http://www.alternative-regionalisms.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/07/schoemar_fromsadcctosadc.pdf (Date of use: 24 April 2012). 
44
  Schoeman http://www.alternative-regionalisms.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/07/schoemar_fromsadcctosadc.pdf (Date of use: 24 April 2012). 
45
  Schoeman http://www.alternative-regionalisms.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/07/schoemar_fromsadcctosadc.pdf (Date of use: 24 April 2012). 
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When it became clear, in the early 1990s, that a democratic South Africa was 
becoming an irreversible prospect, and against the background of changes in the 
global economy and severe droughts in the sub-region, the Heads of States of 
SADCC on 17 August 1992 turned SADCC into the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).
46
 
 
This was a positive development as it would be counterproductive to pursue economic 
independence from South Africa once apartheid had collapsed. Further, there was a need for 
the transformation of the SADCC by Southern African leaders so as to focus on new challenges 
facing the region, as opposed to pursuing economic independence alone. As a result of these 
developments, the SADCC was replaced by the SADC. 
 
3 SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
Following the demise of the SADCC, the Heads of State or Government of the SADCC met in 
Windhoek, Namibia, on 17 August 1992 and adopted the Treaty of the Southern African 
Development Community (the Treaty).47 The original 1992 Treaty was subsequently amended in 
2001.48 The Treaty was signed by the then ten member states of the SADCC and came into 
force on 5 October 1993 after having been ratified by all the member states.49 The SADC has a 
membership of fifteen states, namely: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Madagascar was suspended 
from the SADC over an unconstitutional change of government in March 2009.  
The SADC region has a population of 257,7 million inhabitants.50 Its vision is “that of a common 
future, a future within a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement 
of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice, and peace and security 
for the people of Southern Africa”.51 The SADC is an international organisation with legal 
                                                          
46
  Saurombe 2010 (5) Journal of International Law and Technology 125. 
47
  During the mid-1990’s, the SADC undertook a review and rationalisation process targeting, inter 
alia, the SADC’s decentralised model and the lack of clarity and specificity in its ambitions. This 
process resulted in the 2001 the SADC “Report and on the Review of the Operations of the 
SADC Institutions”. This was approved by the Summit in March 2001. The recommendations from 
the review report were incorporated in the Agreement Amending the Treaty of the SADC (AAT of 
the SADC). The AAT of the SADC became operational on 14 August 2001. See Saurombe 2010 
(5) Journal of International Law and Technology 125. 
48
  To avoid confusion, the study will not refer to the Amended SADC Treaty but will merely refer to it 
as the SADC Treaty. See Consolidated Text in Ebobrah and Tanoh Compendium 339. 
49
  Ebobrah and Tanoh Compendium 339. 
50
  Ebobrah and Tanoh Compendium 339. 
51
  See the SADC website http://www.sadc.int/ (Date of use: 05 November 2011). 
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personality.52 Article 4 of the Treaty sets out the principles in accordance with which the SADC 
and its member states ought to act.53 These principles are: (a) sovereign equality of all member 
states; (b) solidarity, peace and security; (c) human rights, democracy and the rule of law; (d) 
equity, balance and mutual benefit; and (e) peaceful settlement of disputes.  
 
The objectives of the SADC are found in article 5(1) of the Treaty and include: the promotion of 
sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development; the promotion of 
common political values, systems and other shared values transmitted through democratic, 
legitimate and effective institutions; the consolidation, defence and maintenance of democracy, 
peace, security and stability; and the promotion of self-sustaining development on the basis of 
collective self-reliance and the interdependence of member states.54 The SADC’s objectives are 
clearly more ambitious than the four goals of the SADCC. As was the case with the SADCC, the 
protection of human rights is not included in the objectives of the SADC. However, it can be 
argued that by requiring SADC member states to act in accordance with the principles of human 
rights, democracy, and the rule of law, the Treaty gives the Tribunal a mandate to hear human 
rights issues. The reasons for this are discussed in Chapter 2 where I examine the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal in detail.  
 
4  SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS 
The drafters of the Treaty realised that for the proper functioning of the SADC, there was a need 
for supporting institutions within the SADC structure. Chapter 5 of the Treaty provides for the 
establishment of various institutions, namely:  
(a) the Summit of Heads of State or Government; 
(b) the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security;  
(c) the Council of Ministers;  
(d) the Integrated Committee of Ministries;  
(e) the Standing Committee of Officials;  
(f) the Secretariat;  
(g) the Tribunal; and  
(h) the SADC National Committees.
55
  
 
                                                          
52
  Article 3 of the SADC Treaty.  
53
   Ebobrah and Tanoh Compendium 339. 
54
   Ebobrah and Tanoh Compendium 340-341.  
55
  Chapter 5, art 1 of the SADC Treaty. 
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These institutions perform various tasks necessary for the fulfilment of the Treaty objectives. 
This thesis focuses specifically on two institutions – the Summit of Heads of State or 
Government, and the SADC Tribunal. 
 
4.1  The Summit 
In terms of article 10 of the Treaty, the Summit is the supreme policy-making institution of the 
SADC and consists of the Heads of States or Government of all member states. The Summit is 
“responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC”.56 It also has 
the power to enact legal instruments to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the 
Treaty. The Summit is authorised to delegate such powers to the Council or any other institution 
of the SADC as it deems appropriate.57 The decisions of the Summit are taken by consensus 
and bind all member states.58 The Summit meets annually.59 It has the power to oversee that 
the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced by member states.   
The Summit, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, has unfortunately not been able to assist in 
executing and enforcing the judgments of the Tribunal. It has, as stated earlier, also adopted a 
silent approach to allegations of human rights violations in member states such as Zimbabwe 
and Swaziland. The Campbell case and other decisions that have been referred to the Summit 
for appropriate action against the government of Zimbabwe,60 remain unenforced. This study 
will offer certain proposals on how to make the Summit a more supportive institution for the 
Tribunal, as opposed to its current status as a largely powerless institution which makes 
minimal, if any, contribution to the effective functioning of the Tribunal. It also remains uncertain 
what should happen to unenforced decisions delivered by the Tribunal. Differently phrased: 
What is the status of the decided but unenforced decisions of the Tribunal? There would appear 
                                                          
56
  Article 10(2) of the SADC Treaty. 
57
  Article 10(3) of the SADC Treaty.  
58
  Article 10(8) of the SADC Treaty.  
59
  Article 10(7) of the SADC Treaty.  
60
  Fick and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe (SADC (T) 01/2010); [2010] SADCT 8 (16 July 2010); 
Kethusegile-Juru v Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC (T) 
02/2009); [2010] SADCT 7 (11 June 2010); Nixon Chirinda and Others v Mike Campbell (Pvt) 
Limited and Others (09/08); [2008] SADCT 1 (17 September 2008); Campbell v Republic of 
Zimbabwe SADC (T) 03/2009); [2009] SADCT 1 (5 June 2009); United Republic of Tanzania v 
Cimexpan (Mauritius) Ltd and Others (SADC (T) 01/2009); [2010] SADCT 5 (11 June 2010); Mike 
Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007); [2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 
2008); Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/07); [2007] SADCT 1 
(13 December 2007).   
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to be proposals that the Tribunal should finalise all partly-heard and pending cases,61 and that 
any decisions already taken by the Tribunal will remain valid and enforceable. What remains 
uncertain is whether the Council of Ministers and the Summit will adopt these proposals. These 
are some of the questions that the thesis will address. 
4.2 The Southern African Development Community Tribunal 
The drafters of the 1992 SADC Treaty envisaged the establishment of a Tribunal at some later 
stage. This is evident from article 9(f) of the Treaty which provides for the establishment of the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal, as envisaged in article 9(f) of the Treaty, was established as a SADC 
institution in 1992 in terms of article 2 of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol.62 The Summit of Heads of 
State or Government, acting under article 4(4) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol, appointed judges 
to the Tribunal in Gaborone, Botswana on 18 August 2005.63 The inauguration of the Tribunal 
and the swearing-in of judges took place on 18 November 2005 in Windhoek, Namibia.64 In 
terms of article 12 of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol, the Tribunal is empowered to appoint a 
Registrar and employ staff in order to perform its work. The Tribunal derives its role and powers 
from article 16(1) of the Treaty which provides: 
The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation 
of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon 
such disputes as may be referred to it. 
 
The role of the Tribunal is clearly set out above and anything outside these functions could be 
argued to fall beyond the scope and ambit of the Tribunal. The Tribunal only started functioning 
in 2007 after the appointment of the Registrar in 2006.65 As indicated above, in terms of article 
16(5) of the Treaty, and article 24(3) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol, the decisions of the Tribunal 
are final and binding on the parties to the dispute.66 The Tribunal is the court of final instance 
and its decisions are not subject to appeal.  
                                                          
61
  These are the views expressed by Lloyd Kuveya from the Southern African Litigation Centre at 
the Transitional Law Group Roundtable discussion on: “The role, responsibilities and terms of 
reference of the Southern African Development Community (SADC Tribunal)” held at the 
University of Pretoria on 13 March 2012.    
62
   Ruppel “Regional Economic Communities” 296.  
63
     Ruppel “Regional Economic Communities” 296.  
64
  Ruppel “Regional Economic Communities” 296. 
65
  Ebobrah 2009 (17) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 83. 
66
  See also art 32(3) of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal which provides: “Decisions of the 
Tribunal shall be binding upon the parties to the dispute in respect of that particular case and 
enforceable within the states concerned.” 
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After the complaints referred to the Summit by the Tribunal regarding non-compliance with its 
rulings by Zimbabwe, the Summit deferred action against Zimbabwe.67 This move resulted in 
Zimbabwe bringing a “politico-legal challenge” questioning the legal existence of the Tribunal.68 
In particular, in a report Zimbabwe challenged the existence and functioning of the Tribunal.69 
The main issue raised by Zimbabwe was the call for a review of the founding instruments of the 
Tribunal.70 It appears that the Summit acknowledged Zimbabwe’s concerns as it later called for 
the review of, inter alia, the role and functions of the Tribunal. 
This was followed by several developments which hindered the operation of the Tribunal, 
including an announcement that the lapsed tenure of the judges would not be renewed during 
the review process.71 According to Ebobrah, the move to suspend the Tribunal was in support of 
the request made by Zimbabwe for a review of the Tribunal’s responsibilities.72 This view is 
supported in that the Summit took no steps to compel Zimbabwe to comply with the Tribunal’s 
decisions, despite several requests from the Tribunal for it to do so.  
In an unprecedented move that sent shockwaves through the SADC region and beyond, the 
Summit decided to limit access to the new Tribunal to disputes between member states,73 so 
effectively preventing individuals from bringing cases before the Tribunal. The decision, by 
implication also means that the Tribunal is to remain dysfunctional.  
On 18 August 2014, the Summit confirmed its initial decision to limit access to the new Tribunal 
to disputes between member states, by adopting and signing the 2014 Protocol on the Tribunal 
in the Southern African Development Community at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.74 The 2014 
                                                          
67
  Ebobrah 2010 (4) Malawi Law Journal 200. 
68
  Ebobrah 2010 (4) Malawi Law Journal 200. 
69
  Ebobrah 2010 (4) Malawi Law Journal 200. 
70
  Ebobrah 2010 (4) Malawi Law Journal 201. 
71
  Ebobrah 2010 (4) Malawi Law Journal 202; SADC: Communiqué by the Southern African 
Development Community Heads of State, on the 30
th
 Jubilee SADC Summit (19/08/2010) 
available at http://www.zimeye.org/?p=20977 (Date of use: 24 May 2012); Request for Proposals 
for Provisions of Consultancy Services to the SADC Secretariat available at  
http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/790 (Date of use: 21 May 2012). The outcome of the 
review process and other developments which resulted in the suspension of the SADC Tribunal 
are discussed fully in Chapter 5. 
72
  Ebobrah 2010 (4) Malawi Law Journal 201. 
73
  Final Communique of the 32
nd 
Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/3413/4531/9049/Final_32nd_Summit_Communique_as_at_August_18_2
012.pdf (Date of use: 23 August 2012). 
74
  Hereinafter referred to as the 2014 Tribunal Protocol. A copy of the 2014 Protocol is on file with 
the author. Nine SADC countries have to date signed the 2014 Protocol. These states are 
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Protocol clearly states that the “Tribunal shall have jurisdiction on the interpretation of the SADC 
Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member States”.75 The Summit’s decision 
has serious implications for the protection of human rights in the sub-region. It also undermines 
the rule of law, democracy, and the protection of human rights in the SADC region. This is 
especially true where local mechanisms to address human rights complaints are ineffective, and 
further calls into serious question the emerging jurisprudence of the Tribunal on human rights 
issues. The recent developments mean that the “new” Tribunal’s jurisdiction will only be open to 
disputes between member states and not SADC citizens. This decision has been condemned 
by many commentators on the basis that it, inter alia, undermines human rights.76 Erasmus also 
raises valid concerns about the 2014 Tribunal Protocol, in relation to its silence on the 
transitional arrangements that will address existing issues, such as, pending cases, staff 
disputes and the enforcement of the Tribunal’s judgments. 77 
As individuals will in future have no access to the Tribunal, we must consider whether it is 
possible for one or more state to bring to the Tribunal, a case involving human rights violations 
against another state which has violated human rights.78 To determine whether this possibility 
exists, the principle of state reciprocity, which refers to the “interdependence of obligations 
assumed by participants within the legal schemes created by [inter alia] human rights law”, is 
discussed.79 Reciprocity is an important principle of international law “constituting the foundation 
of obligations between states” to enforce certain acceptable norms and/or agreements such as 
human rights treaties.80 These obligations are said to be reciprocal because their “creation, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, South Africa and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
75
  Article 33 of the 2014 Protocol. 
76
   Ndlovu R “Sadc Tribunal back with mandate reduced to interstate cases” available at 
 http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2014/08/20/sadc-tribunal-back-with-mandate-reduced-
to-interstate-cases (Date of use: 18 February 2016). 
77
  Erasmus G “The new Protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional changes and implications for 
SADC community law” available at http://www.tralac.org/images/docs/6900/us15wp012015-
erasmus-new-protocol-sadc-tribunal-20150123-fin.pdf (Date of use: 18 February 2016).  
78
  Henkin et al Human Rights 316. 
79
  Hallstrom P “The European Union-From reciprocity to loyalty” available at 
http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/39-5.pdf (Date of use: 14 October 2012); Provost 1994 (65) 
British Yearbook of International Law 383. 
80
  Parisi and Ghei 2003 (36) Cornell International Law Journal 1; Hallstrom 
http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/39-5.pdf (Date of use: 14 October 2012). 
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execution and termination depend on the imposition of connected obligations on others”.81 
Reciprocity is explored further in Chapter 3. 
4.2.1 Access to and jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal 
The Tribunal was constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the Treaty 
and its subsidiary instruments, and to adjudicate disputes referred to it.82 The 2000 Tribunal 
Protocol regulates access to the Tribunal and also sets out the basis for its jurisdiction. In 
particular, article 14 of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol fully sets out the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
which relates, inter alia, to the interpretation and application of the Treaty.83 
Before the Summit’s recent decision to deny individuals access to the Tribunal, article 15(1) of 
the 2000 Tribunal Protocol empowered the Tribunal to “have jurisdiction over disputes between 
States, and between natural or legal persons and States”. Article 15(2) required natural or legal 
persons to first exhaust local remedies before bringing an action against a state.84 Article 15(3) 
provides that “where a dispute is referred to the Tribunal by any party the consent of other 
parties to the dispute shall not be required”. It is therefore safe to suggest that disputes arising 
from the interpretation or application of the Treaty which cannot be resolved nationally, will be 
referred to the Tribunal.85 As of 2007, the Tribunal had received seventeen cases.86 Of these 
cases, none involved disputes between member states.87 Two of the cases involved labour 
disputes between employees and certain SADC institutions,88 while the remaining fifteen cases 
concerned disputes between natural or legal persons and individual member states.89 
According to Viljoen, the Tribunal was set up primarily to resolve disputes arising from closer 
economic and political unity rather than the protection of human rights.90 Ebobrah and others 
                                                          
81
  Provost 1994 (65) British Yearbook of International Law 383. 
82
   Article 16(1) of the SADC Treaty.  
83
  Article 14 of the SADC Treaty.  
84
  2000 Tribunal Protocol. 
85
  Article 32 of the SADC Treaty. 
86
  See Case Report for matters filed in the SADC Tribunal since 2007 to date available at 
http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/docs/CaseReport.pdf (Date of use: 24 April 2012); Ruppel “Regional 
Economic Communities” 296.  
87
  Ruppel “Regional Economic Communities” 296. 
88
  See for example, Ernest Francis Mtingwi v the SADC Secretariat (1/2007) [2008] SADC (T) (27 
May 2008). 
89
  Ruppel “Regional Economic Communities” 301. 
90
   Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 488. 
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have also taken the view that the Tribunal lacks a clear mandate on issues of human rights.91 
The views of these authors are supported only to the extent that the Tribunal was originally 
established to resolve economic disputes. However, this does not mean that the Tribunal was 
precluded from adjudicating human rights issues in that the preamble to the Treaty and its 
article 4(c) indeed refer to “human rights”.92 It must nonetheless be noted that the provision in 
the 2000 Tribunal Protocol which sets out its jurisdiction, makes no mention of jurisdiction over 
human rights.93 Despite this lacuna, the Tribunal has adopted a flexible approach and ruled in 
the Campbell case that it had jurisdiction to hear human rights cases. Zenda has noted with 
concern, the Tribunal’s reasoning on its competence to deal with human rights.94 Zenda’s 
concerns are fully addressed in Chapter 2.   
There are two schools of thought with regard to the interpretation of a treaty establishing an 
international organisation. The orthodox approach requires that the text of the treaty be narrowly 
interpreted so as to respect the sovereign rights of the member states and reflect the agreement 
at the time when the treaty was adopted.95 The flexible approach, on the other hand, allows an 
organisation to be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in its 
constituent document, are conferred upon it by necessary implication on the basis of their being 
essential to the performance of its duties.96 These different approaches are further explored in 
Chapter 2 where the preferred approach will be indicated as this may provide direction in 
answering the research question. 
A comparative study of the Tribunal – only to the extent that it is relevant to human rights 
jurisdiction – with the Economic Community of West African States’ Community Court of Justice, 
(ECOWAS CCJ), and the East African Court of Justice, will be useful in assessing how these 
sub-regional tribunals have dealt with human rights cases. The various and unique features of 
these tribunals will be helpful in formulating recommendations aimed at making the Tribunal an 
effective sub-regional tribunal for the SADC region.  This is discussed further in Chapter 2. 
                                                          
91
  Ebobrah 2009 (9) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 332; Murungi and 
Gallinetti 2010 (7) International Journal on Human Rights 119; Nkhata 2012 (20) African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 87. 
92
   Article 4(c) contains principles to the SADC Treaty. 
93
   Article 15(1) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol in part provides: “The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction 
over disputes between States, and between natural or legal persons and States.”  
94
  Zenda SADC Tribunal and Judicial Settlement 41.  
95
  Capps et al Asserting Jurisdiction 129; Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 651. 
96
  Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ 
Reports at 182 (hereafter the Reparation case). 
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 4.2.2 Relationship between community law and national law  
The Tribunal Protocol provides an operational sphere by guiding the Tribunal on the law it must 
apply in its day-to-day business. The Tribunal Protocol requires the Tribunal, when adjudicating 
cases, to apply the Treaty, its Protocols, and all subsidiary instruments adopted by the Summit, 
by the Council, or by any other institution or organ of the Community pursuant to the Treaty or 
protocols.97 The Tribunal Protocol further obliges the Tribunal to “develop its own Community 
jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public 
international law, and any rules and principles of the law of States”.98 These provisions were 
useful during the early stages of the Tribunal when it had developed no jurisprudence of its own. 
It was therefore necessary for the drafters of the Tribunal Protocol to provide it with an 
operational framework to assist in the development of its jurisprudence. In particular, it was to 
have regard to the law of individual states. 
Even though the 2000 Tribunal Protocol gives the Tribunal the power to develop its own 
jurisprudence, there is nothing in the Treaty or the 2000 Tribunal Protocol which provides or 
clarifies the nature of the relationship between SADC Community law and national law. This gap 
may cause a problem when a conflict arises between the two systems of law. Olivier and others 
have taken the view that in closing this gap, the Tribunal may use the provisions of article 21 of 
the 2000 Tribunal Protocol and seek guidance from the jurisprudence of other regional or 
international courts or tribunals.99 Moyo considers that even though the Treaty does not contain 
a supremacy clause, it is clear that SADC norms constitute a higher law.100 He submits that 
where there is a conflict between member states’ national law and SADC law, SADC law should 
be preferred.101 In support of his views, Moyo points out that: 
 
The SADC Treaty expressly prohibits member states from taking any measures 
(including the passing of legislation) which jeopardises the implementation of SADC 
treaties. This appears to be an express statement that as long as SADC has legislated 
in a specific area, member states may not partake of [in] any measures whose effect 
will be to derogate from such.
102
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  Article 21(a) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol.  
98
  Article 21(b) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol. 
99
  Ruppel et al “Regional Integration” 18. 
100
  Moyo Towards a Supranational Order for Southern Africa available at 
http://www.duo.uio.no/publ/jus/2008/84111/KHULEKANIxMASTERSxxTHESIS.pdf (Date of use: 
28 June 2012). 
101
  Moyo http://www.duo.uio.no/publ/jus/2008/84111/KHULEKANIxMASTERSxxTHESIS.pdf (Date of 
use: 28 June 2012). 
102
  Moyo http://www.duo.uio.no/publ/jus/2008/84111/KHULEKANIxMASTERSxxTHESIS.pdf (Date of 
use: 28 June 2012). 
17 
 
He nonetheless concedes that “it would have been helpful though for the SADC Treaty to state 
expressly as to the relationship between national law and SADC law as such will be of 
assistance should there be a divergence between the national law and SADC law”.103 In the 
absence of a supremacy clause or a decision by the Tribunal clarifying the relation between 
national law and community law, there is a potential for conflict or confusion as to which law 
enjoys precedence. Generally, the constitutions of the countries indicate that they are supreme 
in the national sphere. However, when a state has international obligations, they may be 
affected in that a national law may not be invoked to evade international obligations.104 The 
nature of the relationship between national law and international law is explored in Chapter 4. 
 
In an attempt to find an answer to the relationship between SADC Community law and domestic 
law, I shall draw on the principle of subsidiarity as understood in the context of the European 
Union. The principle of subsidiarity appears somewhat illogical in that it “limits the state, yet 
empowers it and justifies it”.105 It also “limits intervention, yet requires it”.106 This it does by 
requiring that member states adopt national legislation unless there is a need to enact it at 
community level.107 In this regard, subsidiarity promotes the legitimacy of the legislation as it 
enforces democracy – something often lacking in international institutions – by requiring that the 
“decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the citizen”.108 Subsidiarity also protects 
state sovereignty against incursion by ever-increasing international and/or sub-regional 
institutions.109 In the context of the SADC region, this principle would assist in clarifying the 
nature of the relationship between SADC Community law and the national law of member 
states. This would be the case where the SADC member states were to be given an opportunity 
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to clarify the relationship between SADC Community law and national law through the adoption 
of an additional protocol. Leaving this up to each state, may result in legal uncertainty as to 
which law should prevail in cases of conflict.  
As Moyo has rightly observed, it would have been better had a supremacy clause been included 
in the SADC Treaty. There has, unfortunately, been no case before the Tribunal dealing 
specifically with the nature of the supremacy and/or relationship between SADC Community law 
and national law and so there is currently no guidance as to which law should prevail in the case 
of conflict.  Even though article 6(1) of the Treaty requires that member states should, inter alia, 
“refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance of its principles, the 
achievement of its objectives and implementation of the provisions of [the SADC] Treaty”, this 
does not appear to mean that SADC Community law is superior to national law. What the 
provision does is to prevent member states from taking any action that would defeat the 
objectives of the Treaty, but it remains silent on supremacy. Furthermore, as far as I could 
establish, there is currently no SADC member state which has adopted national legislation 
clarifying the nature of the relationship between SADC Community law and its national 
constitution. The doctrine of supremacy110 of European community law over national law that 
has been developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice may provide 
guidance when a conflict arises between SADC Community law and national law. The principles 
of direct application and direct effect, which are discussed in Chapter 4, as developed by the 
European Court of Justice will be useful in this regard.  
The Court of Justice of the European Union (the European Court of Justice) was originally 
established in 1952 under the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community111 to 
implement the legal framework of the European Coal and Steel Community. In cases of conflict 
between European Union community law and the national law of member states, the European 
Union community law will prevail.112 Generally, member states have a good record of 
compliance with the decisions of the European Court of Justice.113 In Chapter 4 I consequently 
                                                          
110
  Ferreira-Snyman 2009 (42) The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
201. 
111
  The ECSC Treaty was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951 and became operational on 24 July 1952. 
It was meant to be valid for 50 years and thus expired on 23 July 2002. 
112
  Costa v ENEL (Case 6/64) [1964] ECR 585. 
113
  Garrubba CJ and Gabel M “Do governments sway European Court of Justice decision-making?: 
Evidence from governments court briefs” available at http://www.ifigr.org/workshop/fall05/gabel-
workshop.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2012). 
19 
 
consider the current functioning of the European Court of Justice and the relationship between 
community law and national law to the extent relevant to this study. 
The Treaty Establishing the East African Community may also be useful as it captures the 
nature of the relationship between community law and national law. In particular, article 8(4) 
states that: “Community organs, institutions and laws shall take precedence over similar 
national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Treaty”.114 These provisions 
are useful as they offer guidance on what should happen in the event of a conflict between the 
community law and national law. 
5 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Tribunal was first faced with a human rights case in 2007 when it adjudicated the Campbell 
case.115 The applicant in this case brought an action before the Tribunal for interim relief 
alleging, inter alia, that the acquisition of agricultural land by the respondent (Zimbabwe) was 
discriminatory as it targeted only white Zimbabwean farmers. The Tribunal ruled in favour of the 
applicant. The decision has been hailed by many as a significant achievement in the protection 
of human rights and in upholding the rule of law in the SADC region.116 Unfortunately, the 
enforcement of the Campbell decision is yet to happen. The difficulties surrounding the 
implementation of all Tribunal judgments eventually resulted in SADC member states restricting 
access to the Tribunal to disputes between member states.117 As a result, individuals can no 
longer bring cases before the Tribunal.118 This study is thus important because it will investigate 
whether regional economic communities should allow access to individuals and whether they 
should be given more a precise mandate and jurisdiction to hear human rights cases. An 
effective enforcement mechanism for the Tribunal’s decisions, based primarily on the 
experiences of the suspended Tribunal, will also be considered. 
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The Tribunal was created to act as an institution for the enforcement of economic disputes and 
did not have a clear mandate or jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights matters. It was also 
unable to enforce its decisions and this rendered it a toothless sub-regional judicial body. In the 
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others, litigants resorted to enforcing the 
judgments of the Tribunal in the South African jurisdiction, as opposed to where the violation 
had occurred (Zimbabwe).119 On the one hand, it may be argued that this is contrary to the 
provisions of article 32(3) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol which provides that “decisions of the 
Tribunal shall be binding upon the parties to the dispute in respect of that particular case and 
enforceable within the territories of the States concerned”. On the other hand, it may be 
contended that South Africa acted in compliance with article 32(2) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol 
which requires, inter alia, that SADC members take all the necessary measures to ensure the 
execution of the decisions of the Tribunal. Whatever the case may be, any non-compliance with 
the decisions of the Tribunal is a clear violation of article 32(3) of the 2000 Tribunal’s Protocol 
as explained above. 
The lack of a mechanism to enforce the judgments of the Tribunal relates to two issues: 
(a) the absence of a SADC Protocol on Human Rights which provides clear provisions 
governing the protection of human rights; and  
(b) that the rules of civil procedure for the registration and enforcement of foreign 
judgments may be used to implement the Tribunal’s decisions.120  
The first issue raises questions of jurisdiction over human rights. The Tribunal still has an 
unfulfilled obligation to eliminate the controversy surrounding its assumed jurisdiction over 
human rights by articulating how the principle in article 4(c) of the Treaty empowers it to 
adjudicate human rights cases.121 It is not clear whether the provisions of article 4(c) impose 
obligations on SADC member states as regards human rights.122  An explanation must also be 
sought for why the Tribunal elected to rely on international law sources to found jurisdiction, in 
preference to the 2000 Tribunal Protocol.  
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The second issue is problematic because it requires a litigant who has been successful before 
the Tribunal to undertake a further legal process and approach a national court for the 
recognition and enforcement of the Tribunal’s decision. In Gramara v the Republic of Zimbabwe, 
the High Court of Zimbabwe declined to register the judgments because it considered that there 
were, inter alia, legal and practical consequences in recognising and enforcing the Tribunal’s 
judgments.123 The High Court of Zimbabwe nonetheless recognised that it was under an 
international obligation to enforce the judgments of the Tribunal. The procedure for the 
registration of foreign judgments that should be followed at national level raises its own 
demands as the applicant is required to meet several requirements before the community 
judgment can be recognised and enforced.124 The conditions, inter alia, require that that the 
judgment delivered must have been final and conclusive, and that the recognition and 
enforcement of the judgment would not be against public policy.125 This is tantamount to 
bringing a new court application at the national level in addition to the one finalised by the 
Tribunal. This may further constitute a bar to those who lack the economic means to have the 
community judgment recognised at the national level. The SADC countries signed the Treaty 
voluntarily and agreed not to act in any manner that would defeat the purposes of the Treaty.126 
By doing so, SADC countries have to a certain extent limited their state sovereignty. As a result 
of the undertakings, it can further be argued that the decisions of the Tribunal ought to be 
directly enforceable in national courts. Contrary to this, the Zimbabwean government’s 
reluctance to respect and comply with the ruling in the Campbell case shows that some states 
are unwilling to “surrender some aspects of their sovereignty to SADC”.127  
The procedure for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment appears to have 
traditionally aimed at enforcing monetary judgments as opposed to human rights judgments, 
such as the Campbell case where the Tribunal ordered respect for and protection of human 
rights.128 Therefore, it appears that the Tribunal’s decision requiring a member state to take all 
necessary measures, through its agents, to protect the possession, occupation and ownership 
of the lands of an individual (as in the Campbell case129), will be excluded by the current 
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procedure for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.130 Furthermore, the 
procedure for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in national courts, as seen 
in cases such as Campbell, appears to depend on the willingness of the member state or 
national courts to recognise and enforce the Tribunal’s judgments. This may not help the victims 
of human rights violations, especially when it comes to states that are reluctant to respect 
human rights and the rule of law. As observed by Oppong, there is a need for SADC member 
states to create a “new and special regime” that will enforce the Tribunal’s decisions on the 
national level in SADC states.131 Oppong’s view is supported because it proposes a new model 
for enforcing the Tribunal’s decisions. The thesis will investigate how the Tribunal’s decisions 
should be enforced in the national courts of all SADC member states.  
The Tribunal had no machinery to order compliance with its decisions. The only mechanism in 
place was that “any failure by a State to comply with a decision of the Tribunal may be referred 
to the Tribunal by any party concerned”.132 Where the Tribunal finds that there has indeed been 
non-compliance with its ruling, the Tribunal Protocol mandates it to refer the matter to the 
Summit of Heads of States or Government for appropriate action.133 The Summit has, however, 
not been effective in enforcing the Tribunal’s judgments. 
In Gondo v The Republic of Zimbabwe, the applicants were victims of acts of violence by the 
National Police and National Army of the Republic of Zimbabwe.134 They were successful in 
seeking remedies before the national courts of Zimbabwe and were awarded damages for the 
violence suffered at the hands of the respondent’s security agents.135 However, the respondent 
failed to comply with the orders of its courts. The applicants were unable to enforce the 
judgment because section 5(2)136 of the State Liability Act prevented the execution of judgments 
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against the respondent’s property. The applicants therefore approached the Tribunal and 
challenged section 5(2) of the State Liability Act on the basis that it was incompatible with the 
respondent’s obligation under articles 4(c) and 6(1)137 of the Treaty, because section 5(2) of the 
Act prevented the respondent from ensuring that effective remedies were available to the 
applicants. The Tribunal held that section 5(2) of the State Liability Act violated, inter alia, the 
rule of law, and was therefore contrary to the fundamental rights and the right to an effective 
remedy.138 There is no doubt that, in theory, the Tribunal’s decision provided a remedy for the 
applicant. Unfortunately, the ruling was not implemented and the applicant did not benefit in any 
tangible way. The Gondo ruling raises issues specifically as regards the impact of the decision 
in other SADC countries with similar legislation. For example, what would the impact of a 
Tribunal decision be on other states not party to the proceedings, especially in view of article 
32(2) of the Tribunal Protocol which provides that the decisions of the Tribunal bind only the 
parties to the particular case and are enforceable only within the territories of those states? It is 
therefore necessary to examine whether the Tribunal’s decisions are binding on states involved 
in the dispute, or whether its decisions should be binding on all the SADC member states. 
Assuming that the decisions of the Tribunal enjoy a status superior to that of national courts, 
would the doctrine of precedent (in the sense that lower courts are bound by the decisions of 
higher courts) result in a decision initially issued against Zimbabwe, binding the entire SADC 
region? These are some of the difficult questions that this study seeks to address. 
 
6 RESEARCH QUESTION 
In view of the above exposition, the research question may be formulated in the following terms: 
“Does the SADC Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights issues and if so, how 
should its judgments be enforced and how would the enforcement of these judgments impact on 
state sovereignty?” In answering this question attention will be paid to the following sub-
questions. 
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(a) Whether Tribunal decisions are to be regarded as foreign judgments, or whether they 
must be regarded as decisions of a sub-regional court that are directly enforceable in 
national courts without following the procedure for the registration and enforcement of 
foreign judgments on the basis of the state involved’s international obligations arising 
from the relevant SADC instruments it has signed or ratified. 
 
(b) What is the relationship between SADC Community law and national law? 
 
(c)  Whether the judgments of the Tribunal should be directly enforceable in the national 
courts of the parties to the dispute (without the need to follow the procedure for foreign 
judgments). 
(d) Whether the decisions of the Tribunal should be binding on all SADC Treaty member 
states (and not only parties to the dispute) and enforceable in these states’ national 
courts. 
(e) Can a SADC country (eg South Africa) recognise the Tribunal’s ruling in its own 
jurisdiction and order the execution of a judgment against another SADC country (eg 
Zimbabwe) and what implications does this hold for state sovereignty? 
 
The approach undertaken in answering the research question and sub-questions is outlined in 
the summary of the individual chapters. 
 
7  SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The scope of the thesis covers issues relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the enforcement 
of its decisions in national courts, and the implications this holds for state sovereignty. To the 
extent necessary, I compare the ECOWAS CCJ, the East African Court of Justice, and the 
European Court of Justice in order to establish best practice with regard to jurisdiction over 
human rights cases and the enforcement of decisions. 
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8 METHODOLOGY 
A detailed review, critical analysis, and interpretation of the SADC treaties and protocols relating 
to the Tribunal, case law, and academic literature is conducted. Reliance on relevant 
international human rights law forms part of this study. Because of existing sub-regional courts 
on the African continent – such as the East African Court of Justice and the ECOWAS CCJ – I 
evaluate, where relevant, the work of these sub-regional courts and ascertain how they have 
dealt with jurisdiction over human rights and the enforcement of judgments against member 
states. The relevant treaties and protocols are consulted. To establish best practice from other 
regions, I also, where relevant, refer to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Although I am 
mindful of the fact that the socio-political and legal context may be different in the European 
Union, the manner in which the ECJ dealt with state sovereignty and interpreted the status of 
Community law, may give direction to African courts on issues relating to regional integration.  
9 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
The current chapter is followed by Chapter 2 which provides a background to and an evaluation 
of the current status of the Tribunal. The chapter addresses and evaluates the Tribunal’s 
assumed competence to adjudicate human rights issues. It also considers the general principles 
of international law to establish what guidance they offer when a treaty is silent or overly broad 
as to a specific mandate or the obligations of an international organisation. The point of 
departure is to examine the Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol better to understand the precise 
role and scope of the Tribunal. To this end, reference to the ECOWAS CCJ, the East African 
Court of Justice, and the European Court of Justice are useful in establishing how the two sub-
regional and the regional court have been empowered to receive and decide on human rights 
issues. It is important to establish whether on their inception, the two sub-regional courts had a 
clear mandate over human rights. If not, we need to investigate how they grappled with and 
assumed jurisdiction over human rights cases. It is also important to evaluate some of the initial 
cases brought before the Tribunal which triggered the claim of human rights violations and so to 
establish how these claims were handled as regards jurisdiction. This compels an extensive 
consideration of the nature of express vis-à-vis implied mandates of the Tribunal and other 
tribunals. Insofar as it proves relevant, reference is made to the European Court of Justice to 
establish best practice which will, it is hoped, make the Tribunal more effective in the future. 
There is no doubt that good practice from other sub-regional and regional tribunals is useful in 
making an effective Tribunal a reality. 
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In Chapter 3 I discuss the concept of state sovereignty from the Treaty of Westphalia and post- 
1945. In particular, I consider how the understanding of state sovereignty has evolved and been 
affected by human rights and jus cogens norms. Further, humanitarian intervention and the 
immunity of heads of states are explored in light of the developments in international criminal 
law, and I consider whether a state can rely on the principle of state sovereignty to refuse to 
comply with the judgment of a sub-regional court upholding human rights. A further question is 
whether a foreign country, such as South Africa, can order the execution of judgment against 
another SADC state (Zimbabwe in our case) despite the fact that the violation of the rights 
complained of occurred within Zimbabwean territory. This entails the application of reciprocity in 
human rights treaties. Developments in international law have impacted on state sovereignty 
including that of member states. Accordingly, I examine whether by becoming parties to the 
Treaty and Tribunal Protocol, Southern African states have surrendered a part of their 
sovereignty. 
In Chapter 4 I review the nature of the relationship between SADC Community law and national 
law. The Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol are silent on this point. Ruppel has asked whether “in 
the event that there is a conflict between community law and domestic laws of member states, 
which law should prevail?”139 An analogous problem presented itself in the Campbell case 
where, on the one hand, the supreme law of Zimbabwe authorised expropriation of land without 
compensation.140 On the other hand, the Tribunal had ruled that Zimbabwe’s national law 
violated the principles of SADC Community law, for example, that of equality.141 This needs to 
be clarified to avoid a similar situation in future. The answer depends on how an individual state 
incorporates international law in its national law. This, however, raises the further question of 
whether SADC Community law and international law mean one and the same thing?142 Hartley’s 
discussion of international and European Union law provides useful guidance where he states 
that “community law derives its legal validity from international law”.143 As the Tribunal is an 
international organisation, it is on these laws of international organisations that the Tribunal was 
founded. Hartley’s work on the relationship between community law and international law in the 
European Union is consequently useful in this study and the position in the European Union will 
therefore be discussed, where relevant. For example, South Africa follows a dualist approach 
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which perceives international and national law as two distinct systems of law.144 In terms of this 
theory, international law may only be applied by national courts if transformed into national law 
through legislation.145 The monist theory, on the other hand, views international law and national 
law as forming part of as a single system of law.146 As a result, international law does not need 
to be transformed into national law as the act of ratifying an international treaty immediately 
incorporates the law into national law. It is therefore necessary to discuss both the monist and 
the dualist theories of international law to establish how SADC member states incorporate 
international law in their national law and the status of international law in their national systems. 
The East African Court of Justice and the ECOWAS CCJ are useful as the Treaty Establishing 
the East African Court of Justice contains a provision dealing with the relationship between 
national law and community law147 while the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS also provides that the 
community legal system exists because member states have ceded a certain portion of their 
sovereignty.148   
The relationship between the Tribunal and national courts is also discussed. In coming to the 
conclusion that the Tribunal is not recognised by the Zimbabwean Constitution as superior to 
the national courts in Zimbabwe, Gorowa J held in Etheredge v Minister of National Security, 
that the Tribunal Protocol was silent as to the nature of the relationship between the Tribunal 
and the domestic courts of SADC member states.149 She went further to hold that if it was the 
intention to elevate the Tribunal to a status superior to the national courts of SADC member 
states, this intention would have been clearly stated. This question cannot be taken lightly as it 
triggers pertinent questions as to the relationship between the Tribunal and national courts. I 
therefore also explore whether decisions of the Tribunal enjoy a status superior to national court 
decisions? For example, what would happen if a national court were to uphold a particular law, 
and the Tribunal were to invalidate that same law?  
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In answering this question, I consider how the ECOWAS CCJ, East African Court of Justice,150 
and the European Court of Justice have approached the principle of state sovereignty, in 
particular with regard to the relationship between community and national courts, as well as 
community and national law. Finally, I evaluate whether Tribunal decisions ought to be superior 
to national decisions and thus be directly enforceable in the national  courts of all member 
states, and whether there is a future need to regard the decisions of the Tribunal as foreign 
judgments as provided for in article 32(1) of the Tribunal Protocol. In the alternative, I ask 
whether the decisions of the Tribunal should be regarded as national judgments 
accommodating both monetary and non-monetary orders. 
In Chapter 5 compliance with and enforcement of judgments of international tribunals, such as 
the SADC Tribunal, are considered. It is necessary to discuss and analyse the Tribunal’s human 
rights’ decisions to establish whether or not there has been compliance with the decisions. If 
not, it becomes necessary to enquire into the status of the decisions in the light of the 
suspension of the Tribunal. The factors that led up to the suspension, such as the political 
challenge by the Republic of Zimbabwe claiming that the Tribunal Protocol had not formally 
entered into force and was consequently not binding on member states who had not expressed 
their intention to be bound by it, are considered; as is the question of whether the Treaty and 
Tribunal Protocol contain any provisions authorising the suspension of the Tribunal in any given 
situation. If not, the question is then whether there was any legal basis for the Summit to 
dissolve/suspend the Tribunal. The consequences (if any) of the continued non-operation of the 
Tribunal are also explored.  
The issue of pending cases also demands attention. In particular, whether the litigants should 
be advised to withdraw their cases or whether they will be heard at some future stage. This 
raises the issue of what remedy is available to victims of human rights violations whose cases 
were pending before the Tribunal when it was suspended. Can they approach another 
competent tribunal to seek redress whilst their cases are still before the defunct Tribunal, or is 
there nowhere for them to seek redress? This is arguably one of the most unique challenges 
facing a sub-regional tribunal and leaves those seeking justice in limbo. The study will further 
explore whether it could be argued that the suspension of the Tribunal violates the right of 
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access to courts as contained in regional and international instruments. To learn from other 
jurisdictions, I shall, to the extent relevant, tap into the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice and establish how it has dealt with the enforcement of its judgments.  
In Chapter 6 I present my conclusions together with a summary of key findings of the study, and 
offer recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2 
POWERS OF INTERNATIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR 
JUDICIAL ORGANS 
1 THE CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION 
Since the establishment of the International Court of Justice in 1920, the international 
community has seen the establishment of various international,1 regional,2 and sub-regional3 
tribunals with differing mandates. International law is dynamic and ever-changing. So too, the 
“international court [and the SADC sub-regional] order is fragile, complex and inadequate for 
modern needs”.4 It is therefore pivotal that sub-regional tribunals are given express and precise 
jurisdiction5 to ensure that they are fully aware of the extent to which they can exercise the 
powers conferred upon them. 
Jurisdiction is a legal term meaning the power or competence of a tribunal to hear and 
adjudicate a legal issue.6 Jurisdiction creates the capacity to generate legal norms and to alter 
the position of those subject to such norms.7 It further relates to the power of a court to 
determine a case before it in terms of an instrument either creating it or defining its jurisdiction.8 
Van Zyl J has described jurisdiction as a power of the court to dispose of a legal issue between 
the parties before it. He further points out that this power may be limited by territory, amongst 
other things.9 According to Koroma, the “notion of jurisdiction is highly intertwined with the 
concept of competence”,10 and the two terms are often used interchangeably although there is 
                                                          
1
  For example, the International Criminal Court, the International Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, and the International Tribunal for Rwanda. 
2
   The European Court of Justice, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African 
Court of Justice, and the Inter- American Court of Human Rights, amongst others. 
3
  The Economic Community of West African States Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the 
ECOWAS CCJ), the Southern African Development Community Tribunal (hereafter the SADC 
Tribunal), and the East African Court of Justice. 
4
  Shabtai The Law and Practice of International Court 1920 – 2005 34. 
5
 The terms “power”, “mandate”, “competency” and “jurisdiction” will be used interchangeably in 
this chapter. 
6
   Capps et al Asserting Jurisdiction xix; Mgijima v Eastern Cape Appropriate Technology Unit & 
Another (2000) 21 ILJ 291 (Tk); Ewing McDonald & Co Ltd v M & M Products Co 1991 (1) SA 252 
(A) at 256G; Spencer 2006 (73) University of Chicago Law Review 617.  
7
  Alexy Theory of Constitutional Rights 132. 
8
  Cheng International Courts and Tribunals 259. 
9
  Mgijima v Eastern Cape Appropriate Technology Unit & Another (2000) 21 ILJ 291 (Tk) 296 E-H. 
10
  Koroma “Assertion of Jurisdiction” 189.  
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literature indicating that they apply in different scenarios.11 Jurisdiction, therefore, means the 
capacity of a tribunal to decide a case and issue a final and binding judgment.12 Competence 
“adds to jurisdiction the notion of propriety”.13 What can be deduced from the above exposition 
is that a tribunal is not competent to act beyond its jurisdiction.14 As a result, any judgment by a 
tribunal which has acted beyond its jurisdiction, will be null and void.15  
The term “human rights jurisdiction” refers to the  power of a court to receive and adjudicate 
over cases brought by those who have  locus standi against the state (or corporations as 
specified in the constituent document) alleging that the state or corporation in question have 
violated a certain human rights treaty that the state has ratified.16 
 
In this chapter I discuss the jurisdiction and powers of the judicial organs of international 
organisations as contained in their founding documents, including where such founding 
documents are silent about certain mandates, such as that capacity to adjudicate human rights 
cases. A comparative analysis is undertaken to establish how the ECOWAS CCJ, and the East 
African Court of Justice have been mandated to adjudicate human rights cases. The doctrine of 
implied powers, coined by the International Court of Justice, is also considered, before I discuss 
the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal and ascertain whether it has been given the power to hear 
and decide issues involving human rights. 
2 JURISDICTION AND POWERS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
The constitution of an international organisation is the source of its authority and guides the 
organisation in the execution of its mandate.17 There are often problems associated with the 
powers of international organisations, as the competency and/or objectives of the organisation 
                                                          
11
  Koroma “Assertion of Jurisdiction” 189.  
12
  Rosenne Law and Practice 536. 
13
  Rosenne Law and Practice 536. 
14
  Cheng International Courts and Tribunals 259. 
15
   Reisman 1986 American Journal of International Law 128; See also Lewis & Marks v Middel 1904 
TS 291 and 303 where the then Supreme Court of the Transvaal stated that a “court must have 
jurisdiction for its judgment and/or order to be valid. If the court does not have jurisdiction its 
judgment and/or order is a nullity. No pronouncement to that effect is required. It is simply treated 
as such”. 
16
  Eno RW “The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 2002 (2) African 
Human Rights Law Journal 225-226 and 229.  
17
  Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 651; Bartels “Jurisdiction and applicable law 
 clauses” 115; Ebobrah “A critical analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS 
 Community Court of Justice” available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf (Date of 
 use: 26 June 2012). 
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are at times couched in broad terms in its constitutive document.18 This makes it necessary for 
the organisation’s tribunal to interpret the constitutive document in an attempt to provide clarity 
as to where the powers in dispute start and where they end. The International Court of Justice 
has adopted a “flexible approach” to the interpretation of the constitution of an international 
organisation.19 In doing so it has, by implication, conferred upon the United Nations powers 
“essential to the performance of its duties”.20 This has generated considerable controversy as it 
is said that it disregards the treaty obligations agreed upon by member states,21 and opens the 
way for the discussion of express and implied powers which follows.  
2.1  Express powers 
As mentioned above, international tribunals, including sub-regional tribunals, derive their powers 
from their respective treaties adopted by member states.22 In other words, the relevant treaties 
and/or protocols specify the nature and extent of the powers a tribunal may exercise. These 
powers are termed “express powers”. For this reason, in fulfilling its mandate, it appears that 
only powers explicitly contained in the treaty establishing a particular organisation can be 
exercised by the tribunal serving that organisation.23 The SADC Treaty, the 2000 Tribunal 
Protocol, and its Rules of Procedure24 are the sources of the current (suspended) Tribunal’s 
powers. In terms of the concept of express powers this means that in discharging its obligations, 
the Tribunal can only do what is set out in these two constitutive documents. From this, the 
proponents of express powers argue that any other activities not expressly provided for in the 
constituent documents, fall outside of the scope of the Tribunal’s work. Nkhata asserts that any 
attempt by an organisation to impose new obligations that are not in its founding instrument on 
its member states, would be an act falling beyond the powers originally given to the institution to 
interpret the treaty.25 In contrast, Brownlie acknowledges that the doctrine of implied powers 
                                                          
18
  Warbrick “Original intention and new world orders” 129.   
19
  Warbrick “Original intention and new world orders” 237; Reparation for Injuries suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ Reports 174 (hereafter the Reparation 
case). 
20
  Reparation case at 182. 
21
  Warbrick “Original intention and new world orders” 129. 
22
  See Sarooshi D “The powers of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals” available at 
http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/sarooshi_2.pdf (Date of use: 13 August 2012).    
23
  Ebobrah http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf (Date of use: 26 June 2012). 
24
   SADC Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure thereof (2000/2001) available at 
http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/163 (Date of use: 1 November 2011).   
25
  Nkhata 2012 (20) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 97. Campbell 1983 (32) 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 523. 
33 
 
may be used to interpret an organisation’s founding instrument.26 Brownlie’s view is tenable 
because the rigid approach advocated by proponents of the notion of express powers appears 
to be an obstacle to justice. For example, does it mean that when there is a dispute regarding 
the powers of a tribunal, such as the SADC Tribunal, the Tribunal cannot engage in an 
interpretative process that will provide a solution? Must the Tribunal refer the matter back to the 
member states for deliberation and consensus in order to provide clarity even though it is part of 
the Tribunal’s mandate to interpret and apply the provisions of the Treaty? If this is indeed that 
the case, it is clear that those who approach any tribunal seeking protection of their rights would 
have no immediate redress. 
In light of the above discussion, including the negative effect of a rigid interpretation of powers, 
the proponents of the notion of express powers would still maintain that for any of the tribunal’s 
decision(s) to be legitimate, the notion of express powers requires that it perform its duties 
within the scope of its authority as expressly set out in the constitutive document. Otherwise this 
may have a negative impact on the decision, especially if the ruling is regarded as falling 
beyond the power of the tribunal that issued it.27 Parties to a dispute may also be reluctant to 
abide by a decision issued by a tribunal whose jurisdiction is questionable28 in that it opens 
many doors for challenging the tribunal’s authority and may render its legitimacy doubtful in 
regard to a specific decision.29 
2.2  Implied powers 
In the absence of express powers in the constitutive instrument establishing a tribunal, that 
tribunal can resort to implied powers to establish the jurisdiction necessary for the organisation 
to fulfil its mandate.30 There is an obvious tension between the doctrines of implied and express 
powers. The former is more concerned with the protection of community interests, whereas the 
latter appears to cling to the old notion of state sovereignty.31 The test used to determine 
whether an international organisation has implied powers under international law, is “whether 
                                                          
26
  Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 651. 
27
  Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 (7) Human Rights Law Journal 132.  
28
  Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 (7) International Journal of Human Rights 132. 
29
  Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 (7) International Journal of Human Rights 132. 
30
  Katabazi & 21 Others v Secretary General of the East African Community and Another (Ref No 1  
of 2007) [2007] EACJ 3 (1 November 2007) (hereafter the Katabazi case); Mike Campbell (Pvt) 
Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) [2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 2008) at 23-26 
(hereafter the Campbell main case). Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 (7) International Journal on 
Human Rights 119; Ruppel “Regional economic communities” 307. 
31
  Klabbers International Institutional Law 6.  
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the exercise of the [implied] power is necessary for the attainment by the organisation of its 
object and purpose as specified in the constituent document”.32 The doctrine of implied powers 
is recognised by international law as it was developed by the International Court of Justice.33 
The four cases discussed below illustrate the application of the doctrine of implied powers by 
the International Court of Justice.  
2.2.1  The Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
In the Reparation case, the United Nations General Assembly requested an advisory opinion 
from the International Court of Justice on, inter alia, whether the United Nations had the 
capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible government for people who had 
died while in the service of the United Nations. The claim was brought with a view to obtaining 
the reparation due in respect of the damage caused to the victim, or to persons entitled to such 
reparations through the victim. The International Court of Justice first remarked that the United 
Nations Charter “does not expressly confer upon the Organisation the capacity to include, in its 
claim for reparation, damage caused to the victim or to persons entitled through him”.34 It then 
posed the following question: 
Whether the provisions of the Charter concerning the functions of the Organization, 
and the part played by its agents in the performance of those functions, imply for the 
Organization power to afford its agents the limited protection that would consist in the 
bringing of a claim on their behalf for reparation for damage suffered in such 
circumstances.
35
 
  
In response to this question, the International Court of Justice held that in terms of international 
law an organisation must be construed as having by implication been given the powers 
necessary for it to discharge its duties.36 This is so even if such powers are not expressly 
provided for in the constitutive document.37 Since this advisory opinion, the doctrine of implied 
                                                          
32
  Sarooshi available at http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/sarooshi_2.pdf (Date of use: 
13 August 2012). 
33
 Reparation case at 182. 
34
  Reparation case at 182. 
35
   Reparation case at 182. 
36
  Reparation case at 182. See also Reparation case at 180 where the Court said that: “Whereas a 
State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law, the 
rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend upon its purposes and 
functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice”. 
37
  Reparation case at 182. 
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powers has been applied in subsequent decisions of the International Court of Justice38 and is 
generally accepted in many jurisdictions.39  
2.2.2  Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict40 
This is one of the opinions in which the International Court of Justice again applied the doctrine 
of implied powers but reached a different conclusion. In the Nuclear Weapons case, the 
International Court of Justice was asked, inter alia, to give an advisory opinion on whether a 
state that used nuclear weapons (which may have an effect on health and the environment) 
during a war would be in breach of its obligations under international law and the constitution of 
the World Health Organisation, 1948.41 According to the Court, the starting point in identifying 
the duties of an international organisation is to have due regard to its constitution.42 The Court 
observed that international organisations are created by member states through the adoption of 
a constitutive document which sets out the function(s) of the organisation.  It considered the 
functions of the World Health Organisation as embodied in its constitution and concluded that 
none of the express powers refers to the legality of any activity hazardous to health, and that no 
functions of the World Health Organisation depend “upon the legality of the situations upon 
                                                          
38
  See for example, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the 
Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 ICJ Reports 151 (hereafter Certain Expenses of the United 
Nations case) where the Court determined at 159 that: “Since no such qualification is expressed 
in the text of the Charter, it could be read in, only if such qualification must necessarily be implied 
from the provisions of the Charter considered as a whole, or from some particular provision 
thereof which makes it unavoidable to do so in order to give effect to the Charter”. It is also worth 
noting that the constituent document of the European Union did not confer the European Union 
with international legal personality. However, the European Court of Justice has recognised that 
the European Union has competence to enter into international agreements even where express 
authorisation is absent from the constituent document. See Judgment of the Court of 31 March 
1971 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities. - 
European Agreement on Road Transport Case 22-70 para 16 where the Court said: “Such 
authority arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty - as in the case with Articles 
113 and 114 for tariff and trade agreements and with Article 238 for association agreements - but 
may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the 
framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions”. 
39
  Wouters J and De Man P “International organizations as law-makers” available at 
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp21-30/wp21.pdf (Date  
of use: 15 June 2013); Weiler JHH “Some preliminary remarks on the conferral by states of 
powers on international organizations” available at 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/03/030401.pdf (Date of use: 14 June 
2013); Rama-Montaldo 1970 (44) British Yearbook of International Law 124. 
40
  1996 ICJ Reports 226 at 226 (hereafter the Nuclear Weapons case). 
41
   Nuclear Weapons case at 68. 
42
   Nuclear Weapons case at 74. 
36 
 
which it must act”.43 It nonetheless recognised that an organisation may have subsidiary powers 
to enable it to achieve its objectives and that this is generally accepted under international law 
which allows an organisation to exercise implied powers.44 It further emphasised that 
“international organizations are subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, 
possess a general competence”.45 According to the court, international organisations are 
governed by the principle of speciality in that they are created by states and exercise their 
powers within restraints as mandated by states.46 Consequently, the powers given to 
international organisations are generally expressed in its constituent document or may be 
implied from the constitutive document provided that they are necessary for the performance of 
the organisation’s duties.47  
The court indicated that the UN Charter has provided a platform upon which international 
cooperation is comprehensively organised. This has been achieved by vesting the United 
Nations with general powers and then bringing it into relationships with a variety of other 
complementary organisations which enjoy sectoral powers.48 It further stated that the exercise 
of these powers by United Nations’ agencies is coordinated by the agreements concluded 
between the United Nations and each of its specialised organisations.49 Accordingly, the World 
Health Organisation’s Constitution cannot be interpreted by considering only the powers 
conferred on it; the “logic of the overall system” as envisaged by the UN Charter must also be 
considered.50 In addition, the court stated, inter alia, that in terms of the rules upon which the 
system is based – globally – the World Health Organisation has broad duties which are limited 
to the sphere of public health under the UN Charter. However, these activities cannot assume 
the responsibilities of other sectors within the United Nations system.51 It ultimately ruled that 
                                                          
43
  Nuclear Weapons case at 76. 
44
  Nuclear Weapons case at 79; see also Competence of the International Labour Organization to 
regulate, incidentally, the personal work of the employer, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Series B – No 13 
July 23
rd
, 1926 at 18 where the International Court of Justice said “…[i]t is not conceivable that 
they intended to prevent the Organization from drawing up and proposing measures essential to 
the accomplishment of that end [measures to ensure conducive working conditions and the 
protection of workers]…”. 
45
  Nuclear Weapons case at 78. 
46
         Nuclear Weapons case at 78 
47
  Nuclear Weapons case at 79; see also Reparation case at 57. 
48
  Nuclear Weapons case at 80. 
49
  Nuclear Weapons case at 80. 
50
  Nuclear Weapons case at 80. 
51
  Nuclear Weapons case at 80. 
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the request for an advisory opinion submitted to it by the World Health Organisation fell outside 
the ambit of the work of the Organisation as laid out in its constitutive document.52 
In this ruling the court reiterated the doctrine of implied powers and acknowledged its existence 
in instances where it can be appropriately applied. However, for the reasons indicated above, it 
found that the doctrine of implied powers did not apply in this case in that the World Health 
Organisation lacks competence to deal with issues involving nuclear weapons.  
2.2.3 Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the International Labour Organisation to 
regulate, incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer53 
In the Competence of the ILO case, the International Court of Justice was asked to consider 
whether it was within the ambit of the functions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to 
propose a law that was aimed directly at protecting certain employees when that same law had 
a direct impact on other employers who performed work of the same scope.54 The court 
examined various factors, such as the Preamble to the constitution of the ILO which requires the 
improvement of the working conditions and the protection of employees’ rights.55 It further 
highlighted that article 387 to the Treaty of Versailles declared that the ILO was created to 
promote the objectives provided for in the Preamble to the Treaty of Versailles.56 It then 
answered this question in the affirmative and held, inter alia, that the member states had 
intended to give the ILO broad powers to adopt measures to promote humane working 
conditions.57  
2.2.4  The Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter)58 
In the Certain Expenses of the United Nations case, the International Court of Justice was 
asked to consider whether expenditure authorised by various General Assembly resolutions 
constituted “expenses of the Organisation” within the meaning of article 17, paragraph 2, of the 
Charter of the United Nations.59 It answered the question in the affirmative and held, inter alia, 
                                                          
52
  Nuclear Weapons case at 81. 
53
  ICJ Series B – No 13 23 July 1926 (hereafter the Competence of the ILO case).  
54
  Nuclear Weapons case at 66. 
55
  Nuclear Weapons case at 14-15. 
56
  Competence of the International Labour Organization case at 14; see also Part XIII of the 
Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919 : Part XIII available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partxiii.asp  
(Date of use: 13 June 2013). 
57
  Competence of the ILO case at 18. See also Engström Constructing the Powers 29-30. 
58
  Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962 1962 ICJ Reports I59. 
59
  Certain Expenses of the United Nations case at 152. 
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that “…when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate 
for the fulfilment of one of the objectives of the United Nations, the presumption is that such 
action is not ultra vires the Organization”.60 As in the Reparations case, the International Court 
of Justice adopted a flexible approach in implying powers for the United Nations’ General 
Assembly. As observed by Akande,  the court has not only restricted itself to what is contained 
in particular provisions of its constitutive document, but has implied powers for the Organisation 
by considering its general purposes and  the conditions of international life.61  
This reasoning is persuasive and in line with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.62 In particular, articles 31(1) and (2), and 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties require, inter alia, that a treaty be interpreted in good faith and that words be 
given their ordinary meaning with reference to the objectives and purposes of the Vienna 
Convention. In addition, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also requires the 
Preamble to be considered during the process of interpretation. In other words, a treaty should 
not be interpreted selectively but should be read as a whole, including its Preamble.63  
From the above, it follows that actions of an organisation that can be shown to be necessary for 
the realisation of its objectives, fall within the competence of the organisation provided that they 
have not been expressly excluded.64  
3  JURISDICTION OVER HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA’S SUB-REGIONAL COURTS 
Africa’s sub-regional tribunals faced challenges regarding their human rights jurisdiction during 
their early stages of operation. The doctrine of implied powers as developed by the International 
Court of Justice has also been applied by some of the sub-regional tribunals in Africa. Here I 
consider how the ECOWAS CCJ, the East African Court of Justice, and the SADC Tribunal 
have grappled with the challenges regarding their competence to adjudicate issues involving 
human rights, especially where their constitutive documents are silent in this regard. 
                                                          
60
  Certain Expenses of the United Nations case at 168. 
61
  Akade 1998 (9) European Journal of International Law 446. 
62
  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679, entered into force 27 Jan 
1980. 
63
  Fitzmaurice 1957 (33) British Yearbook of International Law 208-209; Rogoff 1996 (11) American 
Journal of International Law and Policy 590. 
64
  Akade 1998 (9) European Journal of International Law 446; Phooko 2015 (18) Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 541. 
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3.1 The ECOWAS CCJ 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established by a treaty 
signed in Lagos on 28 May 1975 (Original ECOWAS Treaty).65 The Original ECOWAS Treaty 
made no reference to human rights.66 The treaty was revised and the revision signed on 24 July 
1993 (Revised ECOWAS Treaty).67 The Revised ECOWAS Treaty provides for the “recognition, 
promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights”.68 In addition, it provides for the 
establishment of the ECOWAS CCJ.69  
The ECOWAS CCJ was created by Protocol A/P.1/7/91 (Protocol) which was signed in Abuja, 
Nigeria on 6 July 1991 and entered into force after having been incorporated into the Revised 
ECOWAS Treaty on 5 November 1996.70 The ECOWAS CCJ became operational on 5 
November 2006. This Protocol71 did not, however, confer human rights jurisdiction and 
competence on the ECOWAS CCJ.72 The court was therefore not established as a forum for the 
adjudication of human rights cases73 but to settle economic disputes. This is clear from the fact 
that only member states had access to the tribunal and could bring any cases regarding the 
interpretation and application of ECOWAS treaties or protocols on behalf of their nationals.74  
3.1.1  Competence and jurisdiction of the ECOWAS CCJ 
The ECOWAS CCJ’s powers were first set out in the Revised ECOWAS Treaty which 
empowers the court to adjudicate disputes between member states, or between member states 
and ECOWAS institutions.75 In addition, the Protocol provides that a member state may institute 
                                                          
65
  Enabulele 2010 (12) International Community Law Review 111. 
66
  Ebobrah available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf (Date of use: 26 June 
2012); The Original Treaty of ECOWAS is available at 
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty (Date of use: 13 June 2013). 
67
   The Revised Treaty of ECOWAS available at 
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang=en  (Date of use: 22 November 
2012). 
68
  Article 4(g). 
69
  Articles 6(1)(e) and 15(1). 
70
  Enabulele 2010 (12) International Community Law Review 115. 
71
  A/P.1/7/91. The text of the Protocol is available at 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid= 
5 (Date of use: 13 June 2013). 
72
  Ebobrah 2009 (17) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 86. 
73
  Ebobrah 2007 (7) African Human Rights Law Journal 312; Alter et al 2013 (107) The American 
Journal of International Law 746. 
74
  Ebobrah 2009 (17) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 86. 
75
  See art 76(2) of Protocol A/P1/7/91. 
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proceedings on behalf of its nationals against another member state or ECOWAS institution as 
regards the interpretation and application of the provisions of the treaty.76 
In light of the above, it is clear that access to and the powers of the ECOWAS CCJ were initially 
limited to disputes between member states. Individuals had no direct access to the court. In 
Enabulele’s words, the jurisdiction of the court was narrow and influenced by the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, modelled on the traditional view of international law which only 
allows states access to a court.77  Expecting member states to bring human rights cases on 
behalf of their nationals is highly unlikely in that one cannot readily conceive of a state institution 
instituting a human rights case on behalf of its national, especially if that state is itself accused 
of the human rights violation. Even if another state could bring a case before the ECOWAS CCJ 
on behalf of an individual who is a national of a different state, this would probably also not 
happen for political and diplomatic reasons. Therefore, in both instances, the protection of 
individuals’ human rights is limited indirectly. 
To establish whether individuals could access the ECOWAS CCJ in a matter against their own 
state, a human rights case – Afolabi Olajide v Federal Republic of Nigeria78 – was brought 
before the court. In this case, a Nigerian businessman instituted action against the government 
of Nigeria challenging the closure by Nigeria of its common border with Benin in 2009. The 
plaintiff argued that the closure of the border negatively affected his business and was in 
violation of free movement of his person and goods as embodied the Revised ECOWAS Treaty 
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. As a result, he suffered financial 
damage. The defendant filed a preliminary objection claiming that the court had no jurisdiction 
and/or competence to hear the case.79  
The court ruled that under Protocol A/P1/7/91 only member states could bring cases before it. 
This decision has been criticised and labelled a retrogressive step in the protection of human 
rights.80 In Frank Ukor v Rachad Lalaye81 the plaintiff’s claim was also dismissed on the basis of 
the individual’s lack of standing to bring cases before the court. In this case the plaintiff sought 
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  Article 9. 
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  Enabulele 2010 (12) International Community Law Review 116; Gathii “The Under-Appreciated 
Jurisprudence of Africa’s Regional Trade Judiciaries” 2010 (12) Oregon Review of International 
Law 266. 
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  Olajide Afolabi v Fed Rep of Nigeria ECW/CCJ/APP/01/03, (2003) (hereafter the Olajide case). 
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  For a full discussion of the case, see Banjo 2007 (22) Africa Journal Online 69–87. 
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  Viljoen International Human Law Rights in Africa 507. 
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to challenge an order for seizure of his truck and the goods on the basis that it violated his 
fundamental right to the free movement of goods.  
It consequently appears that the ECOWAS CCJ has adopted a narrow interpretation of the 
Protocol by relying on the doctrine of express powers. This has resulted in individuals having no 
redress for the alleged human rights violations they may have suffered. Article 4(c) of the treaty 
provides, inter alia, for the “recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights 
in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”.82 From 
this, it may be construed that the court enjoys implied power to hear human rights matters.  
The jurisdiction over human rights was redefined when the Protocol83 was amended in 2005 by 
a Supplementary Protocol.84 Article 3 of Supplementary Protocol extends the jurisdiction and 
competence of the court by introducing a new article 9.85 Article 9(4) of the Supplementary 
Protocol empowers the ECOWAS CCJ to receive and adjudicate cases brought by individuals 
which involve alleged violations of human rights occurring in the territory of any member state.  
Since the expansion of the ECOWAS CCJ jurisdiction to cover human rights cases, the court 
has received and decided several such cases.86 The express and operational jurisdiction over 
the promotion and protection of human rights distinguishes the ECOWAS CCJ from the SADC 
Tribunal and the East African Court of Justice. It is interesting to note that the ECOWAS CCJ 
did not attempt to invoke the doctrine of implied powers to assume jurisdiction and competence 
over human rights in the Olajide and Ukor cases, despite the existence of persuasive judgments 
from the International Court of Justice regarding the application of the doctrine of implied 
powers. 
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3.2  The East African Court of Justice  
The Treaty Establishing the East African Community87 (Treaty Establishing the Community) was 
adopted in 1993 by three founding states: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.88 It establishes the 
East African Court of Justice as the judicial organ of the East African Community.89 The court 
commenced operation on 30 November 2000. 
3.2.1  Competence and jurisdiction of the East African Court of Justice 
The jurisdiction and competence of the East African Court of Justice is set out in the Treaty 
Establishing the Community. Article 27(1) of this treaty gives the East African Court of Justice 
initial jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the Treaty Establishing the East 
African Community. Article 27(2) of the Treaty Establishing the Community extends the 
jurisdiction of the court to human rights matters, subject to a future date to be determined by the 
Council. In order to trigger the operation of the human rights jurisdiction, member states are 
required to adopt an additional protocol that will give effect to article 27(2) of the Treaty 
Establishing the Community. No protocol has however yet been adopted to operationalise the 
jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate over human rights cases.  
However, the East African Court of Justice decided to hear human rights cases in the absence 
of the envisaged additional protocol.90 In the Katabazi case, twenty-one applicants charged, 
inter alia, with treason, were arrested and remanded in custody.91 The High Court of Uganda 
granted bail to fourteen of the accused. Soon after having granted bail, the court was 
surrounded by security personnel who interfered with the preparation of bail documents, re-
arrested the men, and returned them to jail.92 The applicants later appeared before a military 
court on similar charges93 and were remanded in custody. The Uganda Law Society 
approached the Constitutional Court of Uganda and challenged the security personnel’s 
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interference in the court process and the constitutionality of prosecuting the applicants in both 
civilian and military courts.94 The Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the Ugandan Law 
Society. However, the applicants (complainants) were not released from detention and the 
matter was brought before the East African Court of Justice.95  
In the East African Court of Justice, the applicants alleged, inter alia, the violation of the rule of 
law contrary to articles 7(2) and 8(1)(c) of the Treaty Establishing the East African Community.96 
The Attorney-General of the Republic of Uganda (second respondent) challenged the court’s 
jurisdiction to deal with human rights cases.97 In response the court stated that “[t]he quick 
answer is: No it does not have [jurisdiction]”.98 It further stated that: 
It is very clear that jurisdiction with respect to human rights requires a determination of 
the Council and a conclusion of a Protocol to that effect. Both of those steps have not 
been taken. It follows, therefore, that this Court may not adjudicate on disputes 
concerning violation of human rights per se.
99
  
Despite this negative response, the court further asserted that:  
While the court will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, it 
will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under Article 27(1) 
merely because the reference includes allegation of human rights violation.
100
 
It held that the intervention by the Ugandan armed security agents to prevent the execution 
of a court order violated both the principle of the rule of law and the Treaty Establishing the 
East African Community. In this case, despite a clear absence of jurisdiction101 over human 
rights, the Court opted to extend its powers to include implied powers in human rights cases 
based on the overall objectives (cooperation among member states)  and principles (such 
rule of law and the promotion and the protection of human and peoples’ rights) of the 
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treaty.102 This decision is commendable as it shows the ability of the court not to interpret 
selective provisions of a treaty, but rather to consider the overall objectives of the document 
as a whole. 
The Court’s decision in the Katabazi case has resulted in divergent views from various scholars 
as to the suitability of the Court to receive and entertain human rights cases. Some authors are 
of the view that the East African Court of Justice does not, pending the adoption of a protocol, 
enjoy jurisdiction over human rights.103 In this regard, Ruppel is of the view that the Court “lacks 
jurisdiction over human rights”.104 The implication of these viewpoints is that the Court cannot 
yet receive and adjudicate a human rights case.105 Viljoen has expressed the view that it is 
uncertain whether the court enjoys human rights jurisdiction, by indicating that the provision on 
the human rights mandate of the Court is imprecise as its jurisdiction “may be extended to 
human rights matters at some time in the future, when the members adopt a Protocol to [that] 
effect”.106 As Viljoen observes, the current factual situation in terms of the Treaty Establishing 
the Community is that the appellate human rights jurisdiction of the Court will be determined by 
the Council at some future date. It is therefore not clear whether this prevents the Court from 
hearing  human rights cases as there is nothing in the treaty which prevents it from exercising 
its powers, inter alia, to interpret and apply the treaty. Ebobrah is, however, of the view that the 
Tribunal does “not have an express human rights jurisdiction”.107  
In light of the above, the East African Court of Justice acted within the powers (to interpret and 
apply the Treaty Establishing the East African Community) conferred upon it by its constitutive 
treaty, when it decided to deal with human rights cases. Even though the Court stated that it did 
not have human rights jurisdiction, and that it could not merely assume such jurisdiction, 
through the interpretation of the treaty it found a legal basis on which to hear the case. This way 
of extending a tribunal’s jurisdiction is to be commended as it assists the courts to fulfil their 
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mandates speedily by reading-in the powers necessary for the fulfilment of the objectives of the 
treaty.  
3.3 The SADC Tribunal 
The Tribunal was established as a SADC institution in 1992 in terms of article 2 of the 2000 
Tribunal Protocol. In terms of this Protocol, access to the Tribunal is open to “disputes between 
States, and between natural or legal persons and States”.108 Individuals may only approach the 
Tribunal once they have exhausted local remedies.109 However, the Summit decided to limit 
access to the envisaged “new” SADC Tribunal when it resolved that a new Protocol on the 
Tribunal should be negotiated and that “its mandate should be confined to interpretation of the 
SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member States”.110 To this end, the 
2014 Protocol, which deals with inter-state disputes only, has been adopted. In contrast to 
article 15(1) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol which provided for access by individuals to the 
Tribunal, the limitation of access to member states only, indicates that the Tribunal has been 
stripped of any possibility of receiving individual cases dealing with allegations of human rights 
violations. The 2014 Protocol also does not determine whether the SADC member states may 
bring cases of allegations of human rights abuses on behalf of their citizens. As was pointed out 
above in discussing ECOWAS, states will in all probability not bring cases before the Tribunal 
on behalf of their nationals for alleged human rights abuses these very states have committed. 
3.3.1  Competence and jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal under the SADC Treaty and the 2000 
Tribunal Protocol 
 
The Tribunal’s powers and functions are set out in the Treaty which provides that a Tribunal 
shall be established to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of 
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the Treaty.111 In addition to this provision, article 14 of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol gives the 
Tribunal jurisdiction and competence over all disputes and applications referred to it in 
accordance with the Treaty and the Protocol which relate to: 
(a) the interpretation and application of the Treaty; 
(b) the interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols, all subsidiary  
     instruments adopted within the framework of the Community, and acts of    
     the institutions of the Community; 
(c) ...
112
 
 
As was already mentioned, a major shift from the aforesaid jurisdiction is that the jurisdictional 
clause contained in the 2014 Protocol has been curtailed, and shows a major and negative 
change from the jurisdiction of the suspended Tribunal. As will be discussed below, the 
suspended Tribunal had jurisdiction and competence over all disputes and applications referred 
to it in accordance with the Treaty and the 2000 Protocol which related to the interpretation and 
application of the Treaty, the interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols, all subsidiary 
instruments adopted within the framework of the Community, and acts of the institutions of the 
Community. The jurisdiction in article 33 of the 2014 Protocol is limited and provides that “the 
Tribunal shall have jurisdiction on the interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating 
to disputes between member states.” This means that other parties, such as individuals, 
including SADC officials, will have no access to the Tribunal. Further, article 33 of the 2014 
Protocol fails to indicate whether the Tribunal’s jurisdiction includes the competency to 
adjudicate over disputes involving the application and interpretation of the SADC Treaty, 
Protocols or all subsidiary instruments of SADC.113 This is something that was contained in the 
2000 Tribunal Protocol.114 
 
Notwithstanding this, plain reading of article 14 of the provisions of the Tribunal Protocol (quoted 
above) clearly sets out the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the extent to which such powers can 
be exercised. Although the Treaty is silent on the express human rights jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, it is submitted that it does not follow that anything outside of the powers here listed, 
falls beyond the scope and ambit of the work of the Tribunal. It is clear from the judgment in 
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Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe115 that the Tribunal applied the 
doctrine of implied powers in order to enable it to adjudicate human rights cases.  
 
It is important to note that the Treaty does indeed refer to human rights. A reference to human 
rights can be found in the Preamble to the Treaty which reads in part that member states are 
fully aware of the need to guarantee democratic rights and observe human rights and the rule of 
law.  In addition, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal applies to the interpretation and application of 
the Treaty. Reference to human rights is also found in article 4(c) of the Treaty which requires 
the SADC and its member states to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law.  
 
The doctrine of implied powers can also be brought into play to ensure that human rights are 
protected. Relying on the principles in article 4(c) of the Treaty, the Tribunal accepted a case 
involving violations of human rights in the matter between Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited and 
Another v Republic of Zimbabwe.116 In this case the applicants sought interim measures 
preventing the respondent (the government of Zimbabwe) from, inter alia, removing them from 
their farms pending the finalisation of the application in the “main” Campbell case which dealt 
with the acquisition of agricultural lands by the government. In addressing the issue of 
jurisdiction, the Tribunal indicated that its basis for jurisdiction over human rights emanated from 
article 4(c) of the Treaty and article 14(a) of the Tribunal Protocol which gives it jurisdiction over 
all disputes over the interpretation and application of the Treaty.117 According to the Tribunal’s 
analysis of article 4(c) of the Treaty which requires SADC member states to, inter alia, act in 
accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, SADC states, 
collectively and as individual member states, are under a legal obligation to respect and protect 
the human rights of SADC citizens.118 The Tribunal ruled in the applicant’s favour. 
 
The Tribunal also dealt extensively with the challenge to its human rights’ jurisdiction in the main 
Campbell case where the applicants challenged the compulsory acquisition of their agricultural 
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land by the Zimbabwean government.119 The acquisitions were made in accordance with the 
land-reform programme adopted by the respondent. In terms of section 16B of the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe “no compensation shall be payable for land referred to in paragraph (a) except for 
any improvements effected on such land before it was acquired”.120 The Constitution further 
ousted the jurisdiction of Zimbabwean courts to receive and hear any challenge to land 
acquisition.121 The applicants argued that the acquisition of their land breached the respondent’s 
obligations to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of 
law. In addition, they argued that the respondent violated its obligation under the Treaty not to 
discriminate against any person on the basis of, inter alia, race and that they had been denied 
access to the respondent’s domestic courts as a means of challenging the legality of the 
compulsory acquisition of their lands without compensation.122  
In response to the applicants’ submissions, the respondent argued that the Tribunal had no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a human rights case under the Treaty.123 To substantiate this claim, it 
claimed that the Treaty “only sets out the principles and objectives of SADC”.124 Therefore, 
according to the respondent, the Treaty failed to “set out the standards against which actions of 
Member States can be assessed”.125 It further argued that the Tribunal could not “borrow” these 
standards from other treaties as to do so would “amount to legislating on behalf of SADC 
Member States”.126 Relying on various protocols adopted under the Treaty, the respondent 
asserted that there is no protocol dealing with human rights or land reform.127 To give effect to 
the principles in the Treaty, the respondent claimed, there ought to be a protocol dealing with 
human rights and land reform.128 In addition, the respondent submitted that the Tribunal “is 
required to interpret what has already been set out by the Member States”.129 If the member 
states failed to set standards by which they could be held accountable, “the [SADC] Tribunal 
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appears to have no jurisdiction to rule on the validity or otherwise of the land reform programme 
carried out in Zimbabwe”.130 
In response to the challenge to its human rights jurisdiction, the Tribunal referred to article 21(b) 
of the Tribunal Protocol which empowers it to “develop its own Community jurisprudence 
through the use of applicable treaties, general principles, and rules of public international law 
and any rules and principles of the law of States”. According to the Tribunal, this provision 
directs it to consult other sources in order to find answers where the Treaty appears to be 
silent.131 The Tribunal further did not see the need for an additional protocol on human rights in 
order to give effect to the principles contained in the Treaty.132 In particular, in assuming 
jurisdiction over human rights, the Tribunal relied on principle 4(c) of the Treaty which requires 
member states to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law.133 According to the Tribunal, this provision gives it jurisdiction over of any human rights 
case.134 Put differently, the Tribunal read the Tribunal Protocol and the Preamble to the Treaty – 
including its objectives and the principles – together in order to establish the basis for its human 
rights jurisdiction.135 There would be no need for resorting to the doctrine of implied powers if all 
the founding treaties of an organisation were drafted with sufficient clarity. However, this is not 
the case. At times, it happens that the treaty and/or protocol establishing a tribunal is 
ambiguous as regards certain powers. As result, there is a need to apply a flexible 
interpretation. 
The reference in the Tribunal to article 21(b) of the Tribunal Protocol as the basis of its 
jurisdiction has merit because this article deals with the sources of law.136 Articles 21(b) and 
14(a) of the Tribunal Protocol are therefore interconnected. In terms of article 14(a) of the 
Tribunal Protocol, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over any dispute involving the interpretation and 
application of the Treaty. In order to interpret the Treaty and establish whether it has a human 
rights mandate, the Tribunal may consult other sources as per article 21(b) of the Tribunal 
Protocol. 
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There are different academic views regarding the Tribunal’s decision to hear the main Campbell 
case. According to Zenda, it was unnecessary for the Tribunal to refer to international law under 
article 21 of the Tribunal Protocol to support its findings on its competence to adjudicate human 
rights issues, as the basis for its jurisdiction lies in article 14 of the Tribunal Protocol.137 Zenda, 
therefore, disagreed with Zimbabwe’s contention that there was a need for a further protocol to 
trigger the application of the human rights provisions in the Treaty – the latter contained only 
objectives and principles which do not create obligations.138 Zenda argued further that there was 
no need for a further protocol on human rights to be in place before the Tribunal could enjoy 
jurisdiction, as the answer to whether the Treaty required an additional protocol before its 
provisions could be invoked, depends on whether it has direct effect. 139 In addition, Zenda avers 
that the content of certain of the notions of human rights, democracy and the rule of law “are 
sufficiently precise and unconditional to be capable of having direct effect”.140 However, 
according to him, democracy is a broad, political concept on which the SADC Tribunal was not 
well placed to rule.141 With regard to human rights, Zenda indicates, inter alia, that there is 
uncertainty as to other rights that may need to be protected in that certain states place greater 
emphasis on the economic rights, while others prioritise social and cultural rights in their laws.142  
In essence, his view is that the SADC should have adopted an additional protocol specifically 
indicating the scope of the rights that need to be protected in the SADC region.143 In his words, 
“what is more worrying is the Tribunal’s casual reference” to the concepts of human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law as if there is consensus as to their precise scope and 
meaning.144 According to him, the SADC Tribunal appears to have operated under the view that 
article 4(c) of the Treaty which refers to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, is binding 
on member states without the need for an additional instrument.145 In this light, Zenda is of the 
view that the Tribunal incorrectly stated that article 4(c) of the Treaty is the basis for its 
jurisdiction over human rights when in fact this provision does not confer jurisdiction on the 
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Tribunal.146 Instead, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is found in article 14 of the Tribunal 
Protocol.147 
However, it should be noted that the concepts human rights, democracy and the rule of law are 
interdependent and interrelated.148 At the very least, it is generally accepted that a democratic 
state must respect human rights including the rule of law. The concept of the rule of law, even 
though it has been approached from various angles, includes human rights.149 Therefore, the 
rule of law would be compromised where there is no observance of democratic principles such 
as human rights and access to courts.150 In addition, the idea that some states place greater 
emphasis on some rights than on others is difficult to comprehend.151 Human rights are 
indivisible, interrelated and interconnected.152 Therefore, they cannot be promoted in isolation 
from other rights. They need each other. They must all be treated equally and placed on the 
same footing and enjoy the same degree of recognition.153 For example, the right to decent 
housing ensures that people live with dignity. In this instance, the provision of an economic right 
also ensures the protection of human dignity. 
These views are, therefore, based on the mutual dependence described earlier in articles 21 
and 14 of the Tribunal Protocol. Article 21 deals with the interpretation of the Treaty. Therefore, 
it is submitted, the Tribunal correctly relied on article 4(c) of the Treaty to found jurisdiction, as 
this is the provision that had to be interpreted to establish whether its reference to human rights 
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was sufficient to give the Tribunal the power to adjudicate a human rights case and/or whether 
there were human rights’ obligations flowing from this article.154 
The reasoning of the Tribunal as regards human rights jurisdiction is set out by Johnson as 
follows: 
The SADC Tribunal stated, in effect, that because this case is being adjudicated on 
the premise of international law, and has elements of human rights, it has jurisdictional 
authority to hear the case; but just in case that wasn’t enough, it also has express 
authority based upon the reference to human rights in the SADC Treaty.
155
 
 
Relying on Fleshman,156 Johnson proceeds to explain that international courts are generally 
governed by a treaty, and the treaty provisions “govern the types of cases that can be heard 
and the international court’s jurisdiction of authority to hear cases”.157 The ruling in the main 
Campbell case, in particular the jurisdiction assumed over human rights, has generated 
considerable debate.158 Johnson’s reasoning, which claims that international tribunals are 
created by treaties, and the conventions govern the nature of cases that should be heard by 
these tribunals, aligns him with the proponents of the doctrine of express powers. In other 
words, he is of the view that anything that is not expressly contained in the treaty cannot be 
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read so as to create obligations binding on member states. It is, however, submitted that since 
the Treaty provides in article 4(c) that member states have the obligation to act in accordance 
with the principles of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy, the Tribunal, which has 
jurisdiction on issues relating to the interpretation and application of the Treaty, should by 
implication then have jurisdiction to adjudicate matters involving human rights.  
It may be argued that the omission of an express mandate over human rights in the Treaty and 
Tribunal Protocol does not necessarily suggest that member states did not envisage the 
inclusion of a human rights mandate in the current mandate of the suspended Tribunal. This 
exclusion could be read to mean that the drafters of the Treaty failed to reach consensus on the 
issue of human rights jurisdiction and therefore left it open for future determination.159 Ebobrah’s 
view on this is that “competency over human rights was not expressly granted to the SADC 
Tribunal despite provisions relating to human rights in the [SADC Treaty]”.160 In addition, 
Ebobrah has said that, by necessary implication, the Tribunal lacks the express human rights 
jurisdiction conferred on the ECOWAS CCJ.161 To support his submissions, he refers to the 
“proposed and rejected” efforts by a panel of legal experts162 in 1997 to grant the Tribunal a 
mandate over human rights cases.163  
Other authors are, however, of the view that this is not a significant concern as the Treaty refers 
to human rights in one way or another.164 In support of this contention, Ruppel makes the point 
that the objective of alleviating and eradicating poverty contributes, amongst others, to ensuring 
a decent standard of living and education.165 These are all human rights, contends Ruppel.166 
His comments are helpful and relate to the theory of implied powers. SADC member states 
would not achieve the objectives set out in the Treaty if they were to fail to ensure that 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are respected in their respective countries. It is 
submitted that the formulation of the provisions that refer to human rights in the Preamble to the 
Treaty are mandatory and empower the Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over human rights. In 
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addition, the Tribunal can adjudicate cases involving allegations of human rights abuse by 
relying on the general undertakings by member states in articles 6(1)167 and 5(c)168 of the 
Treaty. This is supported by the recent decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
where it ruled that the SADC Tribunal was, inter alia, created to adjudicate complaints relating to 
human rights.169  
Ebobrah argues that SADC member states are entitled to challenge the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to 
receive and decide human rights matters, since no agreement to grant the tribunal such powers 
was reached.170 It is, however, submitted that a state which has consented to act in accordance 
with the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law has, by implication, agreed 
that it can be brought before a sub-regional tribunal regarding claims of the violation of human 
rights. Were this not the case, the duty to act in accordance with the principles of human rights 
would be frustrated. Therefore, the view that it is within a member state’s right to refuse to abide 
by any order that purports to create implied obligations to which it did not expressly consent, is 
untenable.171 This may, however, have implications for state sovereignty.172 
According to Viljoen, the Tribunal was established primarily to resolve disputes arising from 
closer economic and political union rather than the protection of human rights.173 It is submitted 
that in the main Campbell decision the Tribunal acted within its powers when it assumed 
jurisdiction over human rights. Nkhata’s view is that the approach followed by the Tribunal is not 
persuasive if one adopts a strict positivistic reading of the Treaty.174 He argues further that it is 
problematic that the Tribunal avoided undertaking a precise and deliberate discussion on how it 
arrived at jurisdiction to hear a human rights case.175 According to Nkhata, this is something with 
which a regional community cannot simply deal with.176 The Tribunal, however, articulated 
                                                          
167
  In terms of this provision, member states, inter alia, undertook to refrain from taking any measure 
likely to compromise the accomplishment of the principles set forth in the SADC Treaty. 
168
  This is one of the objectives of the SADC to “promote and defend peace and security”. These are, 
in the author’s view, the ideals of a democratic state. 
169
  The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others (CCT 101/12) [2013] ZACC 22 
(27 June 2013). 
170
  Ebobrah Legitimacy and Feasibility of Human Rights Realization 310. 
171
  Ebobrah ST “A critical analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Community Court 
of Justice” (2008) available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf (Date of use: 26 
June 2012). 
172
  State sovereignty is dealt with in Chapter 3.  
173
  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 488. 
174
   Nkhata 2012 (20) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 97.  
175
  Nkhata 2012 (20) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 97. 
176
  Nkhata 2012 (20) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 97.  
55 
 
clearly how it assumed powers to adjudicate human rights cases in the main Campbell case, by 
relying on article 4(c) of the Treaty which refers, inter alia, to human rights. Viljoen also supports 
the decision of the Tribunal by stating that even if regional economic communities were initially 
focused at increasing trade and improving economic relations and not building a sound culture 
of good governance and human rights within their countries, there is a link between their 
objective of regional integration – such as improving the welfare of the people in member states 
– and the realisation of socio-economic rights.177  
Another persuasive line of reasoning is offered by Bartels who correctly relies on the 
“longstanding usage in international law of the term ‘principles’ to refer to binding obligations”.178 
Bartels proceeds to assert that  
[t]he verbal phrase (‘shall act’) in article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty is in the usual 
language of obligations, and the object of the sentence (‘in accordance with the 
following principles …’) is clearly defined.
179
 On its face, article 4(c) therefore 
constitutes a binding obligation.
180
 
These are clear obligations. This fortunately also addresses Zenda’s concern over what he 
refers to as the “worrying” SADC Tribunal’s “casual reference” to the concepts of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law because there was no meaning agreed upon regarding the said 
concepts.181  
According to Bartels, article 4(c) of the Treaty “therefore constitutes a binding obligation”. As if 
responding to the concerns raised above, Bartels correctly disputes the view that principles are 
not binding based on the reasons above. He further substantiates this by relying on article 
38(1)(c) of the  Statute of International Court of Justice (ICJ) which mandates the ICJ to apply 
the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations.182 Bartels also rejects any 
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suggestion that the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are not 
“susceptible of objective determination, and are consequently non-justiciable”.183 In my view, 
Bartels correctly supports this by reliance on a judgment of the European Court of Justice in the 
joined cases of P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of 
the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.184 In this case the United 
Nations Security Council (UN SC) issued various resolutions (with an annexure of suspects) 
requiring all UN member states to freeze the funds and other financial resources controlled 
directly or indirectly by individuals and entities associated with, inter alia, the Al-Qaeda group. 
To give effect to this, the European Community Council adopted a regulation ordering the 
freezing of the funds and other economic resources of the persons and entities whose names 
appeared in a list annexed to that regulation. The applicants’ names were on the list and their 
assets were frozen. Their attempts to have the European Community regulation annulled failed 
in the court of first instance. They then appealed to the European Court of Justice challenging 
the lawfulness of the measures taken against them. The Court relied on the then provisions of 
article 6(1) of the EU Treaty and indicated that liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, form the foundations of the principles of the 
Community legal order which are common to the member states.185 It proceeded to hold that 
“[t]hose provisions cannot, however, be understood to authorise any derogation from the 
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
enshrined in Article 6(1) EU as a foundation of the Union”.186 It therefore, inter alia, nullified the 
regulation that imposed restrictions directed at persons associated with the Al-Qaeda network. 
This judgment supports the assertion that principles are binding obligations.  
Finally, Bartels states that  “[i]t goes without saying that a simple reference to the principles of 
‘human rights’ is sufficiently clear to be interpreted and applied by any tribunal, especially when 
read in the light of more detailed applicable human rights norms.”187 In light of, in particular, the 
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views of Viljoen, Ruppel and Bartels, it is unthinkable that the SADC region could achieve its 
economic objectives without protecting and promoting human rights through the Tribunal. I 
consequently find myself in agreement with Bartels and Nkhata that the SADC Tribunal can deal 
with human rights by relying on, inter alia, general undertakings of members states in articles 
6(1), the obligations to defend and maintain peace in article 5(c), and the statement of principle 
in article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty read together with the provisions of several protocols that the 
organisation has adopted.188  
It is submitted that this argument is convincing and that the Tribunal in fact deliberated along 
these lines. Unfortunately, in Gramara (Pvt) Ltd and Another v The Government of Zimbabwe 
and Others189 the High Court of Zimbabwe was incorrect when it found that it was not entirely 
convinced that the provisions of article 4(c) of SADC Treaty were sufficient to empower the 
Tribunal to deal with human rights cases.190   
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear cases involving human rights was clearly based on implied 
powers. The view that the text of treaty agreed upon between member states should be 
interpreted narrowly to respect the sovereign rights of member states and in the light of their 
understandings at the time the agreement was reached, would limit the interpretative powers of 
tribunals.191 To do so would further restrict any tribunal from ensuring that treaty objectives are 
fulfilled. In the case of SADC, this would significantly hamper the protection and promotion of 
human rights. 
4 LESSONS FROM OTHER REGIONAL, SUB-REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRIBUNALS ON IMPLIED POWERS  
In the Reparations, Nuclear Weapons, and Certain Expenses of the United Nations cases the 
ICJ invoked the doctrine of implied powers to give an organisation powers that were not 
provided for in the constitutive document but necessary for achieving the organisation’s 
objectives.  
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On a regional level, the European Court of Justice, in the joined cases of P Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities,192 found that principles constitute binding 
obligations which must be complied with. In addition, the court has also recognised that the 
European Union has competence to enter into international agreements even where there is no 
express authorisation from its constituent document.193 This is also instructive for the way in 
which implied powers may be applied on a (sub-) regional level.  
Various observations can be made with regard to the exercise of implied and express 
jurisdiction on a sub-regional level by the ECOWAS CCJ, East African Court of Justice, ICJ and 
the SADC Tribunal. Firstly, the instrument establishing the ECOWAS CCJ did not empower it to 
adjudicate human rights issues. Access to the court was also limited to member states. The 
Olajide and the Ukor cases came before the ECOWAS CCJ and the court declined to exercise 
jurisdiction on the basis that it had no power to do so. It is unfortunate that the ECOWAS CCJ 
adopted a strict, in preference to a more proactive, approach to the assumption of jurisdiction 
over human rights.194 To address the absence of human rights jurisdiction and individual 
access, the ECOWAS member states adopted an additional protocol that allowed individuals to 
bring cases involving human rights violations before the court. As a result, legal certainty has 
been largely achieved in the ECOWAS CCJ.  
Secondly, the instrument creating the East African Court of Justice empowered it to adjudicate 
human rights issues subject to a future protocol triggering the operation of the Court’s human 
rights’ mandate. To date, no protocol has been adopted to give effect to the Court’s jurisdiction 
over human rights cases. Despite the absence of the additional protocol, a human rights case 
has been brought before the Court.195 The Court acknowledged that it had no express mandate 
over human rights but it nonetheless heard the case on the basis of implied powers. The Olajide 
and Katabazi cases can be contrasted in that even in the absence of jurisdiction over human 
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rights, the Court in Katabazi opted to extend its jurisdiction through implied powers. As in the 
case of the ECOWAS CCJ, legal certainty has now been achieved in the East African Court of 
Justice.  
The SADC Tribunal also opted, using implication, to assume jurisdiction over human rights. 
Given the fact that the Tribunal has the powers to deal with any matter that involves the 
application and interpretation of the Treaty, there should be no protest when the tribunal adopts 
a flexible interpretation in assuming the powers necessary for the fulfilment of the objectives of 
the Treaty. Member states have voluntarily submitted themselves to the SADC order and 
therefore ought not to act contrary to its principles.  
A brief comparison of Africa’s sub-regional tribunals gives us an indication that the express 
jurisdiction in the ECOWAS Treaty, and the ECOWAS CCJ’s exercise of this jurisdiction in 
dealing with human rights issues, distinguishes the ECOWAS CCJ from the SADC Tribunal and 
the East African Court of Justice which assumed jurisdiction, by implication, over human rights. 
It is submitted that the ECOWAS CCJ’s approach is the most appropriate for ensuring legal 
certainty in that it adopted a Protocol which clearly set out its jurisdiction. The East African Court 
of Justice and the SADC Tribunal acted within their powers when they assumed jurisdiction over 
human rights pending a protocol triggering such a mandate. 
It is necessary to point out that the doctrine of implied powers should be resorted to as a matter 
of last resort due to changing circumstances which at times necessitate a wider interpretation of 
the treaty. Consequently, the doctrine of implied powers should be used as a tool for according 
a tribunal the power to protect the foundational principles of a particular organisation without 
referring the matter to member states for deliberation. However, if a tribunal uses the doctrine of 
implied powers to assume jurisdiction, its actions should be properly explained and have a clear 
legal basis. They should, therefore, be based on a sound interpretation of the treaty. Especially 
where the application of the doctrine of implied powers is necessary, an interpretation of the 
treaty that best serves to protect human rights, must be followed. 
The doctrine of implied powers has its own shortfalls. As observed by Murungi and Gallinetti, 
there are various issues underlying the exercise of implied powers, as the exercise of 
jurisdiction could be seen as exceeding the powers initially given on the tribunal or inviting 
parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal and by so doing drag the proceedings out. 
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Lastly, it allows the judges a discretion to determine the extent of the tribunal’s power.196 To 
avoid confusion, it is advisable that human rights’ obligations and jurisdiction over human rights 
issues, be drafted in precise terms in order to ensure that there are no challenges as to the 
competence of the tribunal to adjudicate human rights cases. According to Murungi and 
Gallinetti, an implied mandate for human rights does not necessarily prevent an exercise of 
jurisdiction.197 However, because of the challenges that may arise, it fails to protect human 
rights fully as envisaged by the commitment of regional economic communities and their 
founding documents.198   
If tribunals are given vague human rights powers and are called upon to interpret and provide a 
clear answer, the answer they give may be rejected by those who are not committed to the 
promotion and protection of human rights. This may also result in a lack of respect for the 
tribunal and its judgments – as happened in the main Campbell case. It is submitted that the 
doctrine of implied powers is helpful as it extends the mandate of an organisation to deal with 
matters necessary for the performance of its duties. The doctrine does not give a court the 
power to do what is explicitly prohibited by a particular treaty, but does ensure that all the aims 
and purposes of the treaty as accepted by the member states, can be achieved. It is self-evident 
that the application of implied powers will have an impact on state sovereignty. However, 
African states cannot hide behind their sovereignty to avoid the consequences of their violation 
of human rights, as Zimbabwe clearly attempted to do in the Campbell case. Furthermore, by 
signing and ratifying the Treaty, SADC member states have inevitably limited certain aspects of 
their sovereignty. They should, therefore, act in a way that does not defeat the purpose and 
object of the Treaty. 
5  CONCLUSION 
In light of the exposition above, in the absence of a clear indication of the nature of the 
obligations imposed on member states, especially when these advance the protection and 
promotion of human rights, resort must be had to implied powers. The doctrines of express and 
implied powers should, therefore, not be seen as in conflict with each other but as 
complementing one another. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY  
1 THE CONCEPT SOVEREIGNTY 
In the late 1990s, in the matter of Prosecutor v Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTRY) remarked that sovereignty was initially perceived as an inviolable 
and unquestionable characteristic of statehood.1 However, the concept has over the years 
“suffered progressive erosion” on the basis of the protection and promotion of human rights, 
amongst other factors.2 Perhaps it is this constant erosion that, inter alia, influenced Ebobrah to 
assert that the notion of sovereignty “is one of the intriguing features of modern statehood”.3 As 
will be pointed out below, in international law sovereignty and human rights are often viewed as 
opposing concepts.4  
Before the Second World War, international law prohibited intervention by one state in matters 
occurring in another state’s territory without the latter’s consent.5 However, since the war, the 
international community has, through the United Nations Security Council (UN SC), intervened 
on humanitarian grounds in the domestic affairs of certain states – for example Somalia.6 A 
recent example of this intervention is the UN SC action against the regime of the late leader 
Moammar Gadhafi by requiring that all necessary measures be taken in order to prevent the 
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human rights violations perpetrated against protestors in Libya.7 Since the 1990s,8 there have 
been a number of humanitarian interventions, for example in Kosovo.9 It is on this basis that 
sovereignty and human rights are seen as fundamentally opposing notions. The obligation to 
protect human rights is seen as increasingly eroding state sovereignty.10 
“Sovereignty” is an elusive term and a controversial topic in international law.11 As one scholar 
observes: 
Few subjects in international law and international relations are as sensitive as the 
notion of sovereignty. Steinberger refers to it in the Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law as “the most glittering and controversial notion in the history, 
doctrine and practice of international law.” On the other hand, Henkin seeks to banish 
it from our vocabulary and Lauterpacht calls it a “word which has an emotive quality 
lacking meaningful specific content,” while Verzijl notes that any discussion on this 
subject risks degenerating into a Tower of Babel. More affirmatively, Brownlie sees 
sovereignty as “the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations” and Alan James 
sees it as "the one and only organising principle in respect of the dry surface of the 
globe, all that surface now … being divided among single entities of a sovereign, or 
constitutionally independent kind." As noted by Falk, “There is little neutral ground 
when it comes to sovereignty”.
12
 
 
These varying views highlight that the use and meaning of the term sovereignty has generated 
significant debate amongst scholars. During the 16th century, Bodin defined sovereignty as an 
“absolute and perpetual power”.13 This definition reflects the positive “side” of sovereignty which 
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entails the provision of political benefit to the citizens, collaboration with other governments, and 
the ability of a sovereign state to protect its independence.14 Even though the definition above is 
Bodin’s, he also recognised that there were laws superior to those created by the sovereign 
such as divine law and the laws of nature or reason.15 In other words, state sovereignty has 
never in reality been superior to all other law. According to the 2004 World Trade Organisation 
Report, “sovereignty is one of the most used and also misused concepts of international affairs 
and international law”.16 It is used repeatedly without much thought as to its true significance in 
that it covers a variety of hugely complicated aspects – for example the extent of a 
government’s authority over its citizens.17 This indicates the difficulty associated with capturing 
the precise meaning of the term “sovereignty”.18 Since Bodin’s definition of sovereignty, several 
other attempts have been made to define the concept. It is in this regard that the efforts by 
Walker and others19 are to be welcomed as they contribute to the discussion and understanding 
of what sovereignty entails. Walker defines sovereignty as: 
[T]he discursive form in which a claim concerning the existence and character of a 
supreme ordering power for a particular polity is expressed, which supreme ordering 
power purports to establish and sustain the identity and status of the particular polity 
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qua polity and to provide a continuing source and vehicle of ultimate authority for the 
juridical order of that polity.
20
 
 
From this, it can be deduced that, at the very least, sovereignty involves an exercise in and 
control of absolute power over something in order to maintain a particular status. The exercise 
of such authority previously excluded other states.21 As will be discussed in due course, this 
position is no longer supported by the majority of the international community. 
There are four ways in which sovereignty has been applied in international law.22 First is 
“domestic or internal sovereignty”, which refers to the organisation and effectiveness of a 
political authority within in a state.23 The power or control exercised by the state is unrelated to 
Westphalian sovereignty. Authority can therefore refer either to internal or to Westphalian 
sovereignty.24 Second, is ‘interdependence sovereignty’ which denotes that in current times it is 
generally accepted that forces of globalisation are eroding state sovereignty and creating the 
need for states to cooperate with each other in order to achieve the common good within an 
interdependent world.25 The main focus is the control of various aspects, such as the health-
care system, and has little to do with the exercise of power. In this regard, the inability to control, 
inter alia, people and diseases across the globe has been described as a loss of sovereignty. 
Therefore, interdependence sovereignty does not relate to Westphalian sovereign as a state 
can be recognised as equal to other states. The inability to control these factors across borders, 
does not necessarily mean that a state is subject to external control. It is therefore important to 
distinguish between internal and external sovereignty. The former refers to the ability of the 
state to exercise its functions and manage its affairs within its territory.26 The latter has 
traditionally been understood as a government exercising control over its affairs to the exclusion 
of all foreign states.27 It was characterised by international independence, the right to self-help, 
and the power to participate in the affairs of the international community.28  
Thirdly, sovereignty denotes international legal sovereignty which involves compliance with the 
requirements for statehood as a political entity in international law as set out in the Montevideo 
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Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933.29 In other words, a state must be 
recognised as sovereign by other states if it is, inter alia, capable of entering into agreements 
with other states. In this sense, the state is treated as distinct from the individual and 
international legal sovereignty does not guarantee that domestic authorities will be able to 
regulate their internal affairs – including movement across their borders.  
Fourthly, we find “Westphalian sovereignty” based on the Westphalian model. This means that a 
state chooses how to conduct its internal affairs to the exclusion of other states.30 Even though 
those in power may choose how to manage their domestic affairs, they may be limited by 
external factors. However, the ultimate decision remains theirs. This form of sovereignty would 
be violated when external actors decide to intervene and influence domestic issues or policies.31 
The Westphalian model of sovereignty is, however, no longer supported by modern international 
law in that “no state is immune from international scrutiny, or even sanction”.32 To this end 
Depaigne has said that the “sovereign is no longer the king but a nation” that must conform to 
standards of human rights.33  
These four ways in which the term state sovereignty is used, support Reisman’s view that since 
the time of Aristotle, “the word sovereignty has had a long and varied history during which it has 
been given different meanings, hues and tones, depending on the context and the objectives of 
those using the word”.34 For purposes of this thesis, the discussion focuses on how state 
sovereignty has evolved as a result of regionalism, globalisation, jus cogens norms, head-of- 
state immunity, humanitarian intervention, and the importance of protecting and promoting 
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human rights. Regionalism and human rights, amongst others, have resulted in states no longer 
regarding human rights as matters falling solely within the rubric of ‘domestic affairs’. I shall 
further discuss how certain African countries have relinquished aspects of their sovereignty by 
becoming members of regional and sub-regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) 
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).  
2 THE EVOLUTION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
As mentioned above, there are two forms of state sovereignty, namely, internal and external 
sovereignty.35 The former relates to the power of the state to discharge its functions as a state 
within its boundaries and freely to control its domestic affairs; the latter refers to the autonomy of 
the state to exercise its powers and to protect its territory without outside interference.36 The 
concept of state sovereignty as originally understood in international law, originated from the 
Westphalian state.37 This notion has been deconstructed over the years in an attempt to dispel 
the traditional view that sovereignty is absolute.38 Absolute sovereignty has, therefore, become 
an outdated notion in contemporary international law in the face of factors such as 
interdependence and cooperation among states.39  
2.1 Westphalian sovereignty  
The core elements of state sovereignty can be traced back to the Montevideo Convention of 
1933. In terms of the Montevideo Convention, to qualify as a state, the territory must have a 
defined territory and a functioning government, amongst others.40 The requirement of a defined 
territory is important in international law as it is that portion of the “earth’s surface” over which 
the sovereign state may exercise control.41  
Westphalian sovereignty entailed the absolute right of states to choose how they wished to 
conduct their political affairs free from external influence.42 Its main purpose was to “preserve 
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the self-interest of the state”.43 The primacy of state sovereignty was therefore undisputed.44 
States could only limit their sovereignty through accepting responsibilities flowing from treaty 
law or compulsory obligations that arose from customary international law.45 The notion of state 
sovereignty as an absolute, unrestricted power of a state originated with the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 (Westphalia).46 Westphalia marked an end of a Thirty Years War in 
Europe.47 It also introduced the principle of sovereignty which permitted states to have control 
over their territories without external influence.48 Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations 
also recognises the principle of non-intervention and provides that 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter Vll.
49 
 
The said principle of non-intervention was reaffirmed in the Corfu Channel case, where the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, stated that 
“… [b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of 
international relations…”.50 This principle was also upheld in Military and Paramilitary Activities 
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in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 51 where the United States of 
America (USA), inter alia, conducted military activities in and against Nicaragua with the aim of 
overthrowing the Nicaraguan government. Nicaragua approached the ICJ alleging, inter alia, 
that the USA was funding militants and that some of the shots fired by USA military forces were 
in violation of international law. The issues for determination by the ICJ included whether the 
USA had breached its customary international law obligation not to intervene in the domestic 
affairs of another state when it aided the military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua. 
The ICJ first remarked that 
…[h]owever the regime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence by a State to any 
particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law; to 
hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State 
sovereignty, on which the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice 
of the political, social, economic and cultural system of a State. Consequently, 
Nicaragua's domestic policy options, even assuming that they correspond to the 
description given of them by the Congress finding [dictatorship], cannot justify on the 
legal plane the various actions of the Respondent complained of. The Court cannot 
contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by one State 
against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology or 
political system.
52
 
 
It consequently ruled that the USA had acted in breach of its obligation under customary 
international law not to intervene in the affairs of Nicaragua.53 According to Brownlie, the 
“principal corollaries of the sovereign state and equality of states [include] a duty of non-
intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states”.54 The principle of non-
intervention is provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and prohibits member states 
from interfering in the domestic affairs of another member state.55 However, this does not mean 
that intervention may never take place in the territory of another state as the UN SC may 
recommend (or even take) measures56 intended to address, inter alia, threats to international 
peace or breaches of the peace, and this constitutes an exception to the principle of non-
intervention.57 The principle of non-intervention was indeed based on the traditional view which 
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regarded states as the sole subjects of international law.58 Accordingly, international law was 
concerned only with inter-state relations. Individuals were regarded as objects which possessed 
no rights under international law.59 In other words, a country could do anything, including 
oppressing its citizens, and thereafter hide “behind the veil of sovereignty”.60 For example, the 
apartheid government in South Africa sought the international community not to interfere in its 
racial policies as these were domestic issues. This argument no longer holds true. Largely due 
to the importance of human rights, state sovereignty is limited and states can no longer hide 
behind their sovereignty to prevent intervention where human rights violations are committed. 
 
According to Antonov, “the sovereign has [had] the right to arbitrarily decide on any domestic 
issue”.61 The sovereign government enjoyed “final and absolute authority” within its borders.62 It, 
therefore, did not matter how a state treated its people – it was simply not a matter of 
international concern.63 This applied even when a sovereign state opted to kill its own people; 
no other state could intervene.64 To illustrate the exercise of absolute sovereignty, Bettati offers 
the example of Bernheim, a German Jew, who unsuccessfully approached the League of 
Nations for the denunciation of the Nazi atrocities committed against his people.65 The League 
of Nations was persuaded by the arguments presented by Joseph Goebbels who represented 
Germany. Goebbels, in defending his country policies, said the following to the League of 
Nations: 
Ladies and Gentlemen, a man’s home is his castle. We are a sovereign State: nothing 
that this individual has said concerns you. We will do what we want with our Socialists, 
our pacifists, our Jews; we will not accept the control of either humanity or the League 
of Nations.
66 
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Goebbels’s submissions were in line with the then principle of absolute state sovereignty which 
prevented other states from concerning themselves in matters that were the domestic affairs of 
other states. Coming closer to the SADC region, specifically in South Africa, the National Party 
defended its apartheid policies that violated human rights. It claimed that the United Nations’ 
General Assembly was not in a position to discuss the internal affairs of member states as per 
article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter.67 Accordingly, the then South Africa justified its 
apartheid policies (the oppression of people) and hid behind the veil of state sovereignty.68 
There was no limit on sovereignty. This is what Jackson classified as negative sovereignty 
which entailed “freedom from outside interference”.69 It is submitted that this aspect of absolute 
state sovereignty was often misused and resulted in many human rights abuses.70 The 
importance of the principle of state sovereignty under international law cannot be gainsaid.71 It 
acts as a shield for small states against interference and bullying by powerful states. In addition, 
state sovereignty constitutes “the backbone of the world order”.72  
Before 1945, states were very protective of their sovereignty. However, states can no longer 
use their sovereignty to escape their international responsibility to protect human rights. Today 
there are numerous widely-accepted factors which limit state sovereignty.73 For example, during 
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the 18th century a distinction was made between “absolute, perfect or full sovereignty on the one 
hand and relative, imperfect or half sovereignty on the other”.74 The former belonged to 
monarchs who had absolute independence within and outside of their states.75 The latter was 
accorded those monarchs who were in some way dependent on other monarchs for running the 
internal and external affairs of the state.76 It was on the basis of this distinction between 
absolute and relative sovereignty, that it was recognised that sovereignty is divisible.77 Divisible 
sovereignty means the division of the sovereign authority “into different components which, 
together, form a full sovereignty”.78 However, the divisibility of sovereignty was not 
internationally recognised during the 18th century.79 Today, in light of numerous factors – for 
example, the transfer of power to regional and international organisations – sovereignty can no 
longer be viewed from the perspective of the earlier theorists such as Jean Bodin and Hugo 
Grotius as indivisible.80 The norm of restricting how states should treat their citizens constitutes 
an infringement of the principle of sovereignty and would support the argument that sovereignty 
is divisible.81 Additionally, it is submitted that globalisation and international cooperation has 
resulted in the demise of sovereignty because states have responded to the need to act 
together for the sake of common interests such as combating terrorism. However, Fremuth has 
questioned whether sovereignty may be divisible.82 According to him: 
Member States remain sovereign but they accept restrictions on their sovereign rights 
to benefit from working together in the supranational EU. That shows that sovereignty 
means the right to allocate tasks and sovereign rights to a level of authority that could 
best serve the goals. However, states reserve the decision of if, when and to what 
degree to integrate in a form of supra-state cooperation.
83
 
 
It is submitted that Fremuth’s view is correct because in today’s world, states can no longer 
always do as they wish since they operate in the collective interests of the common good, such 
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as respect for human rights. Moreover, when member states transfer certain competencies to a 
regional body, such as the EU, they cannot at a later stage decide to disregard this as and when 
they wish. For example, Zimbabwe transferred some of its sovereign power to protect its 
citizens to the SADC Tribunal, but later decided to ignore the rulings of the Tribunal.  
 
It is therefore submitted that due to the developments such as human rights and regionalism 
sovereignty should be seen as divisible.84 Specifically as a result of the atrocities committed 
during the Second World War, international law changed significantly and international 
governance can no longer be seen to be based “purely on voluntary co-operation of member 
states”.85 A need for global governance arose, and with it the call for the establishment of a 
body such as the United Nations based on shared community interests.86 According to Brus, a 
community interest is not something that should be viewed as opposing national interest.87 
Instead, it should be seen as a “continuation, or even strengthening of the national interests in 
an interdependent world”.88 The creation of an international community through the United 
Nations signifies the reality that states are dependent on one another and that there is a need 
for international cooperation to achieve the common good, such as upholding human rights.  
Sovereignty is, therefore, increasingly viewed as a “status consideration”. A state needs to 
cooperate with other members of the international community in order to pursue common 
interests. In the past, an individual state exercised its sovereignty by acting independently to 
achieve its own national interest.89 This is no longer the position. In today’s world, states 
transfer some aspects of their national sovereignty to regional and international bodies and by 
doing so, to a large extent limit their freedom to act independently.90 This entails that state 
sovereignty is divisible as it is “neither inherently territorial nor exclusively in the hands of 
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states”.91 In this way, a state can only act in accordance with a consensual decision taken by 
members of the relevant bodies. As pointed out by Schermers, “[n]o State can isolate itself from 
the world community”.92  As a result, it is said that the involvement of states in regional and 
international organisations in fact strengthens state sovereignty.93 The basis for this claim is that 
through participation in regional and international organisations, states promote their individual 
“ability to gain access to new resources and secure other benefits needed to operate in a 
globalized world”.94 It is therefore submitted that the exercise of sovereignty is no longer viewed 
from the perspective a state’s independence, but by the extent to which a state participates in or 
becomes a member of international organisations.95 In this light it may be asserted that 
sovereignty has changed and is now a question of status.96 The factors that are increasingly 
eroding state sovereignty are dealt with separately in what follows. 
 
2.2  Regionalism  
In her recent statement at the inauguration of the Africa Maritime Indaba, the AU chairperson, 
Dr Dlamini-Zuma, said that states should not be protective of their sovereignty and that certain 
elements of state sovereignty “need to be exercised collectively”.97 Indeed, if African states 
need to cooperate in the achievement of issues that affect the continent such as peace and 
security, they must be willing to relinquish certain aspects of their sovereignty. It is increasingly 
evident that because of, inter alia, regionalism and globalisation, absolute state sovereignty is 
something of the past. Regionalism and globalisation “go hand in hand” because one cannot 
talk of regionalism in isolation of certain of the aspects arising from globalisation.98 The 
concepts of regionalism and globalisation are addressed separately. 
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Regionalism may be described as an “ideology and political movement” that seeks to promote 
the interest of a particular region(s).99 Further, it is a process in which states and non-state 
actors come together in a given region to cooperate in the achievement of mutual objectives 
such as the promotion of economic, political and security interests.100 To assist in understanding 
the concept of regionalism, the International Law Commission has divided the term regionalism 
into three categories: (a) Regionalism as a set of approaches and methods for examining 
international law; (b) Regionalism as a technique for international law-making; and (c) 
Regionalism as the pursuit of geographical exceptions to universal international-law rules.101 
These categories are discussed below. 
(a)  Regionalism as a set of approaches and methods for examining international law 
In terms of this approach, which is in common use, regionalism refers to “particular orientations 
of legal order, thought and culture”.102 For example, the requirement that members of the 
International Law Commission should represent various cultures and be drawn from the various 
legal systems of the world so as to promote the development of international law, fits with this 
conception of regionalism.103 The composition of other international law bodies, such as the 
General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) also consists of members from various regions 
in the international community.104 It is said that there have always been regional and local 
approaches to cultures under international law.105 To this end, sociological, political and cultural 
factors have influenced international law significantly.106 However, studies do not indicate that 
certain rules should be read in a particular way, despite the fact that such rules originated in a 
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regional discourse.107 Instead, these regional influences “appear significant precisely because 
they have lost their originally geographically limited character” and contributed to the growth of 
international law.108  
(b) Regionalism as a technique for international law-making 
In this instance, regionalism is perceived as offering a privileged forum for creating international 
law.109 The basis for this les in the perception that regions have common interests which will 
ensure, inter alia, efficient implementation of the rules.110 Shared community interests ensure 
the legitimacy of the norms and their coherent application.111 As a result, it is said that this may 
form the basis for human rights and free trade laws to originate at regional level.112 The same 
applies to economic growth for various regions. Further, it is said that the need for cooperation 
and interdependence among states and the sociology of globalisation, need to be governed 
independently of the state level (ie regional level).113 This is supported by the conclusion of 
various trade agreements at a regional level, despite the existence of a well-developed 
international trade system in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade 
Organisation.114 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade 
Organisation do not operate at a national level unless empowered to do so by the state 
concerned.  
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(c)  Regionalism as the pursuit of geographical exceptions to universal international law 
rules 
Finally, it is said that regionalism may be stronger if “it is meant to connote a rule or a principle 
with a regional sphere of validity or a regional limitation to the sphere of validity of a universal 
rule or principle”.115 In the positive sense, the rule and/or principle would only be binding on 
members who belong to a specific region.116 In a negative sense, regionalism would exempt 
those states within a particular geographic area from the binding authority of an international 
rule.117 The concern with the above approaches lies in identifying the relevant region and the 
imposition of a norm that would generally not be relevant for everyone in the region.118 Another 
difficulty is the imposition of a regional rule on a state that has not accepted it.119 The notion of 
regionalism is, therefore, not straightforward as emerges from the various approaches adopted 
in an attempt to explain it.120 
It is said that because the world is has not yet created a fully effective global authority for the 
maintenance of world peace, regionalism is a first step “in establishing areas of consensus 
toward eventual (full) intergovernmental coordination or integration”.121 Further, regionalism 
promotes transparency, helps in controlling the effects of globalisation, and makes states more 
accountable as they have not only to act in their own interest, but in the interest of the region as 
a whole.122 Accordingly, the need for cooperation and interaction among states at a regional 
level requires states to be prepared to revisit the traditional view of state sovereignty as 
absolute.123  
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From the 1980s what has come to be known as the “new regionalism” has emerged.124 This was 
a result of, inter alia, economic change, globalisation and the transformation of the state.125 
Boutros-Ghali views new regionalism “not as a resurgence of ‘spheres of influence’”, but as a 
“healthy complement to internationalism”.126 He is further of the view that regional actors should 
not be limited to states, but should extend to non-governmental organisations as there is a 
greater demand for resources for international action.127 Indeed, there has been a reduction in 
donor funding in most countries and a shift of focus from one area to another because of new 
challenges – such as terrorism – which demand attention.128 In this light, it is vital for regional 
groups and the United Nations to cooperate in the search for solutions to the problems facing 
the international community. 
Despite the positive aspects of regionalism referred to above, there are arguments that prefer 
universalism129 over regionalism. It is said that because of, inter alia, the interdependence of 
states, some political and social problems that emanate from various border regions require 
global solutions.130 Further, proponents of universalism are of the view that regional resources 
are limited and unable to resolve various challenges within regions.131 They also contend that 
the existence of several universal organisations is evidence that governments prefer to 
cooperate at an international level, rather than using regional organisations to address concerns 
affecting regions.132 Whilst it is true that some problems, such as terrorism, require international 
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cooperation, there has been a move to create regional organisations to handle other issues 
which can be addressed on the regional level.133     
Regionalism is not something new as the United Nations system also contains certain 
regionalist features in that various bodies within the UN are composed of people from various 
regions.134 The General Assembly and other plenary bodies within the UN, are made up of 
various groupings with the result that a “highly elaborate group system” for discussion and 
decision-making has emerged.135 The composition of these groupings shows regional features 
in that they are characterised by geographic or cultural ties (such as Africa), or membership of a 
regional organisation (such as the European Union).136 Further, regionalism can be traced back 
to the composition of the UN SC which can be said to have regional features because of the 
allocation of non-permanent seats to certain regions.137 The demand for the equitable 
distribution of seats (permanent and non-permanent) in the restructuring of the UN SC to reflect 
representation of certain regions, also evidences the relevance of regionalism within the United 
Nations system.138 Further, the United Nations system recognises regional mechanisms 
necessary for the maintenance of, inter alia, peace and security.139 Regionalism in the United 
Nations system plays a pivotal role as it ensures democracy in the decision-making process by 
member states in various UN structures, such as the General Assembly which is the body’s 
chief deliberative organ.140  
The AU serves as an example of a regional organisation created by African states to, inter alia, 
promote the integration process of African states in order to enable them to participate 
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meaningfully in the global economy.141 Further, the motive behind the establishment of the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (now SADC) in the 1980s by the 
independent countries of Southern Africa, was to reduce their economic dependence on the 
then apartheid South Africa.142 This move represented a “peculiar experiment of economic 
regionalism in Africa”.143 In addition, at a sub-regional level, the SADC was established and 
member states undertook to act in accordance with the principles of democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law.144 The cooperation among SADC member states is further supported by the 
adoption of the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC in 2005, the aim of 
which is to facilitate the free movement of people between countries in the region.145 This 
Protocol shows the commitment of SADC member states whose undertakings involve the 
promotion of “inter-dependence and integration of our [SADC] national economies for the 
harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the region”.146 Indeed, Madakufamba has 
correctly observed that there is a “need to involve ordinary citizens of the region centrally in the 
process of development and integration”.147 There is little doubt that the relaxation of stringent 
border entry requirements impact on state sovereignty as people from the entire SADC region 
will eventually be able to move freely between SADC member states. In addition, it is submitted 
that the commitment of member states to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law entitles any SADC member state to call on other SADC states to 
observe and respect these principles. This is supported by SADC’s decision to discuss the 
violence inflicted on opposition parties in Zimbabwe during the 2000 parliamentary elections.148  
It is in this regard that Fawcett has stated that the “regional momentum has proved unstoppable, 
constantly extending into new and diverse domains”.149 Indeed, cooperation entails working 
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together in areas of mutual concern, including matters that were initially perceived as falling 
squarely within the competence of the sovereign state and which tolerated no external 
interference.150   
Globalisation or a global world has become one of the most common terms in our current 
lexicon.151 It is said that there is a growing “interconnection and interdependence” between all 
countries of the world.152 Writing on the “values for the global neighbourhood” or global world, 
Karatoprak and Tamsen have reported that there is a greater need for cooperation among 
global citizens in order to uphold peace and to protect the environment,153 as global concerns 
which require the attention of world citizenry if they are to be resolved for the betterment of the 
international community and mankind.154 The authors have also stated that security concerns 
have gone beyond “state issues to include the security of the people” which is threatened by 
factors such as terrorism.155 Some writers have even gone so far as to suggest that all national 
societies will merge into one global village because of their interdependence on one another.156 
Henkin correctly indicates that the “global economy is slowly replacing and overwhelming 
national and regional economies”.157 Further, companies that are created in one country may 
have their principal headquarters in another. They also have branches and subsidiaries in 
various countries.158 Henkin therefore asks a relevant question when he enquires: “What is 
globalization doing, or what has it done to that concept of sovereignty”?159 International trade 
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has also arguably forced states to take an interest in other states for various reasons.160 
Akindele et al have said of the impact of globalisation on African states: 
[G]lobalisation is an awesome and terrifying phenomenon for African countries … Its 
universalization of communication, mass production, market exchanges and 
redistribution, rather than engendering new ideas and developmental orientation in 
Africa, subverts its autonomy and powers of self-determination. It is rather by design 
than by accident that poverty has become a major institution in Africa despite this 
continent’s stupendous resources … Nation-states in Africa today, rarely define the 
rules and regulations of their economy, production, credits and exchanges of goods 
and services due to the rampaging menace of globalisation. They are hardly now 
capable of volitionally managing their political, economic and socio-cultural 
development. Globalisation has imposed heavy constraints on the internal 
management dynamics of most if not all the polities in Africa ….
161
 
 
The forces of globalisation identified above, arguably limit the ability of states freely to make 
their own decisions without taking global economic issues into account. It is therefore submitted 
that the concept of sovereignty as understood in the traditional sense, is gradually being eroded 
by internationalisation.162  
Inter-state relations have resulted in the establishment of specialised institutions such as the 
SADC which have become “obvious and typical vehicles for interstate cooperation”.163 
Therefore, where the need for cooperation in various spheres has given rise to the 
establishment of international organisations and courts, such as the SADC and the International 
Criminal Court,164 member states are regarded as having “accepted obligations and 
considerable limitations on their powers and liberties which were a consequence of their 
sovereign character”.165 From the above discussion, it is clear that the notions of regionalism 
and globalisation are increasingly restricting state sovereignty.166  
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2.3  Human rights   
The human rights atrocities of the Second World War have fundamentally affected the 
understanding of sovereignty under traditional international law. Sovereignty is now a changed 
concept that needs to be aligned with modern developments. Unlike the position before 1945, 
how a state treats its citizens in its own territory is no longer regarded as a purely domestic 
issue.167 Individuals are now also subjects of international law who possess rights that are 
deserving of protection.168 In Ferreira-Snyman’s words, “[t]he idea of absolute sovereignty is in 
many respects an outdated concept in modern international law” for various reasons, not least 
human rights.169  
The gross violations of human rights committed during the Second World War resulted in the 
international community agreeing that states should be held responsible and accountable for 
crimes that they commit in their territories.170 Accountability is important as states can no longer 
treat their people as objects. Therefore, states must act in a way that protects their citizens’ 
rights. In other words, states should never be allowed to commit gross violations of human 
rights and hide behind the veil of state sovereignty. This is confirmed by the decision of the 
ICTY in Prosecutor v Tadic,171 where the appellant challenged the establishment of the tribunal 
to adjudicate crimes committed in his country. According to the appellant, the tribunal was 
created to “invade an area essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States” and thus violate 
the principle of state sovereignty.172 In response to this contention, the ICTY held that 
…[i]t would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, should 
the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human 
rights. Borders should not be considered as a shield against the reach of the law and 
as a protection for those who trample underfoot the most elementary rights of 
humanity… .
173
 
 
This statement indicates clearly that the importance to protect and promote human rights has 
eroded the traditional international law perception of state sovereignty. A state, therefore, should 
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be able to protect its citizens within, and arguably also outside of, its territory.174 It is in this 
regard that a “state sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-
being-oriented approach”.175 The adoption of numerous human rights treaties (including the so-
called International Bill of Rights176) after the Second World War is a clear indication that human 
rights now top the international law agenda.  
 
The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the international 
community further evidenced a surrender of sovereignty in that countries accepted international 
human rights standards as set out in the Declaration.177 In other words, states have chosen to 
replace “their own once-sovereign standards” with those set up by the international community 
and contained in the UDHR. The UDHR’s main objective is to set a common standard for the 
global achievement and protection of human rights.178 Today certain rights in the UDHR, such 
as the right to protection from racial discrimination, have attained the status of customary 
international law and are binding on all states.179 Further, many other rights set out in the UDHR 
have been translated into binging obligations in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.180 Therefore, 
state sovereignty is being limited. In addition, most states today embrace the idea of human 
rights and are party to various international,181 regional,182 and sub-regional183 human rights 
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treaties. They have assumed treaty obligations and submit periodic reports to the relevant treaty 
bodies. This shows that they are now accountable for how they treat their citizens within their 
jurisdictions. It is submitted that through voluntarily signing and accepting to abide by 
international human rights standards contained in various treaties, states have relinquished 
certain aspects of their sovereignty. 
 
2.4 The role of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes  
 It is imperative to note at the outset that the SADC Tribunal does not enjoy criminal or universal 
jurisdiction184 to adjudicate crimes such as genocide.185 These crimes can only be heard by 
courts with the necessary criminal jurisdiction, such as the International Criminal Court. 
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Therefore, jus cogens norms are discussed only as an illustration that states can no longer hide 
behind their sovereignty in order to prevent external intervention where gross human rights 
violations have occurred. 
Jus cogens norms are peremptory rules of general international law from which no derogation is 
permissible.186 The effect of jus cogens norms is that states are bound to observe them.187 The 
violation of the obligations flowing from a peremptory norm gives rise to a legal interest for other 
states to have the jus cogens norm respected.188 In cases of conflict between jus cogens norms 
and other general rules of international law, jus cogens norms prevail over those other rules.189 
It is therefore evident that sovereignty is being limited by higher norms.190  
Traditionally, international law was based on the premise that it is a body of law created by 
consenting states in order to regulate relations between states.191 The then narrow 
understanding of international law failed to take into account that the international community 
also accords certain human rights and norms special status within the international law 
setting.192 However, over the years, the international community has accepted that there are 
norms, such as jus cogens, that now compete with the “sovereignty norm of primacy”.193 For 
example, there is widespread acceptance that the prohibition on torture194 and genocide195 have 
risen to the level of jus cogens norms which constitute erga omnes duties.196 These norms do 
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not require state consent and, it is said, enjoy a higher status in international law.197 As was 
stated by the ICTY in Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, a norm against torture is jus cogens 
“because of the importance of the values it protects”.198 
 In terms of article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a jus cogens norm is a 
“peremptory norm of general international law”, that is 
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole 
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having similar character.
199
  
 
A jus cogens norm thus also entails erga omnes duties for states – obligations owed not only to 
the victims, but to all states and the international community.200 According to Posner “[e]rga 
omnes norms are those that give third-party states, rather than just the victim, legal claims 
against states that violate them”.201 Each state, therefore, has a legal interest in their 
protection.202 It is apparent that these obligations are “compelling” and binding on all states. 
Consequently, all states have an interest in protecting norms that have been accorded a special 
status in international law such as torture. To this end, the ICJ said the following in the 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment concerning erga omnes 
obligations:  
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In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a 
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are 
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States 
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes.
203
 
 
The ICJ, relying on its earlier decision,204 further elaborated that erga omnes obligations 
originate in international law and especially from the “outlawing of acts of … genocide, as also 
from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person.”205  Accordingly, 
the violation of these norms “gives rise to a claim for compliance accruing to each and every 
member, which then has the right to insist on fulfilment of the obligation or in any case to call for 
the breach to be discontinued”.206 With regard to torture and genocide, which have also attained 
the status of jus cogens norms, there is an obligation on all states not to grant impunity to the 
violators of these norms.207  
Even though national,208 regional,209and international courts have invoked jus cogens norms and 
pronounced on them, it was only recently in Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda,210 
that the ICJ took the opportunity to endorse jus cogens norms. In this case, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) approached the Court on the basis that Rwanda had, inter alia, 
allegedly committed gross violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law in the 
territory of the DRC. These rights, according to the DRC, constituted jus cogens norms and 
entitled the Court to hear the case. The DRC asked the Court to declare that Rwanda had 
violated human rights which are one of the goals of the United Nations Charter (maintenance of 
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international peace and security) and the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (right to 
life and protection of the law).211 Rwanda raised a preliminary objection and asked the Court to 
dismiss the DRC’s applications as the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the case.212 This was 
so because Rwanda had not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction and had entered a reservation 
to article 9 of the Genocide Convention which empowers the ICJ, at the request of any of the 
parties to the dispute, to receive disputes between state parties as to the interpretation and 
application of the Genocide Convention.213 The ICJ found that it had no jurisdiction to hear the 
case as Rwanda had not consented to its jurisdiction through the Genocide Convention. In the 
words of the Court, the mere fact that the rights affected are jus cogens norms such as 
genocide, “cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain that 
dispute” because jurisdiction is based on the consent of states.214  
What is, however, significant is that this is the first instance in which the Court has recognised 
and accepted jus cogens norms.215 In a separate opinion Judge ad hoc Dugard states:  
This is the first occasion on which the International Court of Justice has given its 
support to the notion of jus cogens. It is strange that the Court has taken so long to 
reach this point because it has shown no hesitation in recognizing the notion of 
obligation erga omnes, which together with jus cogens affirms the normative hierarchy 
of international law.
216
 
 
Indeed, this move is encouraging and further boosts the recognition and application of jus 
cogens norms. This was long overdue as the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations which reflects the Court’s authoritative deliberations on various significant issues of 
international law involving disputes between sovereign states. The importance of a decision by 
the court on any aspect of international law cannot be underestimated in the present global 
community.217 
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The serious nature of jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes cannot be gainsaid.218 
Their breach gives non-injured states the right to institute legal action against the violating state 
on behalf of the entire international community.219 This route was previously seldom taken by 
states as they were, before the Second World War, reluctant to interfere in the domestic affairs 
of other states.220 However, this in no longer the position. As discussed earlier, it is increasingly 
accepted that human rights cannot be regarded as a purely domestic matter. The requirement 
therefore for the international community to respect, protect and promote human rights in their 
territories challenges state sovereignty,221 as it may be regarded as an infringement of article 
2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations which requires member of the United Nations to act in 
accordance with the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. There are, however, 
certain justifications for the prohibition of heinous crimes because of the commitment by 
members of the international community to protect and promote human rights.222 Furthermore, 
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the fact that some human rights have attained the status of jus cogens or erga omnes norms 
shows a significant “development in the process of universalizing human rights”.223  
Instead of punishing those responsible for human rights violations, some third party states have 
rather opted for avenues of conflict resolution other than prosecution, so promoting impunity in 
the process. For example, the AU has adopted a conciliatory approach, for example negotiation, 
in dealing with the current Sudanese President who is allegedly responsible for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.224 The SADC countries, have also taken a moderate approach to the 
Government of Zimbabwe for its alleged human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. Even if this is the 
case, Ferreira and Ferreira-Snyman have correctly stated that although states are usually not 
comfortable to litigate against (or investigate) other states to enforce a human rights treaty, it 
does not follow that it is legally impossible to do so.225  For example, in National Commissioner 
of The South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and 
Another,226 the Constitutional Court of South Africa was asked to determine whether South 
Africa’s international and domestic obligations imposed a duty on the South African Police 
Service to investigate allegations of torture committed by Zimbabwean police against 
Zimbabwean nationals in Zimbabwe? The Court found that there was indeed such a duty and 
held that “the duty to combat torture travels beyond the borders of Zimbabwe”.227 It further 
indicated that torture is a crime against humanity and that under customary international law all 
states have an interest in combatting it.228 Additionally, the Court held that: “South Africa may, 
through universal jurisdiction” take measures to investigate the alleged perpetrators with a view 
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to prosecution.229 The South African Police Service was consequently instructed to investigate 
the complaints of alleged torture. This is an important decision as it indicates that international 
law does permit allegations of torture to be investigated regardless of where they have been 
committed. In addition, the fact that the AU has initiated the negotiation process in Zimbabwe 
and elsewhere to restore peace, is testimony that other states are concerned and prepared to 
intervene. It is therefore not an issue of exclusive concern to Zimbabwe but implicates the 
international community as a whole. Consequently, as the international prohibition on torture 
and genocide have already attained the status of jus cogens norms which entail erga omnes 
obligations, states are obliged to respect these norms without having consented to them. It is 
submitted that this is a significant limitation on state sovereignty. 
2.5. Humanitarian intervention  
2.5.1 Humanitarian intervention with the approval of the UN SC 
As stated earlier in the discussion, article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits 
Members of the United Nations from interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. However, 
articles 40, 41 and 43 of the Charter of the United Nations, which authorises the UN SC to take 
measures that may include entering the territory of another state in order to restore peace, are 
an exception to the principle of non-intervention. The basis for this is that Members of the United 
Nations have a collective international responsibility through the UN SC to maintain international 
peace and security. This means that sovereignty or the principle of non-intervention cannot be 
used to pre-empt an action that has been approved by the UN SC to deter conduct that is a 
threat to international peace.230 It therefore follows that an action taken by the UN SC under 
article 39231 of the Charter of the United Nations will erode state sovereignty. Indeed, the UN SC 
has over the years taken various measures which allow (or allowed) its troops to enter a 
sovereign state with the aim of responding to gross violations of human rights. One of the 
examples is the UN SC resolution that authorised external intervention through member states 
                                                          
229
  The South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another   
  at para 49. 
230
  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty “The Responsibility to Protect” 
Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty 6-7. 
231
  Article 39 provides that “ [t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, … and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security”. 
92 
 
in Libya to protect civilians whose rights were being violated by the government.232 The reality is 
however that at times the UN SC fails to act in instances where gross human rights violations 
are committed. The genocide in Rwanda which the UN SC failed to prevent through intervention 
in Rwanda is a case in point.233  
2.5.2 Humanitarian intervention without the approval of the UN SC  
The violation of human rights in Rwanda, Darfur, Sudan, East Timor and Kosovo, amongst 
others, has led to debate among legal scholars as to whether there is a right of humanitarian 
intervention without the necessary authorisation from the UN SC.234 One of the concerns is that 
unilateral humanitarian intervention may be open to abuse as states might hide behind the 
banner of humanitarian intervention to wage war on other states for ulterior motives.235 
Generally, international law prohibits the use of force against another state,236 for any reason 
including to rescue victims of human rights violations, save when the intervening state is acting 
in self-defence.237  
The Charter of the United Nations requires the United Nations and its members, when pursuing 
the purposes of the Organisation – for example the maintenance of international peace and 
security – to act in accordance with the principle of the sovereign equality of all members.238 
This could be read as implying that all states are sovereign and equal irrespective of their size 
or wealth. However, in reality this is not the case as some states are more powerful in terms of 
resources than other states. It is submitted that as a general rule, and no matter how small or 
how wealthy states are, their sovereignty should be protected and that there should be no 
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external interference without the approval of the UN SC. Although not legal,239 humanitarian 
intervention may be at least legitimate under certain circumstances to protect civilians such as 
in the case of Kosovo.240 Humanitarian intervention can be traced from the writings of Hugo 
Grotius during the 19th Century in which he advocated that foreign state may enter the territory 
of another because of the former state’s failure to protect its citizens.241 For example, during the 
1800s some European states intervened in the Ottoman Empire to end the killings of Christian 
civilians.242 It was only after the 1840s that humanitarian intervention appeared in international 
legal writings and gradually became one of the topical issues in international law.243 It has 
become difficult for certain individual states to sit by and watch another state committing gross 
human rights violations against its people. There is, therefore, an emerging trend, based on a 
moral justification, to allow states or international organisations to intervene in another state for 
humanitarian reasons.244 On an international level, this practice was illustrated by NATO’s 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo.245 An example of such intervention specifically in the 
SADC region, is the 1998 military intervention on humanitarian grounds in Lesotho by South 
Africa and Botswana in order to prevent a coup and possible violation of human rights.246 
Humanitarian intervention has also been undertaken by the Economic Community of West 
African States in both Liberia and Sierra Leone to stop the violations of human rights.247 The 
                                                          
239
  Many governments remain opposed to the principle of humanitarian intervention without the 
authority of the UNSC.  See in this regard Press Release GA/SPD/164 “’Humanitarian 
intervention’, slow reimbursement rates assailed as special committee reviews peacekeeping 
operations” available at http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/1999/19991018.gaspd164.doc.html 
(Date of use: 23 March 2015). See also para 54 of the Declaration of the South Summit adopted 
in 2000 where Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the Group of 77 and 
China said that they “... reject the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal 
basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law”. The 
Declaration is available at http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm (Date of use: 
23 March 2015).  
240
  Greenwood 1999 (10) Finnish Yearbook of International Law 161-162. See also Goodman 2006 
(100) The American Journal of International Law 108 where he concedes that “…the consensus 
of opinion among governments and jurists favors requiring Security Council approval for 
humanitarian intervention”.  
241
  O’ Donnell 2014 (24) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 559; Quinn The 
Responsibility to Protect 6.  
242
  O’ Donnell 2014 (24) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 559. 
243
  Quinn The Responsibility to Protect 6. 
244
  See, inter alia, Goodman 2006 (100) American Journal of International Law 112; Van der Vyver 
2003 (28) South African Yearbook of International Law 6-7; Arias 1999 (23) Fordham Law Review 
1006. 
245
  Greenwood 2002 (X) Finnish Yearbook of International Law 141. 
246
  Likoti FK “The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace Mission or resources war?” 
2007 (14) International Peace Keeping 251. 
247
  Goodman 2006 (100) American Journal of International Law 112. 
94 
 
intervention was carried out under articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance 
on Defence which sought to prevent political unrest that had the potential to constitute a threat 
against the entire Economic Community of West African States.248  
A further example of intervention for humanitarian purposes emerges from Bishop Rubin Phillip 
and Another v National Conventional Arms Control Committee and Another249 instituted by 
concerned South African citizens to prevent the transportation of arms via the Indian Ocean 
from the Durban Harbour to Zimbabwe.250 The applicant’s concerns were that the weapons 
were destined for use against civilians “for internal repression or suppression of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms”.251 Even before 1945, on various occasions states took action and 
intervened in other states in order to prevent gross violations of human rights.252 It is submitted 
that humanitarian intervention, depending on the circumstances of each situation (such as that 
of Kosovo), may be justifiable to prevent a human catastrophe.253 The international community 
should not watch a state killing its own citizens when there is a process available allowing 
intervention to protect human rights.254 It is submitted that the examples above show that state 
sovereignty is increasingly being eroded because of the need to restore international peace and 
to protect human rights. Accordingly, the traditional view of state sovereignty as absolute can 
longer stand, as the issue of humanitarian intervention clearly indicates.255  
The moral justification for humanitarian intervention may be attributed to the belief of the 
international community that it has a responsibility to protect. In recent years, the doctrine of the 
“Responsibility to Protect” has emerged in international law in terms of which the international 
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community has a duty to prevent the massacre of people in any territory without the approval of 
the UN SC.256 The responsibility to protect was initially conceptualised by Deng from the 
framework of the Charter of the United Nations which empowers regional arrangements to strive 
for the maintenance of international peace and security.257 Deng’s work has been accepted by 
the international community and it is now widely known that sovereignty is no longer about “the 
privileges of power but also responsibilities to the citizenry”.258 The failure of the international 
community to prevent the genocide in Rwanda led the former United Nations Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan – to ask the global community to attend to humanitarian intervention.259 In response 
to the aforesaid request, Canada created the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty which expanded the discussion on sovereignty as a responsibility.260 The 
2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty introduced 
three elements of the responsibility to protect applicable in cases of conflicts that involve crimes 
such as genocide.261 These are: (1) the responsibility to prevent whereby states should identify 
the causes of a conflict before it escalates into an emergency situation; (2) the responsibility to 
react which permits states to respond to a conflict that has erupted into a crisis through, inter 
alia, sanctions or military intervention; and (3) the responsibility to rebuild which involves the 
provision of assistance by other states to a state recovering from crisis.262 The 2001 Report of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has received wide 
international support.263 Further, at the 2005 World Summit, states, inter alia, agreed and 
declared that every state has a responsibility to protect it people and prevent genocide.264 These 
undertakings were further endorsed by the Security Council in 2006 and by the General 
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Assembly in 2009.265 In light of this discussion, it is evident that humanitarian intervention 
without the UN SC approval is increasingly justified with reference to the so-called 
“responsibility to protect”.266 
It is however currently still accepted that the UN SC authorisation is needed for intervention to 
be legal.267 Interventions such as the one in Kosovo may thus be regarded as legitimate at the 
most.268 
2.6 African states’ perception of sovereignty  
2.6.1  The Organisation of African Unity 
When the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1961, Africa ascribed to the 
traditional international law view of sovereignty in the sense that sovereignty was regarded as 
“basic, sacrosanct and uncompromising”.269 It can be safely said that the OAU was established 
during the time where there was no restriction on state sovereignty and that African countries 
used it to protect their independence from Western countries.270 Therefore, the principles of 
absolute state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs271 of another state, were 
the key objectives of the OAU Charter.272 As a result, it has been said that many African states 
did not take human rights seriously and were unwilling to intervene and/or denounce other 
states even in the face of clear gross violations of human rights.273 For example, the massacre 
of the Hutus by the Tutsi regime in Burundi during 1972 and 1973 drew no comment from the 
OAU, as the massacre was said to be an “internal affair”.274 Furthermore, reliance on strict state 
sovereignty benefitted those African governments and or leaders who mounted coups, rigged 
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elections, and dictated to their people.275 During the existence of the OAU, more than 71 coups 
took place in Africa, and the OAU’s approach was that these were matters falling solely within 
the domestic jurisdiction of its member states involved.276 It is submitted that even though many 
of the African countries are still very protective of their sovereignty,277 sovereignty is being 
redefined as emerges from the provisions of the AU’s constitutive document. As indicated by 
Nagan and Hammer, a “new conception of sovereignty is being formulated” in the sense that 
African countries are expected to act in accordance with the continent’s obligations arising from 
various instruments.278 In this way, African sovereignty is being subordinated “to the continent’s 
own constitutional and public order”.279 
 
2.6.2 The African Union 
In comparison to the OAU Charter, the Constitutive Act of the African Union280 places greater 
emphasis on the protection and promotion of human rights on the African continent.281 The 
human rights agenda in the AU can be traced to the Preamble of the Constitutive Act where 
African leaders indicate their express determination “to promote and protect human and 
peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance 
and the rule of law”. In addition, the objectives of the AU include: the encouragement of 
international cooperation having due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
UDHR;282 the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good 
governance;283 and the protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.284 There is 
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no doubt that these provisions promote the protection of human rights, something that was 
lacking under the OAU Charter with its emphasis on state sovereignty.285 More importantly, 
where atrocities such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity have been 
committed,286 the Constitutive Act empowers the AU to intervene in a member state pursuant to 
a decision of the Assembly. Further, the Constitutive Act recognises the right of any member 
state to request intervention from the AU in order to restore peace and security.287 The 
provisions in the Constitutive Act which empowers the AU to intervene in the territory of a 
member state to protect human rights are similar those of the Charter of the United Nations 
which authorises the UN SC to take measures by inter alia entering a sovereign state in order to 
restore peace. In other words, both under international law and African regional law sovereignty 
cannot be used in a manner that compromises the protection of human rights. 
 
There are proposals288 to amend article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act which will allow the AU, 
upon recommendation by its Peace and Security Council, to intervene further in a member state 
in cases of a “serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member 
State of the Union”. This will afford the AU an opportunity to intervene in countries where 
atrocities are committed such as the recent conflict in South Sudan. In 2008 the AU intervened 
militarily in the Comoros Islands to take control from Mohamed Bacar, whose election as 
president was not recognised by the international community, and assist the Union Government 
of Comoros to “re-establish control over the Island”.289 The military intervention by the AU, 
excluding South Africa, was supported by the international community.290 It must be noted that 
the ground for intervention in the Comoros Islands is not one of the grounds listed in article 4(h) 
of the Constitutive Act, and certainly not those listed in the Protocol on Amendments to the 
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Constitutive Act which are not yet in force.291 In this regard, Ferreira-Snyman has correctly 
observed that the intervention might have been on the basis of the AU’s “condemnation and 
rejection of unconstitutional changes of government”.292 It can, therefore, be said that article 4(h) 
of the Constitutive Act has never been used by the AU, despite opportunities to do so where 
there have been violations of human rights in countries such as the Central African Republic, 
Zimbabwe and Mali. It is submitted that to the extent that article 4(h) accords the AU a right to 
intervene, it represents a limitation on the principle of non-interference (which enjoyed superior 
status under the OAU) and thus limits state sovereignty.293 Even though the Constitutive Act still 
contains the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state, it is clear that 
there is an exception to this principle, as the AU or any member state (via the AU) may 
intervene in cases of grave breaches of human rights, including unconstitutional changes of 
government. In addition, it is submitted that article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act also serves as a 
deterrent to potential dictators contemplating committing heinous crimes as they are aware that 
the AU may intervene. Given the fact that member states have to treat their citizens in 
accordance with the accepted standards of human rights, it is clear that the human rights 
movement has brought about a significant shift in the traditional principle of state sovereignty 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. How a state treats its nationals, is 
no longer a purely internal matter but the concern of the international community as a whole. 
There has, therefore, been a clear change in the understanding of the concept of sovereignty 
traditionally espoused by African states. 
 
2.6.3  Reciprocity of human rights treaties 
Reciprocity is an important principle in international law because states conclude a treaty for 
mutual benefit. This means that when a treaty becomes operational, all the parties to it need to 
observe and fulfil their treaty obligations equally.294 There are different manifestations of 
reciprocity. It entails the material exchange of goods or benefits between parties to a particular 
treaty.295 It also means that even though treaties may not result in reciprocal exchange of 
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goods, the fact that there was consent suggests that there might be some form of reciprocity.296 
Lastly, reciprocity, in its ordinary meaning, represents a framework of an agreement between 
states and only contains the rights and obligations of the parties to the treaty.297 In other words, 
only a party that has a “direct benefit from the performance of an obligation can successfully 
invoke the duty of another party to perform”.298 This is evident when one looks at it from the 
perspective that there is generally a very good culture of compliance with non-human rights 
treaties,299 as opposed to those protecting human rights. The reason for this is that there is a 
motive for reciprocity in non-human rights treaties because one party performs its obligation in 
anticipation that it will also benefit from the performance of the other party.300 However, as there 
is no counter-performance involved in human rights treaties, it may prove difficult to enforce a 
human rights treaty against a violating state.301 Some scholars are of the view that there is no 
justification for reciprocity in human rights treaties because the treaty is between states, but for 
the benefit of their citizens.302 It is submitted that states will probably support this view in order 
to prevent infringement of their sovereignty by other states.303   
As an important principle of international law, there is no legitimate reason to claim that the 
principle of reciprocity does not apply (or applies to a limited extent) to human rights treaties. 
Human rights treaties are part of international law. As noted by Klein, “states would not 
conclude a treaty if they had no mutual interest in the performance of the accepted 
commitments”.304 It is immaterial whether human rights treaties are concluded by states, but for 
the benefit of their nationals. The fact remains that the states have undertaken to fulfil their 
treaty obligations.305 The undertaking is made towards other states. According to Henkin, 
human rights agreements are directly enforceable between the parties to a particular 
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instrument.306 It therefore follows that a state party has a reciprocal duty towards other state 
parties to fulfil its treaty obligations.307  
There is evidence (such as the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and 
the International Criminal Court) supporting the argument that human rights cannot be regarded 
as a purely domestic matter. It has also been increasingly accepted that states cannot use their 
sovereignty as a shield behind which to commit human rights violations and contend that such 
action is a domestic matter. The international community has a legitimate interest to intervene in 
gross domestic violations of human rights.308 For example, it was within the powers of the South 
African Constitutional Court to receive a case and rule against Zimbabwe in the matter between 
the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others which arose from the violation 
of the rights contained in the SADC Treaty.309 The basis for this is that: “South Africa has 
essentially bound itself to do whatever is legally permissible to deal with any attempt by any 
Member State to undermine and subvert the authority of the [SADC] Tribunal and its decisions 
as well as the obligations” flowing from the Treaty.310 In this case, the government of Zimbabwe 
was ordered to pay the legal costs incurred by the respondent in a case that was before the 
Tribunal concerning human rights violations (ie dispossession of their agricultural land without 
compensation and eviction from their farms).311 This judgment acknowledged the importance of 
states’ obligations flowing from international and regional treaties, and the duty of states to 
adhere to their commitments. In addition, the decision indicates the commitments of the courts 
to promoting human rights and the need for states to observe the rule of law in their respective 
countries, and that non-compliance with a judgment by one state can be remedied in another 
state.312  
Another case in point is the ruling of the South African court in Southern African Litigation 
Centre and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others in which the 
government of South Africa was ordered to investigate and prosecute Zimbabwean officials 
responsible for alleged human rights violations committed in Zimbabwe. It is also an indication 
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that state sovereignty can no longer be used as a shield to protect those accused of human 
rights violations.313 In this case, the applicants had identified certain Zimbabwean officials who 
had allegedly been responsible for torturing people in Zimbabwe. They then asked the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPA) to conduct investigations with the aim of prosecuting 
these officials on the basis of South Africa’s obligations flowing from the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. In addition, the applicants argued that the rule of law had collapsed 
in Zimbabwe and it was unlikely that the responsible officials would be brought to justice in that 
country. In declining to conduct the necessary investigations, the South African Police Service 
wrote to the NDPP stating, inter alia: 
This you will appreciate would imply that these persons are in fact "agents of the 
service and a very real risk exists that the SAPS can be accused of conduct which is 
tantamount to espionage, or at the very least impinging on that countries sovereignty. 
(Emphasis added.)
314
 
 
This passage influenced the NDPP not to prosecute those allegedly involved in torture. The 
Court found that the SAPS and the NDPP were under a duty to investigate the allegations 
raised, and that it was not their place, at that stage, to consider political or other factors.315 This 
judgment effectively opens the way for the perpetrators of torture to be prosecuted in South 
Africa regardless of the sovereign state in which the acts were committed. In Thakur’s words, 
“[t]he doctrine of national sovereignty in its absolute and unqualified form, which gave rulers 
protection against attack from without while engaged within in the most brutal assault on their 
own citizens has gone with the wind”.316 Although these cases were not brought before the 
courts by a state (South Africa) but by an individual and an NGO, it is submitted that the 
principle of reciprocity is applicable in that South Africa has an interest in the promotion and 
protection of human rights.  
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In addition, some of the human rights treaties – for example, the ICCPR – contain inter-state 
complaint mechanisms for human rights violations.317 This clearly indicates that states have an 
interest in how other states adhere to the principles of human rights. 
In light of the above exposition, it is submitted that reciprocity is also applicable to human rights 
treaties and there exists a possibility that SADC member states may litigate against each other 
to enforce compliance with treaty obligations.318 Given the fact that access to the SADC Tribunal 
has been limited to disputes between states, reciprocity may therefore be an avenue to provide 
individuals with “indirect” access to the envisaged “new” Tribunal. This seldom happens in 
practice as states are generally reluctant to litigate against each other to enforce compliance 
with human rights laws. However, it has been said that this does not “necessarily imply that it is 
a legal impossibility to do so”.319  
2.6.4 Immunity 
Although there is a vast amount of literature on the concept of immunity, there is no uniform 
definition of what immunity is.320 The word immunity generally refers to protection and/or 
exemption from prosecution even though someone has committed a crime. The same applies to 
an international organisation which enjoys immunity in the sense that such an organisation 
cannot be brought before the courts (and that its property cannot be seized).321 Terms such as 
sovereign immunity, foreign state immunity, state immunity, or jurisdictional immunity are often 
used interchangeably in an attempt to explain what immunity entails.322  This study does not 
cover the broad conception of immunity, but focuses only on sovereign immunity, Heads of 
State immunity, and immunity of international organisations,323 particularly that of the SADC. 
These different forms of immunity are discussed separately below.  
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2.6.4.1  Sovereign (state) immunity 
 
Sovereign immunity refers to immunity which guarantees a foreign sovereign state immunity for 
all acts committed by states in the execution of their powers.324 It is said that state immunity and 
Head of State immunity (discussed below) are closely related and at times confused.325 The 
origin of the doctrine of state immunity, however, remains uncertain.326 Lauterpach has traced 
the roots of the doctrine to Head of State immunity at a time when the state and the sovereign 
were seen as one.327 The basis for this was the old idea that the “King can do no wrong” and 
that no King (the sovereign) could be called to account by another King.328 Since the King could 
do no wrong, this meant that even a wrongful command by him could not be challenged.329 The 
theory that King could do no wrong continued until such time as a distinction was made between 
the state and the King.330 Its objective was to shield “political activities of the state as a 
sovereign entity”.331 The immunity of the state was, at that time, regarded as absolute.332 
However, it was only when the governments and their agencies became frequent players in 
international trade and finance that the law developed.333 Judicial activisms also contributed to 
the transformation of the law regarding the principle of state immunity because some domestic 
courts denied immunity to foreign states if the acts of these states were private or 
commercial.334 Immunity of the state is no longer absolute as evidenced by the recent 
attachment of Zimbabwean property in Cape Town.335 
 
In order to assist domestic courts to distinguish between the actions of a foreign state in its 
private or commercial capacity and its actions classified as “sovereign”, the law of state 
immunity has been codified in many jurisdictions.336 As a result, the courts have guidance on 
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what to do when the issue of state immunity comes before them. For example, in the case of 
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others337 the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa confirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal which ordered the attachment of 
Zimbabwean property. This was in line with the provisions of the Foreign States Immunities 
Act338 which provides that commercial transactions of the state are not immune. In other words, 
the property can be seized and sold in execution.339 Section 3 of the Foreign States Immunities 
Act recognises that immunity of a foreign state may be forfeited by express waiver. Both the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court of South Africa relied on the provisions of 
the Foreign States Immunities Act to conclude that Zimbabwe had waived its immunity when it 
committed itself to the Tribunal Protocol and the Treaty.340 According to De Wet, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa did not deal extensively with the concept of state immunity 
because the questions relating to immunity were “clear-cut” and therefore only required the 
application of the law as contained in the Foreign States Immunities Act.341 It is therefore now 
settled that the principle of sovereign immunity from any legal claims has to a certain extent lost 
its once absolute status in order to allow individuals to bring legal action against the state. The 
recent Zimbabwean property sold in Cape Town is testimony to this.342 The state can therefore 
also be challenged and has in this regard lost a portion of its sovereignty. 
 
2.6.4.2  Head of state immunity 
There are two forms of immunity involved in Head of state immunity under international law, 
namely personal immunity and functional immunity.343 The former refers to immunity that 
attaches to a person while in office, and the latter to the “official acts or functions of senior state 
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question. (3) The provisions of this Act shall not be construed as subjecting any foreign state to 
the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic.” 
337
  The details of the case are discussed in Chapter 5 and this section deals only with the aspect of 
state immunity. 
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http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Zim-govt-property-in-Cape-Town-sold-for-R37m-
20150921 (Date of use: 23 September 2015). 
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officials” such as a head of state.344 Functional immunity can be invoked by, inter alia, a serving 
head of state or former heads of state, for crimes they committed while in office.345 Generally, 
one may not invoke functional immunity after committing international crimes because such 
conduct is not classified as an official act.346 An example in this regard is the Pinochet case.347 
Pinochet became president of Chile through a military coup in 1973.348 During his term in office, 
people disappeared, while others were tortured and murdered. He was voted out of office during 
the 1990 elections but was appointed Senator for life. This granted him immunity.  While visiting 
the United Kingdom in 1998 for medical attention, Pinochet was arrested at the request of the 
Spanish government in order to have him extradited to Spain to stand trial for the crimes he had 
committed during his term in office. Pinochet's legal representatives contended that he was 
immune from the jurisdiction of the British court because he was a head of state at the time the 
crimes were committed. The issue that was to be decided by the Court was whether Pinochet 
could claim state immunity from prosecution for the crimes he had allegedly committed and 
therefore not be extradited to Spain. The Divisional Court ruled in favour of Pinochet in that he 
had state immunity as the acts of which he was accused were committed while he was head of 
state.349 However, the House of Lords ruled that Pinochet did not have immunity because the 
acts of torture and murder could not be classified as official acts that ought to be performed by a 
head of state.350 
Traditionally, heads of state or government officials were immune from prosecution for all crimes 
committed while in office.351 However, the emergence of human rights requires everyone to 
respect human rights.352 International criminal law also calls for those who commit heinous 
crimes, regardless of the office they hold, to be held accountable for international crimes.353 The 
establishment of the ICTRY and the ICTR in 1993 and 1994 are indicative that no immunity 
shall be granted to anyone, including heads of state, for gross violations of human rights. These 
                                                          
344
  Nkhata 2011 (5) Malawi Law Journal 156. 
345
  Nkhata 2011 (5) Malawi Law Journal 156; Murungu Duty to prosecute” 37. 
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tribunals were clear in their constitutive documents that the official position of any accused 
person, including a head of state, “shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate punishment”.354 The fact that Slobodan Milosevic, although he died before the 
conclusion of his case, was indicted when he was still president of the former Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia is testimony that heads of state can no longer hide behind state immunity or 
sovereignty before international tribunals.355 The indictment of Charles Taylor by the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) while he was head of state offers further confirmation.356 
The commitment of the international community to end impunity for heinous crimes by punishing 
those responsible regardless of the position they hold, did not end with the ICTY, SCSL and 
ICTR. A permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) to adjudicate gross violations of human 
rights was also established on 17 July 1998357 and came into operation on 1 July 2002.358 The 
ICC reaffirmed that the international community intends putting an end to impunity by trying 
anyone, including heads of state, responsible for committing crimes against humanity, amongst 
others. The Statute of the ICC is clear that official capacity and/or position as head of state will 
not bar the Court from exercising criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for, inter alia, 
genocide.359 It is important to highlight that the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction over state 
parties who have ratified the Statute. However, referrals by the UN SC may also be made in 
case of non-party states where it appears that crimes such as genocide or crimes against 
humanity have been committed.360 A referral by the UN SC to the ICC was made for the 
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investigation of a serving head of state, Al Bashir of Sudan, for genocide and crimes against 
humanity.361 The UN SC referral indicated that: 
Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court;  
2. Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Sudan 
shall co-operate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
Prosecutor pursuant to this Resolution, while recognizing that states not party to the 
Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all states and concerned 
regional and international organizations to co-operate fully.
362
 
 
It must be noted that this referral is silent on the issue of the immunity of a head of state. It is 
submitted that such silence could be read as implying that the UN SC was aware that the issue 
of immunity of heads of state before international criminal tribunals is settled.363 In any event, it 
is further submitted that the UN SC would not have referred President Al Bashir to the ICC had 
Head of state immunity still applied to international tribunals. The fact that a warrant of arrest 
has been issued by the ICC prosecutor (and not by the domestic judicial authority), may 
indirectly impact on state sovereignty to the extent that President Al-Bashir acts on behalf of the 
state of Sudan. In a recent case, in the matter between the Southern Africa Litigation Centre v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others,364 it also became apparent that 
being a head of state does not provide any form of immunity for international crimes such as 
genocide. This case concerned the indictment of President Al-Bashir of Sudan by the ICC to 
stand trial for, inter alia, allegations of committing war crimes and genocide.365 Sometime in 
June 2015 President Al-Bashir attended the AU Summit in South Africa. His presence resulted 
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in a court process that sought to have him arrested and handed over to the ICC. The High Court 
found that the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court 
expressly provides that heads of state do not enjoy immunity under its terms. Similar 
provisions are expressly included in the Implementation Act. It means that the 
immunity that might otherwise have attached to President Bashir based on customary 
international law as head of state, is excluded or waived in respect of crimes and 
obligations under the Rome Statute.
366
 
 
The Court found that South Africa was obliged under international law to arrest President Al-
Bashir. It further expressed its dismay at President Al-Bashir being permitted to leave South 
Africa despite a court order preventing him from doing so.367  
 
In light of the above exposition, it is submitted that a head of state can no longer hide behind 
Head of state immunity and/or state sovereignty to evade justice.368 International criminal law 
has, therefore, effectively done away with the doctrine of Head of state immunity and anyone 
who commits international crimes will be prosecuted before international tribunals.369  
3 CONCLUSION 
Our discussion has shown that traditionally there was absolute respect for state sovereignty in 
that international law was initially involved only with inter-state relations. In addition, the state 
was the sole possessor of absolute power and could use it in any way it deemed necessary, 
including violating the rights of its citizens. This form of autonomy was known as Westphalian 
sovereignty.  
However, after the Second World War, international law developed rapidly and state sovereignty 
began to lose its absolute character. This was caused by factors such as regionalism, 
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globalisation, human rights, humanitarian intervention, and jus cogens norms which require 
cooperation among states. The international community realised that for the maintenance of 
international peace, amongst others, there was a need to create minimum standards with which 
states had to comply in order to promote the protection of human rights. States, through signing 
various (sub)-regional and international treaties, agreed that how they handle various issues 
(such as human rights) in their own territories would be measured against international 
standards. The creation of sub-regional communities such as the SADC for, inter alia, mutual 
economic benefit also serves as an indication that states are interdependent and need one 
another for the achievement of the common good.  To this end, Fawcett has said that “no state 
wishes to remain outside the current trends”.370   
In addition, the transformation of the OAU which was based on the principle of non-intervention, 
into the AU, signalled a major development in how African states perceive state sovereignty 
Further, humanitarian intervention, regardless of diverse views on its legality, has also shown 
that states increasingly recognise that they have an obligation to prevent another state from 
committing heinous crimes.371 This has, as we have seen, manifested most practically in the 
responsibility to protect movement. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity – which was regarded as absolute in all its manifestations, 
such as immunity for international organisations (the SADC), sovereign immunity, and Head of 
State immunity – has also been greatly affected. Heads of state, SADC as an institution, and 
any state can be brought before national and international courts to account for their actions – 
notably those involving human rights violations. No one is considered above the law.  
Finally, it is submitted that by becoming party to the Treaty and Tribunal Protocol, SADC 
countries have surrendered certain elements of their sovereignty and must respect the 
decisions of the Tribunal. In addition, SADC member states may also enforce the judgments of 
the Tribunal in their respective territories as they have undertaken obligations under the relevant 
instruments.  
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In light of the discussion above, it is clear that until 1945 state sovereignty was regarded as 
superior to other norms such as human rights, as their protection was regarded as a matter of 
purely domestic concern in which no interference was permitted. Currently, certain matters that 
were traditionally perceived as domestic, are now issues in which the international community 
has an interest. The ability of the UN SC to intervene in the territory of a member state for the 
promotion of international peace and the protection of human rights, has extinguished the power 
of the once sovereign state used to enjoying immunity from external intervention. It is therefore 
submitted that these factors have together significantly eroded state sovereignty, and that states 
can no longer hide behind the veil of sovereignty to avoid the promotion and protection of 
human rights.  
 
 
 
 
112 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL (SADC) AND NATIONAL 
LAW 
1 INTERNATIONAL LAW, SADC COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW 
One of the perennial problems in the national application of international law is that many states 
fail to transform their international commitments into their national law in order to give it the 
force of national law.1 Even where international law is automatically transformed into national 
law, states often choose to ignore international law.2 I deal with three relationships in this 
chapter: 
 
  the relationship between community law and the domestic laws of member states, that 
is sometimes defined in the constitutive documents of regional or sub-regional 
organizations;3 
 the relationship between international law and domestic law of member states; and 
 the relationship between community law and international law.4  
 
These relationships are often not determined in constitutions and constitutive documents. Due 
to globalisation, it is submitted that these relationships should be clarified by states in their 
constitutions or treaties. 
 
It must be noted that the SADC Treaty5 makes no provision for the nature of the relationship 
between international law and the national law of member states or for the relationship between 
community (SADC) law and the national law of member states, or the relationship between the 
community itself and international law. The clarification of these relationships is important in 
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 Cassese Realizing Utopia 188. 
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 Cassese Realizing Utopia 188. 
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constitutional and judicial challenges” available at 
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order to “make community law effective in national legal system”.6 Because of this gap in the 
Treaty, one needs to consider what member states’ national constitutions provide in this regard 
together with the approach taken by national courts in dealing with this lacuna.7 It is in this 
regard that the monist-dualist debate is useful, because to a certain extent, it provides answers 
as to how national legal systems incorporate treaty law.8 
 
In order to understand the relationship between SADC Community law and national law, one 
must look to the status of SADC Community law within a particular country. In cases where the 
constitution of a certain country provides no answers, there is a need to clarify the relationship 
between SADC Community law and national law in order to prevent legal uncertainty. Currently, 
it is not clear which system (SADC Community law or national law) is to be applied when a 
conflict between these legal systems arises. In order to ensure that the status of SADC 
Community law in national laws is properly understood and given effect to, it is necessary to 
address these voids. In addition, there is a need to clarify the relationship between national 
courts and sub-regional courts – such as the SADC Tribunal – as they operate on different 
levels.    
 
Because the Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol9 are silent on these questions, in this chapter I 
discuss the relationship between SADC Community law and the national law of member states; 
the relationship between international law and the national law of member states; and the 
relationship between SADC Community law and international law. Further, I explore the 
traditional theories on the reception of international law in national law. In addition, I consider 
the relationship between the Tribunal and the national courts of member states. The answers 
will be sought in the national constitutions10 of all SADC member states, the instruments 
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applicable to the Tribunal, and the approach (if any) taken by national courts. I shall also 
examine whether the Tribunal’s decisions ought to enjoy a status superior to the decisions of 
national courts and whether these decisions are directly enforceable in the national courts of 
member states. To the extent relevant, reference is made to the treaties (and decisions) 
establishing the ECOWAS CCJ and the European Court of Justice.  
2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SADC COMMUNITY 
LAW 
SADC Community law can be described as the legal principles, and undertakings set out in the 
SADC Treaty and its protocols.11 Regulations and other treaties of the community are also part 
and parcel of community law.12 These provisions are binding on member states. The 
establishment the Tribunal was a huge step forward in the development of SADC Community 
law and jurisprudence.13 However, this achievement was short lived as the Tribunal was 
suspended in 2010 before it was able to finalise the cases already before it.   
 
Neither the Treaty nor the Tribunal Protocol contains any provision indicating the relationship 
between SADC Community law and international law. The provision dealing with international 
law empowers the Tribunal to develop: “Community jurisprudence having regard to applicable 
treaties, general principles and rules of public international law”.14 These sources for the 
development of SADC Community law reproduce the well-known binding sources of public 
international law. It is therefore logical to conclude that the sources of public international law 
serve as persuasive legal authority in SADC Community law, and that SADC Community law 
should be in line with international law. This observation is important as it will form the basis for 
my argument that the sources of international law are a useful tool in ensuring convergence of 
SADC Community and international law, and that the national law of SADC member states is 
aligned with SADC Community law. In this regard, member states may not act in a way that is 
contrary to SADC Community law. 
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3 TRADITIONAL THEORIES ON THE RECEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
NATIONAL LAW 
The legal systems of all SADC countries differ in that some are monist and others dualist. The 
former British colonies are, by and large, dualist,15 while some of the former French and 
German colonies are predominantly monist.16 These theories are discussed in what follows. 
  
3.1  Dualism  
In terms of the dualist theory, international law may only be applied by national courts if it has 
been transformed into national law through legislation.17 For example, South Africa follows a 
dualistic approach and treaties are not directly enforceable in South African law unless 
parliament gives such law the force of national law in terms of section 231(4) of the 
Constitution,18 which reads as follows: 
Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law 
by national legislation but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.
19
 
 
In this regard Schlemmer (with reference to the World Trade Organisation [WTO] agreements in 
South African law) points out that the WTO agreements are binding on South Africa at an 
international level because they have been ratified.20 However, since there has been no 
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legislation enacted in order to domesticate the WTO, they are not part of South African national 
law.21  
 
Even though the South African Constitution provides a binding procedure for domesticating 
international law, the section is not entirely clear. In particular, the introduction of the concept of 
a self-executing treaty which becomes automatically binding in the domestic sphere upon 
ratification, is problematic.22 A provision of the treaty is said to be self-executing if it can be 
applied by the courts without the need for further legislation to give it national effect.23 In order to 
ascertain whether certain provisions in a treaty are indeed self-executing or not, is a matter to 
be clarified by the courts.24  
 
The requirement of the statutory enactment of international law in national law is the final step in 
the procedure triggering the applicability of international law in national law. I therefore support 
the view expressed by Schlemmer, because South Africa is a dualist state and ratified treaties, 
by and large, still need to be domesticated in South African law. For dualist states, the 
assumption of treaty obligations that have the force of national law is not completed by the mere 
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act of ratification.25 There is a further requirement of domesticating that particular treaty through 
legislation in the national legal system.26 The requirement of domestication of international law 
in South African law has been dealt with in many cases. In the matter between International 
Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa27 the Court was clear that the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 and WTO Agreements were part and parcel of South 
African law because they had been enacted into national law. The Court said: 
[South Africa’s] international obligations on tariffs and trade arise from the WTO 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 ...These obligations are honoured through domestic legislation … [which] 
consists of the International Trade Administration Act, 2000 ... The Act [International 
Trade Administration] is the primary domestic legislation ...
28
. 
This position reflects the general approach of the courts.29 However, despite the established 
jurisprudence on the process of transforming treaty obligations into municipal law, the 
Constitutional Court appears to be adopting what may be considered a monist approach in its 
recent decisions. For example, in Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others,30 the Court was called upon to determine the constitutionality of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act 56 of 2008 and the South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 
of 2008. The effect of these Acts was to disband the Directorate of Special Operations, which 
was located within the National Prosecuting Authority, and replace it with the Directorate of 
Priority Crime Investigation, located within the South African Police Service. The main issues 
were whether section 7(2) of the Constitution and ratified (but not domesticated) treaties impose 
a positive obligation on the state to establish an independent anti-corruption unit.31 The answers 
to these questions divided the Court. Interestingly, both the majority and minority judgments 
agreed that South Africa was obliged in terms of international law to create an independent 
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body to prevent organised crime.32 The only disagreement was on the interpretation of the 
content and extent of the obligation to which South Africa was bound by international law.  
The majority decision indicated that section 231(2) of the Constitution imposes a legal obligation 
on South Africa at an international level.33 This implies that a treaty that has been approved by 
Parliament binds South Africa and other states to that agreement on the international plane.34 
However, the majority judgment cautioned that South Africa’s international obligations arising 
from section 231(2) of the Constitution, although binding only on the international plane, should 
not be seen to mean that these international obligations have no impact at a domestic level.35 
To this end, the majority judgment found that South Africa’s obligation to establish an 
independent unit to deal with crime does not exist on the international level alone, but is also 
enforceable on the national level in terms of the Constitution.36 The basis for this was that 
section 7(2) of the Constitution requires the “state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights”.37 The majority judgment proclaimed that the provisions of section 
7(2) of the Constitution, inter alia, “impose a positive obligation on the state” to devise structures 
that will protect everyone.38 It further held that implicit in this positive obligation, is the duty to 
take reasonable measures to ensure that the rights in the Bill of Rights are protected.39 For the 
majority, to establish whether something is reasonable must be determined by having regard to 
international law as mandated by section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution which obliges it to consider 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.40 The majority then found that the 
conclusion it had reached as regards South Africa’s obligation to create an independent unit 
under international law, is not intended “to incorporate international agreements into [the] 
Constitution”, but rather represents the Court being “faithful to the Constitution itself, and to give 
meaning to the ambit of the duties it creates in accordance with its own clear interpretive 
injunctions”.41 
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Tuovinen is of the view that the majority judgment takes a “highly ambitious approach about the 
role of international law in constitutional adjudication” for the reasons indicated below.42 The 
difficulty with the majority judgment is that it relies on ratified but unincorporated treaties, such 
as the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime,43 in reaching its 
conclusion that the disbanding of the Directorate of Special Operations and its replacement with 
the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation was unconstitutional. The question asked by 
Ferreira and Ferreira-Snyman regarding the approach and the effect of the majority decision on 
the relationship between international law and national law in South Africa, is relevant to the 
present discussion.44 The majority judgment, through the “interpretive injunction in section 
39(1)(b) and its concomitant effect on section 7(2) of the Constitution, the latter of which 
concerns positive obligations of the state”, established a way for unincorporated international 
law to override local law.45 This case reflects an unusual procedure in which an unincorporated 
treaty was applied to influence its role within the domestic law.46 The observation by Ferreira 
and Ferreira-Snyman  that the practical effects of the route taken by the majority judgment is “to 
allow the Constitution to impose a monist approach” when it comes to human rights obligations 
flowing from ratified (but unincorporated) treaties,  in that they are applied by the courts even 
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  Tuovinen 2013 (134) The South African Law Journal 664. Tuovinen captures the problems of the 
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September 2003. 
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though they have not been domesticated, has merit.47 This was a clear departure from the 
dualist theory which regards international law and municipal law as two distinct and independent 
legal systems.  
 
The minority judgment disagreed with the majority decision and held that the approval of an 
international agreement in terms of section 231(2) of the Constitution does not imply that the 
agreement has been incorporated into South African law. For it to become law, it must be given 
the force of national law by enabling legislation, as mandated by section 231(4) of the 
Constitution.48 The minority further said: 
[T]reating international conventions as interpretive aids does not entail giving them the 
status of domestic law in the Republic. To treat them as creating domestic rights and 
obligations is tantamount to incorporat[ing] the provisions of the unincorporated 
convention into our municipal law by the back door.
49
 
 
The minority judgment dealt with the issue before it by taking into account that South Africa 
follows a dualist legal system and therefore ratified treaties are not binding at the national level 
until they have been incorporated.50 I agree with the minority judgment as the procedure for the 
application of or reliance on international law is provided in the Constitution and the Court’s own 
jurisprudence. The Court ought to have followed the dualist theory that regards international law 
and municipal law as separate and supreme within their own spheres of operation.51 It is 
therefore submitted that applying unincorporated treaties at a national level is contrary to 
section 231(4) of the Constitution. Ratified treaties must still be enacted into national law 
through legislation. The Courts’ approach has the potential of creating legal uncertainty, 
something that is undesirable for South Africa’s relationship with international law.  
 
Tshosa has rightly observed that the monist and dualist theories must be “approached with 
caution” as they may not “in practical terms purely determine the relationship between national 
and international law”.52 The South African case law above supports Tshosa’s observation. In 
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addition, the approach taken by South African courts makes the status of SADC Community law 
in the national legal system of South Africa unclear. 
In support of his views, Tshosa submits that the applicability of international law in the national 
sphere is “always conditioned by a rule of municipal law”. In addition, the application of treaties 
in many legal systems is mainly “governed by domestic constitutional law”.53 Further, he points 
out that the practical approach of the national courts is different as at times even monist 
countries fail to apply treaties that are applicable in a particular case.54 Despite these 
observations, Tshosa agrees that both systems are useful in helping to understand the 
relationship between international law and municipal law. Indeed, despite the highlighted gaps 
in the monist and dualist theories, they are nonetheless valuable in identifying how a particular 
legal system treats international law within its national law. Thosa’s views have merit and it is 
submitted that they should also apply to regional law because community law and international 
law are created through state consent and member states decide the manner in which these 
two legal systems will be given the force of law in their own territories.55 Further, as Barent’s 
correctly points out, “there is no fundamental difference between community law and 
international law, as various characteristics of the community legal order such as direct effect … 
[and] primacy are also recognised in international law”.56 I also adopt this view because, in 
reality, international law and community are adopted and operationalised in the same manner. 
Countries in the SADC region with dualist legal systems include Botswana, Lesotho,57 Malawi, 
Swaziland,58 Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Of these countries, South Africa,59 
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Malawi,60 Zimbabwe61 and Tanzania62 have clear provisions on the status of international law 
and the processes for its domestication in national law. This is what Oppong refers to as Africa’s 
“international law-friendly” attitude, as opposed to the initially hostile approach to international 
law during and immediately after colonialism.63 Unfortunately, no SADC member state has to 
date domesticated the SADC Treaty or the Tribunal Protocol. The dualist countries have, 
however, domesticated other treaties in their municipal laws. For example, in 2008 Tanzania 
enacted the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act 6 of 2008 which domesticates the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons.64 South Africa has also domesticated, 
inter alia, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court65 by enacting the Implementation 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002.66 Lesotho has also 
domesticated, inter alia, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child67 through 
enacting the Children’s Protection and Welfare Act 2004. From this, it can be deduced that there 
has been what may be described as “a wait and see approach”, or some lack of political will 
when it comes to the domestication of the SADC Treaty and Tribunal Protocol.68 
 
The constitutions of Botswana,69 Lesotho70 and Zambia71 are silent on the legal status of 
international law at the domestic level. The status of international law in Zambia is governed by 
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common law and, as a dualist state, a treaty must be transformed into national law through 
legislation in order to have the force of national law.72 Although Zambia actively participated in 
negotiating, adopting and ratifying several international instruments during the 1980s, it has, 
twenty years later, not yet transformed any of these instruments into national law.73 As a result, 
it is argued that there is no apparent willingness to domesticate international law, including the 
SADC Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol.  
 
With regard to Botswana, the country’s legal system is a dualist one74 and a ratified treaty does 
not automatically attain the force of national law but must be domesticated before it can be 
applied at the national level.75 There is a distinction that needs to be made between treaties in 
Botswana as there are those that require parliamentary action in order to have a force of 
national law.76 These are the treaties that are intended to affect the rights and duties of 
individual.77 Those treaties which deal with administrative issues such as “the provision of 
technical and financial assistance, do not require parliamentary action”.78 Botswana, too, does 
not have a good record of incorporating ratified treaties into its domestic law.79 
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Seychelles has a hybrid legal system based on both French civil law and English common law.80 
The Constitution of the Seychelles provides guidance on the status or application of 
international law in the domestic system.81 The country follows the dualist approach when it 
comes to the reception of international law into its domestic system. Further, article 48 of the 
Constitution of Seychelles, 1993, inter alia provides that the Bill of Rights shall be interpreted in 
a manner that is not contrary to Seychelles’s international human rights obligations. Seychelles 
is yet to ratify the SADC Treaty.82 
3.2  Monism 
The monist theory views international law and municipal law as a single system of law.83 
Consequently, international law need not be transformed into national law because the act of 
ratification (followed by publication) of an international treaty immediately transforms the treaty 
law into national law.84 Unlike dualism, upon ratification and publication the treaty obtains the 
force of national law and its status in local law is settled in that international law takes 
precedence over national law.85 This is usually the case with former French colonies whose 
constitutions were influenced by article 55 of the French Constitution of 1958, which gives 
ratified and domestically-published treaties supremacy over national law.86  
 
This is also the case with article 215 the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
2005, which provides that “[l]awfully concluded treaties and agreements have, when published, 
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an authority superior to that of the law, subject for each treaty and agreement to the application 
by the other party”. Ultimately, international law is applicable as law in the national legal system 
and may be invoked directly in national courts.87 However, it must be noted that this is not 
automatically the position in all countries whose legal systems are monist. The precedence of 
international law over national law largely depends on what the constitution of a particular 
country determines. Thus, the fact that international law may be directly applied by the courts, 
does not mean that it automatically takes precedence over domestic law. 
 
In countries with a monist legal system, such as Madagascar88 and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo,89 national courts are obliged to apply the provisions of international law without a further 
act of incorporation by the legislature.90 However, in practice this seldom happens. Killander and 
Adjolohoun have observed that “direct applicability of international law in domestic courts in civil 
law countries is in practice avoided by the courts, though sometimes invoked by counsel”.91 
Instead, courts only refer to international law in certain cases as a means of upholding 
constitutional provisions.92 This is often the case with Francophone African countries such as 
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which also follow the monist approach.93 It is, 
however, interesting to note that Portuguese-speaking African countries such as Angola,94 
Mozambique95 and the former German colony, Namibia,96 which also follow a monist legal 
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system, have constitutions that are friendlier in accommodating international law.97 This 
observation is supported by article 18(2) of the Constitution of Mozambique in that norms of 
international law shall have the same force in the Mozambican legal order as have infra-
constitutional legislative acts (situated under the constitution). Article 26(1) of the Angolan 
Constitution states that the fundamental rights provided for in the constitution shall not exclude 
others contained in international law. There is no doubt that these constitutional provisions 
expressly recognise and give international law the force of national law in these countries. This 
notwithstanding, it does not mean that international law is frequently applied by national courts 
as the “courts still expect the legislator to provide a legal framework for the implementation of 
treaty principles”.98 My research has, with the exception of Sychelles and Mauritius, revealed 
that all the SADC states have ratified the SADC Treaty99  and the Tribunal Protocol. However, 
all the states whose legal system is monist have not as yet published these instruments in their 
national laws in order to give them the force of national law. This is also the situation with the 
states whose legal system is dualistic and which have not yet promulgated enabling legislation. 
This thus means that the provisions of the Treaty and Tribunal Protocol have not been given the 
force of national law in the territories of all SADC states and consequently cannot be applied by 
national courts. 
 
Mauritius has a hybrid legal system based on both French civil law and English common law.100 
The Constitution of Mauritius101 is silent on the status of international law in the domestic 
sphere. There is furthermore no constitutional provision dealing with the process of ratification 
and implementation of international law in Mauritius. The Constitution of Mauritius provides only 
that the constitution is the supreme law of the country and that any law inconsistent with it shall 
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be void.102 As I have indicated, Mauritius has not yet ratified the SADC Treaty and Tribunal 
Protocol. In light of the above, it is necessary for Mauritius to provide a procedure for becoming 
party to the SADC Treaty and the status of this treaty in its national law. 
 
Although specifically referring to international human rights law, Killander and Adjolohoun have 
indicated that to ensure greater reliance on international law, ratified treaties should be 
published so that lawyers and judges may readily access the knowledge they need to ensure 
quality pleadings and judgments.103 In addition, they recommend that countries that have not 
done so, “...should provide a constitutional or legislative mandate for courts to consider 
international human rights law in addition to implementing legislation consistent with their 
international obligations”.104 In the absence of these recommended provisions, it will be difficult 
to implement international obligations at the national level. It is submitted that the continued 
uncertain status of the Treaty and Tribunal Protocol in the countries with a monist legal system, 
could be viewed as a lack of political will from member states to give effect to the obligations 
assumed under these instruments. 
 
Three observations can be made as regards the theories of law discussed above. Monism 
views international law and national law as a single system. Further, in cases of conflict 
between the two legal systems, there is no clarity of what should occur unless a specific country 
has expressly indicated that its national legal system shall have the same status as SADC 
Community law, or that the latter shall enjoy superior status where a conflict between the two 
legal systems arises. Dualism sees international law and national law as two distinct and 
independent legal systems which operate in their own spheres. Consequently, national law can 
enjoy a status superior to international law – except in the case of jus cogens norms. This is so 
because it was said that the source of national law is the will of the state itself, whereas the 
source of international law is the common will of states.105  
 
International law traditionally dealt with states as subjects of international law.106 This is no 
longer the position. It is now beyond doubt that the traditional view which regarded international 
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law as regulating states only no longer applies.107 Individuals too, have become subjects of 
international law and holders of rights.108 Further, national law cannot be used to invalidate or 
evade international obligations. It is in this regard that it is submitted that international law (and 
thus regional law) should override national law when a conflict between the two arises. This will 
apply only if the constitution of a particular country is clear that regional law takes precedence 
over national law. It is submitted that once a state becomes a party to a treaty, and that treaty is 
published at a national level, such a treaty should acquire a status superior to national law if the 
constitution of the state concerned so provides.109 Where there is no provision indicating the 
solution in case of conflict between two legal systems, it is submitted that the state concerned 
should strive as far as possible to accord regional law superior status. Accordingly, it is 
submitted that when there is a conflict between SADC Community law and national law, the 
former should be preferred.110 This is to allow the law-making body on the national level to bring 
the state’s national law in line with its regional obligations. This also brings legal certainty 
between the two legal systems.111  
 
It is submitted that this approach should be borrowed from a well-established principle of 
international law which oblige states to any international agreement to ensure that they 
discharge their treaty obligations in good faith.112 The then Permanent Court of International 
Justice correctly declared in its Advisory Opinion in the matter between Exchange of Greek and 
Turkish Populations113 that there is 
a ‘self-evident’ principle in international law, according to which a state which has 
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such 
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations 
undertaken. 
 
In light of this international law principle, it is submitted that when SADC Community law 
imposes obligations on a member state, that state should honour its obligations by ensuring that 
its laws are in conformity with its treaty obligations.114 Unfortunately, this rarely happens115 
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despite the fact that that the law of the treaties requires that treaty obligations be discharged in 
good faith by signatory states.116 
Under the European Union system in which community law is regarded as a separate legal 
order which, inter alia, takes precedence over conflicting laws of member states,117 three key 
arguments are advanced to justify the supremacy of community (regional) law over the national 
law of member states. These are: 
 
 the international legal obligation to observe treaties;  
 ensuring the efficacy and uniform application of community law; and  
 the autonomous character of the community legal order (this is not applicable in the 
current SADC legal system).118 
 
These arguments are supported as they justify the supremacy of community law over national 
law. Another feature of the European Union system is the autonomous character of the 
European Union community law which makes community law supreme over the laws of member 
states.119 It is submitted that these characteristics should also apply in the SADC region 
because it would be a futile exercise for SADC member states to embark on a lengthy process 
of negotiating and adopting treaties whose provisions would thereafter be ignored. It is 
conceded, however, that community law is largely based on state consent. Therefore, states 
may negotiate and thereafter opt to be part of a treaty or choose not to be. Notwithstanding, 
when it is clear that SADC Community law takes precedence over national law of member 
states, there will be legal certainty and this will prevent a situation whereby national law and 
community law regulate similar issues differently.120 To ensure the effectiveness of community 
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law, it is submitted that states should cede certain aspects of their legislative authority to the 
SADC Community legal order for the better functioning of the community legal order.    
 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been very useful in clarifying the 
relationship between community law and the national law of European Union member states.121 
Accordingly, it is necessary to discuss the concept of direct application as developed by the 
ECJ. Direct application means that community law does not require the legislature to enact 
legislation in order to make EU law applicable in member states. Immediately on coming into 
operation, community law is binding and applicable in EU member states.122 To this end, the 
ECJ has correctly stated that the operation of community law is “… independent of any measure 
of reception into national law …” and that member states are under an obligation to respect the 
direct applicability of community law.123 In the event of a conflict between the European Union 
community law and the national law of member states, community law will prevail.124 As was 
stated in Flaminio Costa v ENEL: 
[B]y creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international 
plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from limitation of sovereignty or 
transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have created a body of law which 
binds both their nationals and themselves.
125
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the SADC Tribunal in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean Constitution authorises expropriation of land 
without compensation. As a result, the applicant’s farms were evicted from their farms and their 
farms were expropriated. They then went to the SADC Tribunal to challenge the constitutionality 
of the land reform programme. The SADC Tribunal ruled in their favour and inter alia ordered that 
Zimbabwe pays a fair compensation to the applicants. The SADC Tribunal had ruled that 
Zimbabwe was in breach of its obligations to inter alia act in accordance with human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law and the principle of non-discrimination. The High Court of 
Zimbabwe declined to honour the judgment of the SADC Tribunal because it was contrary to 
public policy as it sought to annul a constitutionally mandated land reform programme. On one 
hand Zimbabwe has its own domestic laws which sanctions expropriation of white famers without 
compensation. On the other hand, SADC has its own laws such as human rights (which include a 
right to be compensated in cases of expropriation) which require Zimbabwe to respect and not to 
discriminate. The SADC law on the other hand protects the rights of people from being evicted 
from their homes.  
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The ECJ’s decision in this case basically means that the European Union community law, as 
regards order of precedence, enjoys a status superior to the law of the member states.126 The 
doctrine of supremacy has been the main driving force in achieving European integration.127 As 
a result, it has been said that the ECJ has gone beyond its interpretative role and entered into 
the realm of policy-making.128 The idea of the supremacy of European Union law is not 
mentioned in any of the European Union Treaties. The ECJ has, however, developed this 
principle through its jurisprudence. Further, European Union community law prevails over the 
national law of member states when a conflict arises between the two systems.129 Direct 
applicability does not mean the same thing as direct effect. The latter entails a situation whereby 
an individual may invoke community law in a case before a national court and that court will be 
bound to follow the community law.130  
 
The approach taken by the ECJ is applauded as the community legal order has to be effective 
and provide protection when community law is threatened or has to be applied. Indeed, the ECJ 
is tasked with the responsibility of interpreting the community law and is the backbone of the 
community legal order. Accordingly, the ECJ is one of the integral parts of the European Union 
order. 
 
Treaties governing other sub-regional communities – for example the Treaty Establishing the 
East African Community – may provide guidance on the relationship between regional law and 
the national law of member states. This treaty specifically provides that “[c]ommunity … laws 
shall take precedence over similar national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of 
this Treaty”.131 There is no doubt that this provision clearly spells out the nature of the 
relationship between the East African Community law and the national law of member states. 
Community law is superior to the national law of member states. The drafters of the Treaty 
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Establishing the East African Community presumably foresaw the need for this provision to 
prevent a situation in which community law would be challenged on the basis of its 
incompatibility with the national law of member states. In addition, with regard to the relationship 
between community law and national law, it is clear that the position in the East African 
Community is similar to that in European Union community law. The only difference is that the 
relationship between community law and national law in the former, is contained in the Treaty 
establishing the East African Community, whereas the relationship in the latter community was 
developed by the ECJ. Unfortunately, the SADC Treaty does not provide clear guidance on this 
critical issue. The nature of the relationship between SADC Community law and the national law 
of member states thus remains unclear.  
 
The SADC Treaty only indicates that member states, inter alia, undertake to take all the steps 
necessary to accord the Treaty the force of national law.132 Despite this lacuna, it is submitted 
that this has to a certain extent been clarified by a South African Constitutional Court in the 
matter between the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others where the 
Court applied the provisions of the Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol despite the fact that they 
had not been domesticated in South African laws.133 In reaching its conclusion, the court stated, 
inter alia, that SADC member states have obligations under the Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol 
to ensure that the judgments of the Tribunal are enforced in the territory of member states.134 It 
further found that: “South Africa has essentially bound itself to do whatever is legally 
permissible” to ensure that the authority of the Tribunal is respected.135 This decision is 
progressive from a human rights perspective as it ensures that member states respect their 
human rights-related treaty obligations. However, the Court’s reasoning that gives 
unincorporated treaties the force of national law is problematic, as it appears to conflict with 
section 231(4) of the Constitution of South Africa which deals specifically with treaty law. It is 
submitted that this means that the Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol enjoy direct application in 
South Africa without the need for further incorporation in South Africa’s national law. It is 
common cause that South African court’s decisions do not bind other SADC member states. It 
will therefore be interesting to see how other SADC states’ national courts handle a similar case 
should the opportunity arise. Given the continued suspension of the SADC Tribunal, it is 
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doubtful whether this will happen in the near future. Whether or not these states will draw 
inspiration from the Fick judgment, remains to be seen.  
 
With regard to the ECOWAS CCJ, the principle of direct applicability of community law in 
member states does not apply as this depends on how each member state incorporates 
community law into national law.136 This is evident from the provisions of the Revised Treaty of 
the Economic Community of West African States (Revised Treaty) which requires member 
states to give effect to community law in accordance with the procedures set out in the 
constitutions of member states.137 It therefore follows that the community law will not have force 
of national law in states that follow a dualist approach, unless it has been domesticated.138 As a 
result, Nwauche has observed that ECOWAS community law is also “less likely to have direct 
effect in the national courts”.139 Nwauche is further of the view that even if one were to assume 
that member states have domesticated the provisions of the Revised Treaty, “it is unlikely that 
the Revised Treaty [would be] superior to the Constitutions … of … countries since their 
Constitutions declare their supremacy”.140 In this regard, he refers to the case of the Nigerian 
Supreme Court in Abacha v Fawehinmi141 where the Court ruled that the Nigerian Constitution 
was superior to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Contrary to Nwauche’s 
view, Ebobrah argues that the ECOWAS legal system envisages the principle of supra-
nationality, including the direct applicability of ECOWAS community law in the national law of 
member states.142 Ebobrah is further of the view that the supra-nationality principle only applies 
in the field of economic integration and not to human rights.143 He bases this on the fact that the 
ECOWAS legal regime is silent on the nature of relationship between itself and national courts. 
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It is submitted that Nwauche’s views cannot be fully supported. The possibility that the 
ECOWAS CCJ and/or future SADC Tribunal can decide that community law has direct effect in 
the national courts of member states cannot be ruled out. Further, it can also not be ruled out 
that in time, as happened with EU community law, the African regional tribunals could develop a 
jurisprudence in terms of which community law enjoys precedence over the national law of 
member states. Additionally, it appears premature to rule out the possibility that the time will 
come when African heads of state will develop sufficient confidence in the community courts to 
support them. This is, after all, one of the major factors in the willingness of EU member states 
to comply with the decisions of the ECJ.144 It is however conceded that it is most unlikely that 
African states will not easily accept the direct applicability of SADC law. This is especially the 
case since the relationship between SADC law and domestic law is not clear. Before states will 
accept this, instruments will have to be negotiated and agreed upon wherein the relationship 
between SADC law and domestic law, as well as the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal are 
clearly set out. States will thus have to consent to community law being supreme to domestic 
law. Ebobrah’s view is supported only to the extent that it addresses the supra-national nature 
of the ECOWAS regime and its direct application. It is submitted that the principle of supra-
nationality should apply to the fields of both human rights and economic integration. Applying 
the principle of supra-nationality only in matters related to economic integration suggests that 
there is no need for a supreme body to ensure respect for human rights. It is submitted that it 
will be more challenging to achieve economic integration where human rights are threatened. 
Accordingly, there is a need to have stable communities to ensure that human rights are 
protected so that “open markets can flourish”.145  
 
The basis for dissenting from the views of the above authors lies in the fact that ECOWAS is a 
regional organisation governed by community law (such as the ECOWAS Treaty).146 Under 
international law, it is now a settled principle that states may not ignore their international 
obligations on the basis of the national law or national constitutions.147 In addition, under 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the “the relationship between the ECOWAS Court and the national court is not hierarchical but 
cooperative”. See Nwauche 2011 (55) Journal of African Law 199.  
144
  Bier S “The European Court of Justice and member state relations: A constructivist analysis of 
the European legal order” available at http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/irconf/papers/bier.pdf (Date of 
use: 15 April 2015). 
145
  Musungu 2003 (3) African Human Rights Law Journal 94. 
146
 Jenks The Proper Law of International Organisations 3-4. 
147
 Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig 
Territory, Advisory Opinion of 4 February, 1932 PCIJ Series A/B No 44 at 24 and 42 (hereafter  
135 
 
international law, the conduct of institutions such as judicial organs are imputed to the state and 
so become acts of the state.148 In other words, when a national court rules that a national law 
which, for example, discriminates against people on basis of race, is not contrary to the 
community law because the national law is supreme, such conduct is regarded as that of the 
state. Accordingly, national laws need to be in line with international obligations and the state 
must modify its law accordingly.149 Taking good practices from the EU and ECOWAS where 
community law is superior to the national law of member states, it is submitted that that this 
should also be followed in the SADC legal order. Although referring to the supremacy of 
European Union community law over the national law of member states, I support the views of 
Kwiecien in that the principle of supremacy of SADC Community law (and other sub-regional 
communities) over the national law of member states is important as it 
 
 prevents national agencies from challenging the validity of community law;  
 prohibits states or organs of state from  applying national law that is incompatible with 
the provisions of community law; 
 prohibits states or organs of state to enact laws that are contrary to community 
provisions; and  
 imposes obligations on member states to amend their national law which conflicts with 
contrary provisions in community law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Treatment of Polish Nationals case). The issue before the Permanent Court of International 
Justice was inter alia whether the treatment of Polish nationals and other persons of Polish origin 
or language in the territory of the Free City of Danzig had to be decided only with reference with 
the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and the Convention of Paris or also by reference to the 
Constitution of the Free City? Before answering the question, the Court indicated that a “state 
cannot rely, as against another State, on the provisions of the latter's Constitution, but only on 
international law and international obligations duly accepted, on the other hand and conversely, a 
State cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a view to evading 
obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force”. It therefore ruled that 
that the question of the treatment of Polish nationals or other persons of Polish origin or language 
must be dealt with exclusively in terms of international law and the treaty provisions in force 
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The principles above are important as they will ensure for SADC Community law a uniform 
meaning and effect in the national legal systems of member states.150 It is submitted that leaving 
the reception of SADC Community law in national law to the discretion of member states would 
negatively affect the functioning of the future SADC Tribunal and the SADC Community as 
whole, as the community law would be subject to the national law of member states.151 Upon 
ratification, community law should have an impact in the local legal system of member states. 
The basis for this submission is to prevent a situation where community law would be applied 
where it suites member states.152 As observed by Ferreira-Snyman, European community law 
favours a monist approach since dualism would cause “divergences in member states’ relations 
vis-à-vis Community law”. 153 
  
Our discussion has revealed that SADC countries with dualist legal systems have not taken 
measures to give effect to the provisions of the Treaty or the Tribunal Protocol in their national 
law. The countries whose legal systems are monist have also not published the relevant 
instruments so as to give them the force of national law.154  Oppong aptly captures the negative 
attitude of non-incorporation (or non-publication) of ratified treaties as follows: 
 
[T]he fact of unincorporation may be a manifestation of parliamentary resistance to the 
treaty. By giving effect to it absent a national implementing measure, the judiciary may 
be indirectly setting itself up against the will of an elected branch of government or 
upsetting the balance of power between the various organs of government.
155
 
 
As if responding to Oppong’s view, in Gramara (Pvt) Ltd v Government of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe156 the Zimbabwe court observed that it was common cause between the parties that 
the Treaty and Tribunal Protocol had not been domesticated in Zimbabwe. Without further 
explanation of the effect of this observation, the Court then went on to state that “...a State 
cannot invoke its own domestic deficiencies in order to avoid or evade its international 
obligations or as a defence to its failure to comply with those obligations”.157 This did not have 
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any influence on the outcome of the case as the judge applied Zimbabwean national law. 
Zimbabwe declined to recognise and register the decision of the Tribunal on the basis that it 
was contrary to public policy. Zimbabwe has not been friendly towards the reception of 
international law in its domestic laws. It still relies on state sovereignty and/or supremacy of its 
own laws as justification for “non-compliance with certain or all rules of international law”.158 It is 
submitted that the argument raised by Zimbabwe was misguided because it is established 
under international law that a state may not invoke its national law to evade its international 
obligations. The international law principle which indicates that a state may not invoke its 
national law to evade its international obligations has been confirmed in various judgments of 
the International Court of Justice.159 Therefore, the proposed autonomy and supremacy of 
SADC Community law will address issues such as those that were confronted by a Zimbabwean 
court in the Gramara case. In contradistinction, as we saw above, the South African 
Constitutional Court recognised and registered the Tribunal’s decision even though the Treaty 
and Tribunal Protocol had not been domesticated in South Africa.160 The difference in approach 
taken by the courts necessitates a further discussion regarding the relationship between the 
national courts and international tribunals. 
 
4 SHOULD DECISIONS OF THE (SUSPENDED) SADC TRIBUNAL BE TREATED AS 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS OR INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS? 
 
With regard to whether judgments of the Tribunal should be treated as foreign judgments or 
judgments of an international court, it is settled that judgments of international tribunals are not 
automatically directly enforceable in national courts as this is a question governed by how states 
incorporate treaty law into their domestic legal systems. 
 
The Tribunal Protocol provides that decisions of the Tribunal shall be enforced in the territory of 
member state in whose judgment has to be executed via the use of “law and rules of civil 
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procedure for the registration and enforcement of foreign judgments”.161 In other words, 
judgments of the Tribunal are treated as foreign judgments for the purposes of enforcement in 
national courts. The procedure envisaged for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in the Tribunal Protocol is not suitable for all forms of international judgment. It must 
be noted that the Oppong has correctly asked whether the rules of civil procedure (which differ 
in the various SADC countries) for the enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions provide adequate 
protection for judgment creditors.162 Indeed, having different procedures in SADC countries to 
achieve a single result – such as the enforcement of the Tribunal’s judgments – may deny 
successful litigants a remedy, especially where the rules of procedure in a particular country are 
cumbersome. In addition, the use of national procedures to enforce international judgments has 
the potential to deny justice to successful litigants as certain states’ national law does not 
provide for the enforcement of non-monetary judgments.163 In this regard, a successful litigant 
with a judgment from the Tribunal requiring a particular government to take the steps necessary 
to protect the rights of those affected, may be unable to enforce the judgment. An example of 
this is where the government of Zimbabwe was required to take all the necessary steps to 
protect the famers from being evicted from their land.164 This order (to take necessary steps to 
protect the rights of the farmers) is not accommodated in the current Zimbabwean system for 
enforcing foreign judgments.165 
 
The 2014 Protocol has fortunately abandoned the requirement in the 2000 Tribunal Protocol 
that the law and rules of civil procedure should be applied for the registration and enforcement 
of foreign judgments.166 This is something positive in the 2014 Protocol. 
 
Despite these shortcomings in the enforcement of international judgments as foreign judgments, 
a South African court has registered and enforced a decision of the Tribunal.167 In the Fick case, 
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the applicant sought to enforce a costs order granted by the Tribunal against the government of 
Zimbabwe, in South Africa. It is important to note that the applicants first successfully registered 
and enforced the Tribunal’s costs order before the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
through the common-law procedure for the enforcement of foreign judgments.168 The 
government of Zimbabwe lodged an appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court recognised and enforced the 
judgment of the Tribunal by determining that the common-law procedure only applied to the 
judgments of foreign courts made by foreign courts.169 In other words, the common-law 
procedure did not cater for the enforcement of the judgments of international tribunals such as 
the SADC Tribunal. The Court then, correctly in terms of sections 8(3) and 39(2) of the 
Constitution of South Africa, deemed it necessary to develop the common-law procedure so as 
to include judgments delivered by international tribunals such as the Tribunal.170 Furthermore, 
there was a need to modify the common-law position, as failure to do so could allow people to 
evade the “jurisdictional nets of the courts and thereby escape legal accountability for their 
wrongful actions”.171 In addition, the Court was of the view that the principle of reciprocity inter 
alia entails that the courts of one country “should enforce judgments of foreign courts in the 
expectation that foreign courts would reciprocate”.172 The Court further indicated that the 
Constitution of South Africa, 1996, enables the modification of national law to ensure its 
concordance with South Africa’s international law obligations.173 The Court again reiterated that 
“[t]his promotes comity, [and] reciprocity …, which is central to the enforcement of decisions of 
foreign courts”.174 
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means; that the judgment must not involve the enforcement of a penal or revenue law of the 
foreign state; and that the enforcement must not be contrary to the provisions of the Protection of 
Businesses Act 99 of 1978.  
169
 Fick CC case paras 52-53. 
170
 At para 53. 
171
 At para 55. 
172
 At para 56. 
173
 At para 57. 
174
 At para 57. 
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The Court then relied on article 32(2) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol which binds South Africa 
and other SADC member states to take “all measures necessary to ensure execution of 
decisions of the Tribunal”.175 This had to be done through the “law and rules of civil procedure” 
which regulate the registration and enforcement of foreign judgments in the territory of a state in 
which it is sought to be enforced.176 This implies that even though the judgment was issued 
against Zimbabwe, all SADC member states have a role to play in ensuring its enforcement.177 
The Court then correctly observed that the above procedure did not apply, but only the 
common-law procedure.178 In other words, it was not envisaged that the law and rules of civil 
procedure were at some future stage going to cater for the registration and enforcement of the 
judgments of the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Tribunal’s decisions could not be enforced via the 
law and rules of civil procedure. It is in this regard that the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
held that the “common law must be developed in a way that would empower South Africa’s 
domestic courts to register and facilitate the enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions”.179 The 
Court indicated that the  
development of the common law extends to the enforcement of judgments and orders 
of international courts or tribunals, based on international agreements that are binding 
on South Africa.
180
 
 
It then ruled that the concept of a “foreign court” includes the Tribunal and, therefore, South 
Africa is bound to abide by obligations flowing from the Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol.181 As 
this was the first opportunity for a South African court to address the status of a binding decision 
from an international tribunal, the development of the common-law position so as to include and 
enforce a judgment of the Tribunal is welcomed.182 De Wet has, however, cautioned against the 
Court’s approach in equating judgments of international tribunals with foreign judgments for 
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 At para 58. It is important to highlight that article 32(2) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol has been 
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enforcement in the national courts of member states.183 According to her, “it is unusual for 
treaties regulating the competencies of international tribunals to determine that their decisions 
shall be treated as ‘foreign judgments’ on the domestic level”.184 Rather, decisions of 
international tribunals are usually “treated as domestic judgments”.185 De Wet’s views are 
supported as the civil procedure for the enforcement of foreign judgments was initially intended 
to accommodate monetary orders only, thereby excluding a decision such as one compelling 
the offending state to take the necessary measures to prevent the continued violation. It is, 
therefore, submitted that the decisions of the Tribunal should be regarded as domestic 
judgments, as the Tribunal Protocol covers the enforcement of both monetary and non-
monetary judgments.186 
 
The courts’ reliance on the Treaty and Tribunal Protocol to enforce an international judgment 
even though these instruments had not been domesticated as required by a dualist legal 
system, is not clear. This is something that the courts failed to address in their deliberations 
when they opted to apply the provisions of the Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol directly 
regardless of the fact that they had yet to be transformed into South Africa’s national law 
through legislation.187 
 
Even though the Constitutional Court is to be commended in developing the common law so as 
to include the Tribunal’s decisions, the relationship between decisions of national courts and 
international tribunals remains unclear as the constitutions of SADC countries and SADC 
community law are silent on this issue.188 In this regard the Treaty of the East African 
Community may be instructive. It provides that the “[d]ecisions of the Court [EACJ] on the 
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interpretation and application of this Treaty shall have precedence over decisions of national 
courts on a similar matter”.189 This provision clearly sets out the nature of the relationship 
between the EACJ and national courts. As was pointed out earlier, the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice also take precedence over the decisions of national courts regarding 
the application and interpretation of European Union community law.190  
 
The decisions of the ECOWAS CCJ are final and binding on member states.191 Nwauche is of 
the view that however, that this does not clearly indicate the relationship between the ECOWAS 
CCJ and national courts in that the hierarchy of the courts is determined by a country’s national 
constitution.192 Accordingly, to ensure the ECOWAS CCJ precedence over national courts 
would require states to surrender their “judicial sovereignty” in clear terms.193 In French-
speaking countries, it appears that upon ratification of the treaty the ECOWAS CCJ becomes 
“superior to the appellate courts of these countries and its judgment is of precedential value”.194 
According to Nwauche, in English-speaking countries, the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS is not 
directly applicable in member states and, therefore, it is not clear whether its judgments are 
“superior to judgments of highest national courts”.195 It is submitted that when ECOWAS 
member states created the ECOWAS CCJ, their intention was to create a supranational court 
that would be superior to their national courts. This can be deduced from the preamble to the 
Revised Treaty of ECOWAS which provides that “… the integration of Member States into a 
viable regional community may demand the partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties 
to the Community within the context of a collective political will”. Consequently, it is submitted 
that a decision of the ECOWAS CCJ should take precedence over the judgments of national 
courts. It is further submitted that this should also be the position within the SADC Community 
regime as regards the relationship between national courts and the “new” SADC Tribunal. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
It is clear that an individual state’s political will determines whether or not the state will be party 
to a specific treaty. Further, the reception of SADC Community law differs from country to 
country. The discussion has revealed that no SADC country has moved to accord the Treaty 
and the Tribunal Protocol the status of national law. For the purposes of, inter alia, uniformity in 
SADC law, state parties must accept that the SADC Community order is superior to national 
law, and that where conflict between SADC Community law and national law arises, the former 
should prevail. This can be achieved through the revision of the relevant treaties. 
Lastly, the creation of the SADC regional order presupposes that states intended to create an 
authority superior to those of national law. If such an authority is not respected, the relevance of 
SADC Community law falls away. There is therefore a need – as under the European Union 
community order – for SADC law to have a direct effect and be directly applicable in SADC 
member states. Although technically problematic, it is submitted that SADC member states 
following a dualist approach, should continue to do so in respect of their “other” international 
obligations, but adopt a monist approach when dealing with SADC law. It is therefore submitted 
that SADC member states should consider amending the 2014 Protocol in order to pave the 
way for the autonomy and supremacy of community law.  
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CHAPTER 5 
COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS OF THE SADC TRIBUNAL  
1 BACKGROUND 
 
The Tribunal became operational in 2005 and received its first human rights case in 2007 in the 
matter of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe.196 In the Campbell 
interim judgment, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the applicants and ordered the Republic of 
Zimbabwe, inter alia, not to take any steps that would directly or indirectly result in the eviction 
of the applicants from their farms.197 The decision was welcomed as a significant achievement 
for the protection of human rights and the upholding of the rule of law in the SADC region.198 
Unfortunately, the judgment of the Tribunal in the Campbell interim case, and other cases 
unrelated to human rights, remain unenforced.199  
The SADC Summit of Heads of State (the Summit) is responsible for overseeing the functions of 
the SADC and its decisions are binding on SADC member states.200 The Summit’s powers 
include taking appropriate action against a member state which refuses to comply with the 
decisions of the Tribunal.201 The Summit may only take such action once the matter has been 
referred to it by the Tribunal. The referral to the Summit is necessary because the enforcement 
of international judgments is a long-standing problem which depends on the willingness of the 
member state concerned to abide by the judgment.202 
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  Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/07) [2007] SADCT 1 (13 
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The first referral testing the Summit’s ability to use its powers to take appropriate action under 
article 32(5) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol, was in July 2008 and arose from Zimbabwe’s refusal 
to comply with the Tribunal’s ruling in the Campbell interim case. A second referral, again 
involving Zimbabwe, was in July 2012 and arose from Zimbabwe’s refusal to comply with or 
implement the Tribunal’s final judgment in Campbell.203 It appears that most of the challenges 
facing the Tribunal concerning failure to comply with its rulings, have involved Zimbabwe. In the 
Fick SADC judgment, the Tribunal consequently stated  
…it is evident that the Respondent [Zimbabwe] has not complied with the decision of 
the Tribunal. We, therefore, hold that the existence of further acts of non-compliance 
with the decision of the Tribunal has been established, after the Tribunal’s decision of 
June 5, 2009 under which the earlier acts of non-compliance have already been 
reported to the Summit. Accordingly, the Tribunal will again report this finding to the 
Summit for its appropriate action.
204
 
The Tribunal has on several occasions reported Zimbabwe’s non-compliance with its decisions 
to the Summit.205 The Summit, a body made up of SADC Heads of State or Government, has, 
however, opted not to take action against Zimbabwe.206 In short, the Summit has done nothing 
to ensure that Zimbabwe complies with the decisions of the Tribunal.  
 
Zimbabwe had also mounted a challenge to the existence of the Tribunal. Because of the 
difficulties surrounding the implementation of certain of the Tribunal’s judgments and 
Zimbabwe’s concerns about the legitimacy of the Tribunal, the Summit, in apparent support of 
Zimbabwe, announced on 17 August 2010 that it would review the “role, functions and terms of 
reference of the SADC Tribunal.”207 During the review process, the Summit placed a moratorium 
on the Tribunal and barred it from adjudicating any new cases. The review process was 
undertaken and concluded by an independent consultant in 2011. The final and official report 
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dated 6 March 2011, found that the Tribunal had been properly constituted208 and therefore 
recommended that the Tribunal be allowed to continue to perform its functions.209 This has not 
happened. Surprisingly, the Preamble to the 2014 Protocol begins by “[n]oting that a review of 
the role, responsibilities and terms of reference of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Tribunal led to recommendations that require a new Protocol on [the] 
Tribunal in the SADC”. This statement in the Preamble is not strictly correct, because the final 
and official report of the review process was adopted by the Attorneys General and Ministers of 
Justice, but ignored by the Summit. In fact, the final and official report explicitly supports the 
retention of the jurisdiction over disputes between natural and legal persons and SADC member 
states in its recommendations.210 Nowhere in the recommendations is it stated that the Tribunal 
should be dissolved and a new protocol be adopted that limits the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to 
inter-state disputes only. 
 
Despite the positive official report, on 20 May 2011 the Summit, inter alia, mandated the 
Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General of member states to initiate a process aimed at amending 
the relevant SADC legal instruments relating to the Tribunal.211 In addition, the Summit decided 
not to reappoint Tribunal judges whose terms of office expired on 31 August 2010 and to not  
replace members of the Tribunal whose terms of office were due to expire in October 2011.212 
The Summit also extended the moratorium on the Tribunal receiving new cases or adjudicating 
pending cases until the 2000 Tribunal Protocol had been reviewed and approved.213 The final 
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report to the Summit regarding the progress of the review of the role, functions and terms of 
reference of the Tribunal was due in August 2012. The SADC Committee of Ministers of 
Justice/Attorneys General gave feedback on progress with the review.214 In a move that elicited 
wide-spread criticism,215 the Summit decided to limit the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal to 
disputes between member states.216  
 
In this chapter I discuss the factors that contributed to the suspension of the Tribunal. This 
includes the challenge by Zimbabwe that the Treaty and the 2000 Tribunal Protocol, together 
with their subsequent amendments, did not formally enter into force and were thus not binding 
on member states. My examination also addresses whether the Treaty and the 2000 Tribunal 
Protocol contain any provisions authorising the suspension of the Tribunal in any given 
situation. 
 
I also analyse compliance with the Tribunal’s decision in the Campbell interim case and 
subsequent human rights decisions related to Campbell. This will assist in determining the 
extent of compliance with decisions of the Tribunal and the status of those that have not been 
implemented. The study also considers whether any alternate remedies are available to those 
litigants whose judgments have not been complied with and those whose cases are still 
pending. I also evaluate whether the newly envisaged jurisdictional provisions limiting recourse 
to the Tribunal to inter-state disputes does not violate the right of the individual to enjoy access 
to courts. This leads to an examination of whether we should, in the future, regard the Tribunal’s 
decisions as foreign judgments – in accordance with article 32(1) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol 
– or as national judgments. Finally, I consider how the Tribunal’s judgments should be enforced 
in the context of international law. To the extent relevant, I examine compliance with the 
judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the ECOWAS CCJ to establish how 
compliance with their decisions has been achieved. 
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2 ZIMBABWE’S CHALLENGE TO THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SADC TRIBUNAL  
 
On 7 August 2009, after Zimbabwe had on a number of occasions been brought before the 
Tribunal for refusing to comply with the Tribunal’s decisions, Zimbabwe rejected the authority of 
the Tribunal in a letter addressed to the Tribunal’s Registrar.217 In his letter, Justice Minister 
Chinamasa gave notice of Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Tribunal on the basis that it lacked 
jurisdiction over Zimbabwe as the amendment to the 2000 Tribunal Protocol had not yet been 
ratified by two-thirds of the total number of SADC member states as required by the Treaty.218 
Minister Chinamasa further claimed that the amendment to the Treaty was also not operational 
as it had not yet been ratified by the required two-thirds of the total membership of the SADC as 
required by treaty provisions and as read with article 41 of the original SADC Treaty.219 
Consequently, Minister Chinamasa stated that Zimbabwe would not appear before the Tribunal, 
and would not respond to any action instituted or pending against Zimbabwe before the 
Tribunal.220 According to Minister Chinamasa, for these reasons any decision made by the 
Tribunal against Zimbabwe would be “null and void”.221  
 
Similar statements of defiance were repeated by Zimbabwe’s Deputy Chief Justice when he, 
inter alia, said that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the main case in 
Campbell and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe.222 Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe 
referred to one of the Tribunal’s decision as “nonsense” and “of no consequence”.223 To add to 
the controversy, the Tanzanian President, Jakaya Kikwete, is reported to have said that by 
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creating the Tribunal, SADC leaders had created a monster that would destroy them.224 The 
Summit did not condemn the acts of defiance from Zimbabwe’s officials and certain of the 
SADC member states. These statements show a lack of support for the Tribunal in that the very 
people who created it question its credibility and discredit it. Furthermore, it can be deduced 
from the discussion above that the Summit was unwilling to confront Zimbabwe and demand 
that it comply with the decisions of the Tribunal.225 
 
3 SADC MEMBER STATES’ CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY A TREATY  
A state can express its intention to be bound by the provisions of a treaty on the international 
plane, inter alia, by ratifying the treaty concerned or by any other means agreed upon by the 
parties.226 The important factor is that there must be consent to be bound by the provisions of a 
treaty. As a result, a member state that has agreed to be party to a treaty which requires a two-
thirds majority to come into operation, cannot later claim that it is not bound by a provision in 
that agreement. This is so because once the requirement of the two-thirds majority has 
complied with and the treaty enters into force, the principle of pacta sunt servanda comes into 
play thereby imposing obligations on member states to discharge their treaty obligations in good 
faith.227 This matter is addressed below by indicating the process that SADC member states 
chose to trigger the operation of subsequent amendments to the Treaty and Tribunal Protocol 
on the Tribunal without the need for ratification. 
3.1  Did Zimbabwe participate in the enactment and ratification of the SADC Treaty and the 
adoption of the Agreement Amending the Treaty? 
The SADC Treaty was adopted on 17 August 1992 by the Heads of State or Government of the 
SADCC in Windhoek, Namibia.228 It became operational in 2003 in terms of article 41 of the 
Treaty which provides that: “This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of 
the instruments of ratification by two thirds of the States listed in the Preamble”. This 
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requirement was complied with on 17 August 1992 and the Treaty became binding on member 
states thirty days later.  
 
Article 36(1) of the Treaty regulates the process of enacting and triggering the operation of 
future amendments to the Treaty. In particular, article 36(1) provides that “[a]n amendment of 
this Treaty shall be adopted by a decision of three-quarters of all the Members of the Summit”. 
The Treaty was amended in 2001 by the Agreement Amending the Treaty of the Southern 
African Development Community (Agreement Amending the Treaty).229 The Agreement 
Amending the Treaty was signed in Blantyre, Malawi, on 14 August 2001 by fourteen SADC 
member states, including Zimbabwe. This complied with the requirement set for the adoption of 
an amendment to the Treaty by three-quarters of Summit members. The entry into force of the 
Agreement Amending the Treaty is regulated by article 32 of the Agreement Amending the 
Treaty which provides that: “This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its adoption by 
three-quarters of all members of the Summit”. In light of the above, it is clear that the Agreement 
Amending the Treaty required no further ratification by member states in that its adoption also 
triggered its coming into operation. It is therefore binding on all SADC member states, including 
Zimbabwe.230 
 
Assuming that the Treaty required signature and ratification by member states in order for it to 
enter into force, this does not mean that pending ratification a state party may violate the treaty 
provisions. Under international law, a party who has signed but not yet ratified a treaty, is under 
an obligation not to defeat the purposes and objects of that treaty231 Therefore, even if 
Zimbabwe had, for example, signed the Treaty but not ratified it, it would still be obliged not to 
act contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. 
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3.2  Did Zimbabwe participate in the enactment and ratification of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol 
and the Amended Protocol on the Tribunal? 
 
The Summit of Heads of State or Government of SADC, which includes Zimbabwe,232 acting 
under article 4(4) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol, appointed the judges of the SADC Tribunal in 
Gaborone, Botswana, on 18 August 2005.233 The 2000 Tribunal Protocol was signed by the 
SADC Heads of State or Government on 7 August 2000.234 Article 35 of the 2000 Tribunal 
Protocol provides that “[t]his Protocol shall be ratified by Signatory States in accordance with 
their constitutional procedures”.235 In addition, article 38 states that “[t]his Protocol shall enter 
into force thirty (30) days after deposit in terms of Article 43 of the Treaty, of instruments of 
ratification by two thirds of the States”. It is, however, unclear whether the 2000 Tribunal 
Protocol was ratified as required by the provisions of article 35 as there is no record of 
ratification.236 In 2002, the 2000 Tribunal Protocol was amended by the Agreement Amending 
the Protocol on the Tribunal (Amended Tribunal Protocol) of 3 October 2002.237 The Amended 
Tribunal Protocol, which was signed by Heads of State including Zimbabwe, effectively removed 
articles 35 and 38 from the 2000 Tribunal Protocol by inserting article 21 of the Amended 
Tribunal Protocol. As a result, article 21 of the Amended Tribunal Protocol regulates its entry 
into force as it provides that “[t]his Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its adoption by 
three-quarters of all Members of the Summit”. Therefore, it is immaterial whether the 2000 
Tribunal Protocol had entered into force under articles 35 and 38, because the new provision – 
article 21 of the Amended Tribunal Protocol – dealing with adoption and operation governs this 
process. Consequently, the adoption of the Amended Tribunal Protocol by three-quarters of the 
members of the Summit in 2002 rendered it binding on all SADC member states, Zimbabwe 
included.238  
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4 TREATY PROVISIONS EMPOWERING THE SUMMIT TO SUSPEND THE SADC 
TRIBUNAL  
 
 
As alluded to earlier, the Tribunal was suspended in 2010 and it has not functioned since. A 
review of the SADC Treaty, the Agreement Amending the Treaty, the 2000 Tribunal Protocol, 
and the Amended Tribunal Protocol reveals that there are no provisions authorising the Summit 
to suspend the operation of the Tribunal. The suspension of the Tribunal is only possible if the 
Summit, acting under the provisions which allow for future amendments, adopts a new protocol 
containing provisions relating to the suspension of the Tribunal. This can be done, for example, 
under article 37(1) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol which provides that “[a]ny State which is a 
Party to this Protocol may propose an amendment thereto”. This procedure was also not 
followed during the process of enacting the 2014 Protocol.239 Because there has to date been 
no such amendment, it follows that there is no legal basis or source of authority allowing for the 
suspension of the Tribunal by the SADC Heads of State or Government.240 Further, it is not 
clear what the legal impact or enforceability of the 2014 Protocol is, as it was initiated outside 
the permissible procedures.  
The Summit has failed to take steps against one of the SADC member states, and eventually 
came to view the Tribunal as a threat to member states’ sovereignty.241 In Ebobrah’s words, 
Zimbabwe brought a “politico-legal challenge” against the Tribunal.242 Ngandwe with reference 
to Trollip,243 and Sasman,244 has also noted that the Tribunal was “suspended for strategic and 
political reasons”.245 Trollip’s view is that the Tribunal was suspended, inter alia, to pre-empt it 
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from adjudicating on sensitive land-grab issues in Zimbabwe.246 Sasman also says that “the 
South African-based Swissbourgh Group claims that the governments of Lesotho, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe were key movers behind the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
decision to, for all intents and purposes, suspend the SADC Tribunal”.247 The root cause of this 
was a court action in Lesotho in which the Swissbourgh Group sued the Kingdom of Lesotho for 
compensation and damages resulting from the “expropriation of its mineral rights in the 
execution of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project”.248 This suite had huge potential financial 
implications for Lesotho. The views above should not be taken lightly as no reasons were given 
for the suspension of the Tribunal. Accordingly, the inference that can be drawn is that the 
suspension of the Tribunal was politically motivated. Indeed, “it is rare that any sovereign [state] 
will simply conform to the decision of an international court that renders an adverse decision”.249 
As noted by Ngandwe, Zimbabwe would not have questioned the legitimacy of the Tribunal had 
the latter ruled in its favour.250 However, it was only once it was realised that Zimbabwe had lost 
its case that the decision was taken to come up with any excuse to ensure that whatever the 
outcome, Zimbabwe would remain unaffected by the Tribunal’s decisions.251 The binding force 
of the Treaty and 2000 Tribunal Protocol provisions in a national legal system, is entirely 
dependent on the political will of SADC member states.252 
5  DISCUSSION OF THE JUDGMENTS OF THE SADC TRIBUNAL 
Having established that the Tribunal had been properly constituted and that the challenges to its 
existence were unfounded, I turn now to compliance with the human rights decisions by 
member states. This will be useful in establishing whether or not such judgments have been 
complied with. Where there has been no compliance, I will consider possible means by which 
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such decisions can be enforced in future. This will be highly relevant to the functioning of the 
“new” Tribunal. 
  
The Tribunal delivered its first judgment in 2007253 and its last in 2010,254 just before its 
suspension.255 To date, most of the judgments have not been complied with,256 and these are 
discussed in what follows.  
5.1 Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe (1) 
 
The Campbell interim case was filed simultaneously with the application in the Campbell main 
case. The applicants sought interim measures preventing the government of Zimbabwe from, 
inter alia, removing them from their farm and taking all steps necessary to protect their stay on 
the farm until the main case had been finalised.257 The Tribunal ruled in the applicants’ favour 
and ordered the Republic of Zimbabwe not to take any direct or indirect steps to evict the 
applicants from their farm.258  
 
5.1.1 Comments on the case and compliance with the judgment  
 
Although the decision in the Campbell interim case was an application within an application, the 
Tribunal’s decision demonstrated its ability to use the principles in the Treaty to prevent the 
violation of human rights and promote the rule of law in the region. Unfortunately, the decision 
has not been complied with and can be seen as the reason for the challenges to the legality of 
the Tribunal.259  
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5.2  Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe (2) 
In the main application, the applicants challenged section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
(Amendment 17, 2005) which sanctioned the expropriation of land without compensation and 
ousted the jurisdiction of local courts from adjudicating land disputes.260 In addition, they argued 
that they had been discriminated against on the ground of race. The Tribunal noted that even 
though the Constitutional Amendment 17 was silent on race, its effect would be felt only by 
white farmers who own the majority of agricultural land.261 The Tribunal ruled in the applicants’ 
favour and found, inter alia, that the applicants had been discriminated against. It ordered the 
Republic of Zimbabwe to pay compensation for the land forcefully taken from the applicants.262  
 
5.2.1 Comments on the case and compliance with the judgment  
The decision in the Campbell main case has generated considerable discussion from various 
angles but has been welcomed in the human rights arena.263 The violence perpetrated by the 
agents of the government of Zimbabwe in carrying out land reform should be condemned in the 
strongest possible terms, as states have the primary obligation to protect their citizens.264 The 
Tribunal unanimously found that Amendment 17, 2005, of the Zimbabwean Constitution, 
contravened the Treaty which prohibits racial and other forms of discrimination, as the policy 
targeted white famers.265 However, Justice Tshosa disagreed that Amendment 17, 2005, 
constituted a form of racial discrimination as found by the majority. In this regard, the dissenting 
judgment points out that: 
In oral arguments, and this is on record, the respondents were specifically asked by 
the Tribunal whether there were other people [black farmers] apart from the applicants 
whose agricultural land was compulsorily acquired on the basis of Amendment 17. 
The answer was in the affirmative and this was not challenged by the applicants.
266
 
(Emphasis added.) 
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According to this statement, Amendment 17, 2005, of the Zimbabwean Constitution, thus 
applied to all agricultural land – irrespective of who (black or white famer) owned the land.267 
The majority of the Tribunal however found that the land reform law, through its application, 
constituted indirect racial discrimination as it targeted predominantly white farmers: 
 
Since the effects of the implementation of Amendment 17 will be felt by the 
Zimbabwean white farmers only, we consider it, although Amendment 17 does not 
explicitly refer to white farmers, as we have indicated above, its implementation affects 
white farmers only and consequently constitutes indirect discrimination or de facto or 
substantive inequality.
268
 
 
 It is submitted that the Tribunal’s approach appears to have overlooked the history of land 
acquisition in Zimbabwe, as it merely said that “we note that the acquisition of land in Zimbabwe 
has had a long history” but did not elaborate on this aspect.269 The issue of how the applicants 
acquired the land should have enjoyed greater attention and been addressed in detail. It is 
submitted that any regional judgment which ignores an unjust history is more likely to be 
disregarded in the territory in which enforcement is sought. The basis for this is that during the 
period 1894 -1895, the colonial rulers forcibly removed black people from their ancestral land.270 
Although black people attempted to resist their removal they lost the battle. During this period, 
various laws were adopted giving the control of the land to white settlers.271 Furthermore, huge 
hectares of land were taken from black people without compensation and transferred to white 
settlers.272 This position was later confirmed in In Re Rhodesia where the Privy Council said that 
the land belonged to the British Crown and that it had been taken from the black people 
because they did not have recognisable property rights to own the land.273 It is submitted that 
Amendment 17, 2005, sought to redress an injustice of land ownership acquired through unjust 
laws. Therefore, the issue of discrimination should not have been judged in a vacuum, but with 
due regard to the historical context of land acquisition and what Amendment 17, 2005, sought to 
achieve.274 
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In light of the above, it cannot be said that the land reform law targeted a specific group only. 
Instead, a more substantial discussion from the Tribunal would have clarified its conclusion on 
the issues of race and unfair discrimination.  
5.3  Gondo and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe275 
The applicants had successfully sued the respondent in the national courts of Zimbabwe on the 
basis of the violence they had suffered at the hands of the respondent’s security agents. 
According to the Tribunal, the respondent failed to comply with the judgments of the 
Zimbabwean courts which had found the Zimbabwean government liable to compensate the 
applicants for the injuries they had suffered.276 As a result, the applicants approached the 
Tribunal claiming that the respondent was in breach of the Treaty because of its failure to 
ensure that effective remedies were available to them.277 This, according to the applicants, was 
a failure to act in accordance with the principles of human rights and democracy as set out in 
the Treaty.278 The applicants also challenged section 5(2) of the Zimbabwean State Liability 
Act279 on the ground that it was in breach of the Treaty as it prevented the execution of the 
respondent’s property to satisfy a judgment. The respondent did not oppose the application. 
 
The legal issues were whether the respondent was in breach of the Treaty which, inter alia, 
requires member states to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law.280 In addition, the Tribunal had to determine whether the respondent’s law (the 
State Liability Act) was in line with the Treaty, as it prevented the respondent’s property from 
attachment or execution to fulfil a judgment debt. The Tribunal answered both questions in the 
affirmative and found the respondent to have breached the Treaty. In coming to these 
conclusions, the Tribunal relied on several regional and international instruments under which 
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SADC member states have undertaken obligations to ensure that human rights are respected 
and promoted in their territories.281 In addition, the Tribunal emphasised that the right to an 
effective remedy and the right to protection of the law are well-known principles of human rights 
law.282 It also found the State Liability Act to be unfairly discriminatory against the applicants as 
it prevented state property from being attached, while the state could attach the peoples’ 
property to satisfy a judgment.283 
 
5.3.1 Comments on the case and compliance with the judgment  
The ruling has to date not been implemented and the applicant is yet to benefit from the 
judgment. Zimbabwe has refused to comply with the decisions of its own courts and with that of 
the Tribunal. In Etheredge v Minister of National Security284 the Zimbabwean High Court held, 
inter alia, that the 2000 Tribunal Protocol did not intend to create a sub-regional forum superior 
to the courts in member states. The Court also ruled that its jurisdiction is superior to that of the 
Tribunal.285 Zimbabwe’s statements of defiance mean that individuals who have obtained 
judgments in their favour from the Tribunal cannot enforce them against the state of Zimbabwe. 
Additionally, it could be argued that Zimbabwe has an unfriendly reception of international law. 
Instead, it prefers its own national laws regardless of whether they are contrary to the well-
established principles of international law such as the protection of human rights.  
 
5.4 Fick v The Republic of Zimbabwe286 
The applicants brought this matter before the Tribunal to report the continued failure by the 
respondent to comply with the earlier Tribunal judgments in the Campbell interim case and the 
Campbell main case. The aim of the application was for the Summit to take appropriate action 
against Zimbabwe. The Tribunal found that there was compelling evidence that the respondent 
had failed to comply with its decisions and, therefore, that there were continued “acts of non-
compliance”.287 The Tribunal indicated that it would again report the finding of non-compliance 
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to the Summit to take appropriate action. It also awarded a costs order against the 
respondent.288  
5.4.1 Comments on the case and compliance with the judgment  
This decision has not been complied with. The applicants’ attempts to have the decision 
enforced in the national courts of Zimbabwe have also failed. 
5.5  Gramara (Private) Limited and Another v Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe289  
In the Gramara case, the applicants sought to register and enforce the judgment of the SADC 
Tribunal in the Campbell main case. The issues for determination before the High Court of 
Zimbabwe were whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction and competence to hear the case before it 
and whether the recognition and enforcement of the Tribunal’s decision would be contrary to 
public policy in Zimbabwe.290 With regard to the first issues, the Court found that the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal “encompasses all disputes between States and between natural and legal 
persons and States relating to the interpretation and application of the [SADC] Treaty” and that 
the Tribunal had been properly constituted.291 The Court went on to state that: 
 
Despite this broad formulation, I am not entirely persuaded that the general stricture 
[sic] enunciated in Article 4(c) of the Treaty, which requires SADC and the Member 
States to act in accordance with the principles, inter alia, of “human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law”, suffices to invest the Tribunal with the requisite capacity to 
entertain and adjudicate alleged violations of human rights which might be committed 
by Member States against their own nationals.
292
 
 
5.5.1   Comment on the case and compliance with the judgment 
This view was addressed in Chapter 2 above where I disagreed with the Court’s view and 
concluded that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over human rights cases. This is so because 
SADC member states undertook, inter alia, to defend and maintain democracy. Therefore, 
one cannot talk of democracy and exclude human rights. 
 
Regarding the registration of the Tribunal’s judgment, the Court held that registering the 
judgments in Zimbabwe would challenge the decision of the Supreme Court and so undermine 
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its authority in Zimbabwe.293 In addition, the Court mentioned several reasons for declining the 
registration of the Tribunal’s decision, including that such registration would require the 
government of Zimbabwe to disregard the land reform policy enacted by the Parliament and 
question the supremacy of the Constitution.294 As a result, the application for registration was 
dismissed.   
 
5.6  Fick v Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and Others295 
In view of the ruling in the Gramara case by the Zimbabwean High Court, Campbell and other 
aggrieved farmers sought relief from the South African High Court in Fick SA High Court case. 
In this case the applicants argued that their application complied with the common-law 
requirements for registration and enforcement of foreign judgments.296 Further, they argued that 
the High Court of Zimbabwe recognised the validity of the Tribunal. The respondent did not 
oppose the application. The Court, without deliberation, ruled in favour of the applicants and 
registered the decision of the Tribunal.297 Consequently, a writ of execution was issued in Cape 
Town to attach and sell Zimbabwe’s property situated in Cape Town to fulfil the Tribunal’s costs 
order. 
 
The government of Zimbabwe appealed the High Court decision in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal on the ground that the Treaty and the 2000 Tribunal Protocol had not been 
domesticated in South Africa and therefore could not be automatically enforced.298 In response 
to these challenges, the Supreme Court of Appeal first indicated that the SADC was constituted 
under the SADC Treaty signed and ratified by Heads of State or Government of the Southern 
African region, including Zimbabwe. As a result, Zimbabwe had been part of the process and 
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that the 2000 Tribunal Protocol was binding on it.299 The Court then held that Zimbabwe’s 
contention that the Treaty and the 2000 Tribunal Protocol had not been domesticated in South 
Africa was misplaced because these were not the instruments being enforced but “…only that 
by its act Zimbabwe has submitted to the jurisdiction and enforcement”.300  
5.6.1   Comments on the case and compliance with the judgment 
The Court found that there were no valid reasons why Zimbabwe should not be held 
accountable for not complying with its treaty obligations. It therefore held that Zimbabwe had 
advanced no defence against the recognition and enforcement of the Tribunal’s costs order. 
The appeal failed. However, Zimbabwe did not comply with the decision but made a further 
appeal. 
 
5.7 Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others301 
Unsatisfied with the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Fick SA SCA case, Zimbabwe 
appealed to the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Government of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe v Fick and Others. The main issue before the Constitutional Court was whether 
South African courts had jurisdiction to register and enforce the decision of the Tribunal against 
Zimbabwe. The government of Zimbabwe argued that the South African Parliament had not 
transformed the SADC Treaty into its municipal law as required by section 231 of the 
Constitution of South Africa, 1996.302 Therefore, the judgments of the Tribunal could not be 
registered and enforced by South African courts. The Court dismissed this argument on the 
basis that South Africa “approved” the SADC Treaty in 1995, and that it was therefore “binding 
on South Africa, at least on the international plane”.303 It also indicated that SADC member 
states are required to take all necessary measures to ensure the execution of the judgments of 
the Tribunal. This means that “both Zimbabwe and South Africa effectively agreed that their 
domestic courts would have jurisdiction to recognize and enforce orders of the Tribunal made 
against them”.304 The appeal was dismissed.  
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5.7.1   Comments on the case and compliance with the judgment 
The decision of the Constitutional Court, although not entirely convincing as regards the 
relationship between SADC Community law and national law,305 basically confirms the SCA’s 
decision in the Fick SA SCA case that by being party to the Treaty and the 2000 Tribunal 
Protocol, Zimbabwe and South Africa undertook to implement the decisions of the Tribunal in 
their respective countries. However, the difficulty with this ruling is that the Court was silent on 
the issues of monism and dualism which was required to substantiate its ruling on how ratified, 
but undomesticated, treaties become enforceable against South Africa and Zimbabwe. Despite 
this shortcoming, the judgment has paved the way for victims of human rights abuse in 
Zimbabwe to approach South African courts for the “enforcement of international, regional and 
sub-regional human rights norms”.306 The judgment was eventually complied with when the 
Zimbabwean Government property was auctioned in Cape Town.307 
 
6  EVALUATION OF THE CASES 
The cases discussed above indicate how instrumental the suspended SADC Tribunal has been 
in promoting and advancing a human rights protection mandate in the SADC region. In addition, 
they show the ability of the Tribunal to exercise its powers to protect those who had approached 
it for relief. The Tribunal, through its judgments, “tried to ensure regional integration and 
common regional standards through the development of community jurisprudence”.308 The 
unenforced judgments remain a major obstacle to ensuring that justice is done. Enforcement of 
the Tribunal’s decisions is something that lies with the Summit and depends largely on the 
political will of member states.309 
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7 ENFORCEMENT OF THE SADC TRIBUNAL’S JUDGMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
 
International tribunals do not have the capacity to enforce their own decisions.310 They also do 
not have personnel such as sheriffs or other institutions that may help pressure the state 
concerned to execute the judgment delivered by the relevant tribunal.311 Their mandate is to 
adjudicate disputes referred to them in accordance with their constitutive documents. Once a 
tribunal delivers a judgment, it becomes functus officio — meaning that the tribunal has fulfilled 
its function regarding the particular issue.312 Enforcement of judgments, therefore, does not lie 
within the work of the tribunals.313 Instead, the body which created the tribunal, or the institution 
entrusted with the power to oversee that the tribunal’s decisions are enforced, is responsible for 
their execution.314  
 
For justice to be done, it is important that the judgments the SADC Tribunal are fully complied 
with. Without this it would be futile for individuals to approach the Tribunal as they would end up 
with meaningless orders. As observed by Mkandawire, “[ju]dicial proceedings are practical and 
if a litigant cannot have a judgment enforced, then there is no point of having judicial 
proceedings in the first place”.315 What is important for any litigant at the conclusion of his or her 
case, either at national or international level, is the resulting judgment.316 The aggrieved 
individual at an international level is generally not overly concerned about the rules or principles 
applied in deciding his or her case, or the significance of the judgment for future similar cases. 
What is of significance to the litigant is the “…judgment as a remedy and the material 
consequence of being granted such remedy”.317 The same frustration applies to tribunals as 
they are regarded as custodians of human rights (albeit subject to the unclear human rights 
jurisdiction such as that of the SADC Tribunal which had to be concretised via the doctrine of 
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implied powers).318 As a result, there is “[n]o court or quasi-judicial body [that] would like to 
render decisions that are tantamount to empty orders”.319  
 
The difficulties associated with the enforcement of judgments of international tribunals are not 
something new.320 As pointed out above, the suspended Tribunal’s decisions regarding human 
rights have not yet been implemented. This problem continues to be a subject of debate 
throughout Africa and beyond.321 As we saw earlier, most African countries are “very protective 
of their state sovereignty”.322 This is one of the reasons why compliance is partially or totally 
rejected by a state for policy or practical323 reasons, even if there is a treaty or other obligation 
requiring compliance with the decision.324 It is in this regard that Llamzon has correctly observed 
that “international institutions [and courts such as the SADC Tribunal] are plagued by too many 
expectations [of protecting human rights] and too little power”.325 This observation has merit 
because in the case of the Tribunal, the victims of human rights violations approached the 
Tribunal in the hope of receiving the necessary protection. The Tribunal ruled in their favour but 
could not enforce its decisions as this fell outside of its powers. The Summit is the body with the 
power to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are implemented by member states, but it has 
failed to do so.326 
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It is unfortunate that a country voluntarily accedes to a treaty but thereafter fails to discharge its 
treaty obligations. This necessitates a brief discussion of why states enter into treaties. 
According to Chayes and Chayes, when states conclude international agreements they will to a 
certain degree fulfil their obligations under that treaty.327 In this regard, these authors indicate 
that even though treaty compliance cannot be empirically verified, the tendency of countries to 
comply with their treaty obligations is more tenable and useful than the realist assumption that 
states violate international agreements whenever it is in their interest to do so.328 In support of 
this, they argue, inter alia, that treaties are closely related to states’ “interests” and for this 
reason states need to enter into agreements which are in their own interests. In this regard a 
treaty will be discussed and concluded based on the interests of states.329 However, if states are 
not entirely honest during the negotiation process, the result would be that countries enter into a 
treaty that does not reflect their interests. Further, they submit that it is a well-known rule of 
international law that treaties are binding on member states, and that state parties have to 
discharge their treaty obligations – pacta sunt servanda.330 Indeed, the motive for international 
agreements is for the common good of the international community as parties negotiate and 
ratify treaties for mutual benefit. In addition, according to Chayes and Chayes, non-compliance 
is a result of states entering into a treaty for the sake of appeasing the international community 
with no intention of carrying out their treaty obligations.331 This is common in many countries 
that ratify treaties but fail to bring their national law into line with their treaty obligations. For 
example, Zambia ratified several human rights treaties in the 1980s but has to date not given 
them the force of national law.332 The government of Zambia has also said that if the treaties 
have not been incorporated, individuals will not be able to approach Zambian national courts 
(since the treaty is then not part of national law).333 However, the individual could approach a 
regional or international court (should he/she have locus standi). The fact that a state has not 
domesticated a treaty does not mean that it is not bound on the international level to comply 
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with its treaty obligations. It is liable to other states on the international plane and that state must 
respect such an agreement.334 
 
7.1  Factors contributing to non-compliance with the judgments of international tribunals 
Compliance with the decisions of the domestic courts is generally high because of the organised 
system involving a police force and sheriffs. For example, if a court issues a judgment in a civil 
case for the award of money, the sheriff will proceed to recover the money even through the 
attachment of the debtor’s assets.335 Also, in criminal cases, where the court issues a judgment 
ordering the arrest of a suspect, police officers will implement that order. However, international, 
regional, or sub-regional courts, such as the SADC Tribunal, do not have the power to compel 
compliance with their decisions because there is “no world order similar to national 
government”.336 In fact, these tribunals are considered to be more political than judicial 
bodies.337 This argument is not without merit as these institutions are created by treaties and 
their operation and proper functioning are dependent on the political will of member states. Even 
if there are problems involving compliance with international decisions, these institutions play an 
indispensable role in the development of international law and the protection of human rights.338 
The various forms of compliance and the causes of non-compliance are discussed below.339 
Full compliance refers to a situation where a state party has fully complied with the decision of 
the international court and/or where the state party has indicated a clear political will to comply 
with a judgment.340 As far as the latter is concerned, the process of complying with the decision 
must have already commenced.341 Non-compliance refers to a situation where a state party has 
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indicated its intention, as Zimbabwe has done, that it will not comply with the decisions of the 
court that issued the judgment.342 
 
Chayes and Chayes are of the view that non-compliance with the decisions of international 
courts can be attributed to the ambiguous nature of a treaty, incapacity of the parties to fulfil 
their treaty obligations, and the temporary dimension of social or economic change.343 The 
SADC Treaty may be regarded as ambiguous in the sense that it is silent on the relationship 
between the Treaty itself and the national constitutions of member states. In addition, as pointed 
out in Chapter 2, the Treaty and 2000 Tribunal Protocol do not expressly empower the Tribunal 
to adjudicate human rights cases. This has resulted in Zimbabwe’s domestic courts declining to 
register and recognise an order of the Tribunal on the basis that it was contrary to the 
Zimbabwean Constitution.344 Further, the government of Zimbabwe has consistently maintained 
that the Tribunal does not have a human rights mandate in that the Treaty does “not set out the 
standards against which actions of Member States can be assessed” but “only sets out the 
principles and objectives of SADC”.345  
 
With regard to the incapacity of some states to comply with their treaty obligations: States may 
enter into treaties but fail to honour their obligations in terms of the treaty due to lack of 
resources and infrastructure. Although such countries may have demonstrated a political will to 
fulfil treaty obligations, the availability of resources may be a barrier to compliance.  
 
The social-change factor – such as the transition from an era of gross human rights violations to 
the democratic dispensation in South Africa, and the subsequent ratification of various human 
rights treaties by the democratic government – does not necessarily mean that all its treaty 
obligations could be fulfilled immediately. Some of these obligations (for example, in the area of 
socio-economic rights) can only be achieved progressively because of the need, inter alia, to 
put an implementation framework in place to achieve the obligations imposed by the treaty.346 
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Chayes and Chayes are of the view that there should not be a requirement of strict compliance 
with a treaty regime but rather certain acceptable levels of overall compliance must be required 
to protect the interests of the treaty.347 They support this by indicating that there can be 
deviations within acceptable levels.348 I can go along with this view only to the extent that 
deviations from treaty obligations should only be allowed in line with the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation to allow member states to a treaty "to derogate from the obligations laid down” for 
them in certain situation.349 However, in order for treaty law to be respected in the same wat as 
national law, it is submitted that full compliance with treaty obligations should always be 
encouraged. This is no straightforward matter given the diverse global community. Further, 
states are deemed to be better placed to understand and regulate certain things such as 
freedom of expression and public morals in their own territories.350 
 
Chayes and Chayes are further of the view that higher compliance can be compelled by treaty 
bodies or non-governmental organisations where a treaty does not have a body responsible for 
monitoring compliance with its obligations.351 Whilst this is true, in practice even established 
treaty bodies – such as the Committee against Torture – do not have notable power in that they 
are limited to making recommendations to member states.352 Even an investigation of 
allegations of human rights violations by treaty bodies in the territory of the delinquent state 
depends largely on the willingness of the country concerned. 
It is submitted that non-compliance can be intentional or unintentional.353 An example of 
intentional non-compliance would be where a state has entered into a treaty for the sole reason 
of appeasing the international community with no intention whatsoever of fulfilling its treaty 
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obligations. Unintentional non-compliance occurs, for example, where the provisions of a treaty 
are ambiguous, or where a state has insufficient resources to discharge its treaty obligations 
such as the provision of access to adequate housing.  
 
In a study assessing state compliance with the recommendations of the African Commission of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights between 1993 and 2004, Viljoen and Louw reaches the conclusion 
that in Africa non-compliance with decisions of regional tribunals is, inter alia, caused by the 
AU’s lack of appreciation of the culture of human rights.354 It is submitted that this is also the 
case on the SADC level as SADC member states have not been notably involved in taking 
appropriate action against Zimbabwe for non-compliance with the decisions of the Tribunal.  
 
A change in government may also result in non-compliance with a decision of the court.355 This 
could happen, for example, where the previous government was involved in gross violations of 
human rights. When the new government assumes power, it may have to compensate victims of 
human rights abuses committed by the former government. The country may not have sufficient 
resources to compensate the victims as the focus may be mainly on building the country and 
the institutions supporting democracy. This is so because gross violations of human rights 
“require large-scale remedies”.356  
 
Unlike the ECJ, the lack of an effective body to monitor compliance with the Tribunal’s decisions 
is also a concern. A successful litigant has, therefore, the additional burden of reporting non-
compliance with the decisions of the Tribunal to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate 
action. 
 
Nathan has also expressed the view that one of the factors which especially affects the 
implementation of human rights decisions of regional and/or sub-regional courts is the political 
character of the state.357 On the one hand, this means that states that have a record of human 
rights abuse, also have a poor record of compliance with human rights judgments issued by 
international courts.358 Zimbabwe, amongst other states, is an example in the SADC region of a 
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state that has violated the human rights of its citizens for decades past and has defied 
judgments of the SADC Tribunal.359 On the other hand, countries that respect human rights are 
more likely to comply with the judgments of international and regional courts.360 In addition, the 
more the decision of an international, regional or sub-regional court deals with a sensitive area 
and is contrary to a local policy of the state concerned, the greater the probability that it will not 
be implemented.361 An example of this is where the government of Zimbabwe and its local 
courts defied the decisions of the SADC Tribunal362 on the basis that they sought to reverse the 
land policy that had been adopted by Parliament. 
 
It is submitted that states party to any treaty should at all times voluntarily discharge their treaty 
obligations, freely assumed, without the need for third parties to intervene.363 Unfortunately, this 
does not always happen in the real world. Therefore, as is further discussed below, it is 
submitted that compliance with the judgments of the Tribunal delivered while it was operational, 
should be achieved through diplomatic means. This may, for example, take place where the 
Summit compels the non-complying party to take measures to ensure that the judgment is 
fulfilled. The decisions of the envisaged SADC Tribunal should be enforced by a judicial 
procedure and/or sanctions (as a matter of last resort) in cases where the parties to the dispute 
deliberately ignore the decision.  
 
7.2  Powers of the Summit to enforce the decisions of the SADC Tribunal through sanctions 
The powers of the Summit to take appropriate action against a member state that refuses to 
comply with the decisions of the Tribunal are also supported by the provisions of the SADC 
Treaty. For example, article 33 of the Treaty authorises the imposition of sanctions against any 
member state who “persistently fails” to discharge the obligations flowing from the Treaty. 
Further, the Treaty requires sanctions to be determined on a case by case basis.364 The 
provision regarding sanctions in the Treaty relates to the oldest and most traditional method 
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used to enforce international law.365 The implementation of sanctions is an example of a self-
help measure taken by sovereign states against a particular state and is aimed at, inter alia, 
coercing the state into complying with a judgment issued against it or to protect certain 
interests.366 International pressure as a form of fostering compliance with judgments cannot be 
ignored regardless of its controversial nature.367 These measures may be remedial and punitive 
in nature.368 Further, “appropriate action” is broad enough to include political pressure and/or 
coercion from member states to compel a defaulting state to comply with the decisions of the 
Tribunal.369 As noted by Adjolohoun, the political influence of an organisation such as the SADC 
and pressure mounted by member states, play a major role in promoting compliance with 
judgments of sub-regional courts.370 There must therefore be coercion or persuasion exerted on 
member states in the form of political pressure regarding the imposition of sanctions to ensure 
that compliance is achieved. It is submitted that had the Summit mounted political pressure on 
Zimbabwe, there could have been some sort of compliance with the Tribunal’s decisions. 
However, the Summit and/or individual SADC member states adopted a silent approach to 
Zimbabwe’s non-compliance with the judgments of the Tribunal. 
 
Apart from the above treaty enforcement mechanisms, international pressure by non-
governmental organisations may also help secure compliance with judgments.  This was helpful 
with the recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) where full compliance with its recommendations increased when non-
governmental organisations mounted international pressure against non-compliant states.371 
The effort of national and international non-governmental organisations is therefore also 
“developing to be a potent force in the monitoring of compliance with agreements” especially in 
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the area of human rights.372 It is conceded, however, that international pressure, whether from 
non-governmental organisations or other human rights bodies, will have no effect if the state 
concerned has no commitment to honouring a decision against it. 
 
Articles 10(8) and 19 of the Treaty require that the decisions of the Summit, unless otherwise 
stated, be taken by consensus. Sanctions can, therefore, by consensus, be imposed on any 
member state. It is however important to highlight that both the Treaty and the 2000 Tribunal 
Protocol are silent as to the types of sanctions that may be imposed against a recalcitrant state. 
It is further submitted that the probability of sanctions being imposed is slim. This is so because 
the Summit’s decisions are reached by consensus. Therefore, even the member state “against 
whom sanctions are contemplated” must be part of the deliberations and agree to any form of 
punishment that may be imposed on it.373 Furthermore, political and diplomatic considerations 
come into play as member states do not wish to cause tensions in their international relations. It 
is also submitted that solidarity among African states forged to address issues of colonialism 
makes it difficult for member states to take drastic measures against one of their own. It is, 
therefore, unlikely that a member state would willingly submit to such “self-imposed” sanctions. 
From this it can be deduced that this was the main obstacle preventing the Summit from taking 
appropriate action or imposing sanctions against Zimbabwe for failure to comply with the 
Tribunal’s judgments.374  
 
It is submitted that self-help measures, such as political isolation should only be resorted to as a 
matter of last resort to enforce compliance because such measures do not affect the wrongdoer 
only, but also certain segments of the population.375 For example, Zimbabwe has experienced 
severe poverty in the last decade because of sanctions resulting from alleged human rights 
abuses by President Mugabe’s regime.  
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7.3  Implementing the decisions of the SADC Tribunal through non-judicial measures? 
Self-help and non-judicial measures were created when standing before international tribunals 
was limited to states.376 The reason for this was said to be that the enforcement of an 
international judgment fell within the sphere of the executive.377 Once the tribunal has issued a 
judgment, parties would enter into negotiations on how it was to be implemented.378 
Accordingly, enforcement was something reserved for the executive and became an entirely 
political, as opposed to judicial matter.379 
 
Other mechanisms for enforcing the judgments of international courts include non-judicial 
institutions, consensual dispute settlement and diplomatic negotiations.380 Arbitration too, falls 
within the ambit of non-judicial measures.381 The parties to the dispute agree to refer the matter 
to arbitration, select the arbitrator, and agree to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision.382 
 
Formal enforcement mechanisms discussed earlier, presumably expose the state accused of 
violations to other states when in fact there are diplomatic means that can be explored to 
establish the causes of non-compliance. The causes of non-compliance, such as an ambiguity 
in the Treaty and the 2000 Tribunal Protocol regarding the Tribunal’s human rights mandate, 
can be discussed and resolved by diplomatic means where the vagueness of the treaty is 
discussed and an amicable solution is reached.383 It is submitted that through such diplomatic 
means national polices and decisions could, over time, be aligned with agreed international 
standards.384 In this way, the non-compliant state is given an opportunity, through dialogue, to 
advance its reasons for its failure to discharge its international obligations. Sudan is an example 
where peace was achieved through diplomatic processes. Although diplomatic channels are 
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slow in resolving an issue and gross human rights violations may persist during the negotiation 
period, they are inexpensive, less confrontational, and “less dramatic” compared to self-help 
measures. In any event, there is political instability in most of the African countries, including 
Zimbabwe, due to various factors.385 Compliance with international judgments is highly unlikely 
in such a climate. It is in this regard that Viljoen and Louw, although referring to compliance with 
the decisions of the African Commission, have observed that good governance and political 
stability within the states influence compliance with the decisions and/or recommendations of a 
judicial body.386 This sentiment has also been correctly expressed by Fagbayibo who has 
observed that “[s]upranational organisations [such as the SADC Tribunal] can effectively assert 
their control and influence only in a stable climate”.387 It is therefore necessary for SADC 
countries to bring peace to their own countries in order to ensure that the rule of law and 
democracy are achieved. In this way, international judgments could be enforced more 
successfully. 
 
It is submitted that the enforcement of and compliance with judgments pending before the 
Tribunal should be achieved through diplomatic means as they are “less intrusive and less 
imposing”.388 Diplomatic means are also flexible and confidential.389 This means that the parties 
themselves control of the process and the outcome.390 Accordingly, a settlement reached 
through negotiation is likely to present fewer problems of compliance and implementation as 
both parties have contributed to the outcome.391 As Chayes and Chayes argue, there should be 
“de-emphasis of formal enforcement measures and even, to a degree, of coercive informal 
sanctions, except in egregious cases”.392 It is submitted that member states should voluntary 
comply with the judgments of the new SADC Tribunal once they have been delivered as a 
matter of first priority, and that they should enforced through diplomatic channels when there is 
unwillingness from parties concerned to comply with them. It must also be noted that under 
international law fostering compliance through sanctions is no simple matter, as some states 
may agree, others not, and yet others abstain during the voting process.393  
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From the foregoing, it can be deduced that there has been continuing difficulty in enforcing the 
judgments of international and regional tribunals within international law. It is in this regard that 
Oppong is of the view that “international law did not contemplate direct enforcement of the 
decisions of international courts by national courts”, but enforcement through diplomatic or 
political means.394 As discussed earlier, this position appears to be changing as certain national 
courts do now enforce the judgments of regional tribunals.395 The question of how these 
judgments should be enforced is addressed below. 
 
The proper functioning of the Tribunal and compliance with its judgments is largely dependent 
on the greater commitment, political will, political leadership, and good faith at Summit level.396 
The support for the Tribunal from member states is indispensable to the Tribunal being in a 
position to discharge its duties. Applying the views of Chayes and Chayes – that treaties are 
closely related to states’ interests and that member states are likely to comply with their 
obligations – it is submitted that SADC countries voluntarily accepted the obligations flowing 
from the Treaty. In addition, the Treaty, as is shown below, seeks to promote the interests of 
SADC countries such as democracy and the rule of law within their territories. This was done for 
the common good of SADC citizens and in pursuit of the objectives set out in the Treaty, 
including the protection of human rights. These obligations are found in the Preamble to the 
Treaty which provides:  
DETERMINED to ensure, through common action, the progress and well-being of the 
people of Southern Africa; 
CONSCIOUS of our duty to promote the interdependence and integration of our 
national economies for harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the 
region; 
… 
MINDFUL of the need to involve the people of the Region centrally in the process of 
development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, 
observance of human rights and the rule of law; 
RECOGNIZING that, in an increasingly interdependent world, mutual understanding, 
good neighbourliness, and meaningful co-operation among the countries of the 
Region are indispensable to the realization of these ideals … 
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In addition, SADC member states have undertaken to adopt measures to ensure that the 
objectives of the SADC are fulfilled.397 Member states have further agreed not to take any 
measures that would compromise, inter alia, the implementation of the principles and objectives 
set out in the Treaty. They have also undertaken to take all the necessary steps to accord the 
Treaty the force of national law and have committed themselves to cooperate with and assist 
institutions of the SADC, such as the Tribunal, in the performance of their functions.398  
 
Article 32(2) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol also requires member states to take all measures 
necessary to ensure execution of the decisions of the Tribunal. What can be deduced here is 
that compliance with the obligations of the Treaty is dependent on the cooperation of member 
states. Without their support, the Tribunal has no power to enforce its judgments. A successful 
litigant before the Tribunal will not be able to enforce a judgment in the territory of the state 
concerned if the member state has no political will to comply with that judgment.  
 
As indicated earlier, there is no major difference between the provisions of the 2000 Tribunal’s 
Protocol and the 2014 Protocol when it comes to the enforcement and execution of the 
decisions of the SADC Tribunal. Article 32 of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol provides that  
 
1. The  law and rules of civil procedure for the registration and enforcement  of 
foreign judgements  in  force  in  the  territory  of  the  State  in  which  the  
judgement  is  to  be enforced shall govern enforcement. 
2. States and institutions of the Community shall take forthwith all measures 
necessary to ensure execution of decisions of the Tribunal. 
3. Decisions of the Tribunal shall be binding upon the parties to the dispute in 
respect of that particular case and enforceable within the territories of the 
States concerned. 
4.  Any failure by a State to comply with a decision of the Tribunal may be 
referred to the Tribunal by any party concerned. 
5.  If the Tribunal establishes the existence of such failure, it shall report its 
finding to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate action. 
  
Article 44 of 2014 Protocol provides that  
1. Member States and institutions of SADC shall take forthwith all measures    
         necessary to ensure execution of decisions of the Tribunal.  
2. A decision of the Tribunal shall be binding upon the parties to the dispute in 
respect of that particular case and must be complied with.  
3. Any failure by a Member State to comply with a decision of the Tribunal may 
be referred to the Tribunal by any Member State affected by the decision.  
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4. If the Tribunal establishes the existence of such failure, it shall report its 
findings to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate action.  
 
 
The main problem with the enforcement mechanisms and execution of judgments as provided 
for in the 2014 Protocol is that it is similar with those contained in the 2000 Tribunal Protocol. It 
does not offer any new methods of ensuring that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced. For 
example, a failure by a member state to comply with a decision of the new Tribunal may be 
referred to the Tribunal by any member state affected by the decision. If the Tribunal establishes 
a failure, it shall report the act of non-compliance to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate 
action. The Summit still consist of the same states that failed to take effective action in order to 
ensure that the former Tribunal’s decisions were enforced. All in all, these enforcement 
mechanisms did not yield any positive results, because several acts of non-compliance by 
Zimbabwe were referred to the Summit by the Tribunal. However, these decisions remain 
unenforced.  
 
The notable difference in the 2014 Protocol is the omission of the requirement that “the law and 
rules of civil procedure for the registration and enforcement of foreign judgments” are to be 
applied in enforcing the Tribunal’s decisions in the territory of member states involved in the 
dispute. As discussed earlier, this procedure was not desirable for the enforcement of non-
monetary judgments.399 In addition, in terms of article 34 of the 2014 Protocol, the Tribunal 
“shall give advisory opinions on such matters as the Summit or Council may refer to it”. This 
provision is welcomed and must be retained. Advisory opinions are important as they provide 
guidance on, inter alia, the constitutionality on “pending legislation or on contemplated action by 
the executive”. 400 
 
Furthermore, as is discussed below, the 2014 Protocol does not include any transitional 
provisions to resolve the issue of pending cases and unenforced judgments.401 The power of the 
Summit to take appropriate action under article 32(5) of the 2000 Tribunal Protocol has been 
retained as is in article 44(4) of the 2014 Protocol. It would have been useful for the Summit to 
elaborate and/or provide guidance as to what “appropriate action” may entail in a given case, 
because this broad power contributed to the demise of the former Tribunal. 
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Although referring to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Stroh has correctly indicated that the cooperation of 
states remains an “indispensable requirement for efficient proceedings [and enforcement of the 
decisions]”.402 Countries that have ratified a treaty promoting human rights should ensure that 
their treaty obligations are carried out in good faith. Even in cases of the breach of treaty 
obligations, there is a need for constructive dialogue through diplomatic means to ensure that 
non-compliance with a treaty is addressed and victims are afforded redress. However, where 
member states decide to protect one of their allies accused of human rights violations, the 
objectives of the SADC region will be compromised.  
 
In light of the above exposition, it is clear that compliance with treaty obligations and/or the 
judgments of regional and international tribunals is significantly dependent on the political will of 
member states. 
 
8 STATUS OF DECISIONS DELIVERED BY THE SUSPENDED SADC TRIBUNAL AND 
PENDING CASES 
 
There is no doubt that the decisions that have already been delivered by the Tribunal are final 
and binding upon member states involved in the dispute, even though the Tribunal has been 
suspended.403 These judgments lack only enforcement. South African courts – although, in my 
view without adequately articulating how undomesticated SADC Community law is enforceable 
in Zimbabwe and South Africa – have taken steps to ensure that the Tribunal’s decisions are 
enforced.404  Interestingly, a property that belongs to the Zimbabwean government was recently 
sold on auction to give effect to the court order in the Fick (CC) case.405 The enforcement of a 
Tribunal’s decision through the sale of property at a national level, has never before happened 
in Africa.  Zimbabwe has vowed to challenge this. 
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Litigants approach the courts in anticipation that their cases will be heard and a ruling made. 
Since the 2014 Protocol does not provide any solution in dealing with decisions which were 
pending when the Tribunal was suspended,406 there are two ways of addressing this difficulty.  
Firstly, this unique challenge can be addressed through non-judicial means as discussed above. 
Fortunately, one of the SADC institutions has taken this approach and the case is currently in 
arbitration at the SADC Investor-State Arbitration.407 Arbitration, as discussed, is an alternative 
dispute-resolution process not involving the courts, which can be used to resolve disputes.408  
  
The SADC as an international organisation, its institutions, its officials, property and assets 
enjoy immunity from any legal process brought against it.409 The immunity of the SADC and its 
institutions is further provided for in article 1 of the Protocol to the Treaty establishing SADC on 
Immunities and Privileges (“Immunities Protocol”).410 This form of immunity is regarded as 
important to ensure that the organisation can fully perform its functions.411 As the SADC enjoys 
immunity in disputes brought against it by, inter alia, its staff or officials, it has to provide some 
means of alternative dispute resolution.412 Indeed, article 32 of the Treaty provide for disputes to 
be settled peacefully before they are referred to the Tribunal. Given the continuing suspension 
of the Tribunal, De Wet is of the view that employees of the SADC have no access to judicial 
protection against any form of unfair labour practice.413 De Wet points out that a practice has 
developed in other international organisations in terms of which immunity has been waived, 
especially in relation to employment contracts where the organisation has failed to provide 
alternative measures to ensure that its staff can claim their rights.414 Referring to the decision of 
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the European Court of Human Rights in Waite and Kennedy v Germany,415 she notes that some 
national courts waived the immunity of international organisations because they (international 
organisations) failed to provide a judicial mechanism for their staff to protect their rights.416 
Ultimately, she cautions that this should be a “signal warning” to the SADC leaders of the 
speedy need to revive the Tribunal.417 According to De Wet, the jurisprudence developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights and spread over Europe regarding the waiver of immunity by 
national courts, can serve as persuasive authority for national courts in the SADC regions.418 
The revival of the Tribunal will be useful as it will be able to draw on the experience of other 
jurisdictions on how the issue of immunity of international organisations has been dealt with 
where regional tribunals have failed to provide mechanisms for redress.  
 
De Wet’s observations certainly have merit. In fact, in 2011 in Swart v Southern African 
Development Community, the High Court of Botswana had an opportunity to decide whether it 
had jurisdiction to adjudicate a case arising from a contract of employment between SADC (an 
international organisation) and its employee.419 The applicant, a former interpreter in the employ 
of the respondent, had sought a review of the respondent’s decision not to renew his contract of 
employment. Cases such as this were generally heard by SADC Tribunal before its 
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suspension.420 Counsel on behalf of the respondent raised a point in limine arguing that the 
High Court of Botswana had no jurisdiction as the SADC was an international organisation421 
and so enjoyed sole jurisdiction over disputes between itself and its employees.422 This 
argument was then abandoned because the Tribunal was no longer functional. Counsel further 
conceded that if the applicant was denied access to the courts of Botswana, she would be 
deprived of an opportunity to claim her rights.423 The judge agreed with counsel’s submission 
and indicated that the “[SADC] treaty of the respondent provides no alternative mechanism 
apart from that tribunal”.424 The Court assumed jurisdiction but dismissed the application on the 
basis that the respondent had not made any promise and/or created a legitimate expectation to 
renew her contract of employment. It is submitted that the effect of this judgment is that it has 
done away with sovereign immunity of SADC as an international organisation in the domestic 
courts of Botswana. Further, the decision sets a precedent that all the SADC officials may 
approach the High Court of Botswana to resolve employment disputes emanating from the 
SADC and its employees.425 The decision may also serve a persuasive authority in other SADC 
countries such as South Africa.426 
 
Under international and regional law, protection of human rights can only be secured through 
the availability of effective judicial remedies.427 Those whose human rights are violated should, 
as a matter of fundamental importance, have access to justice.428 In this context, access to 
justice means “the possibility for the individual to bring a claim before a court and have a court 
adjudicate it … in accordance with substantive standards of fairness and justice”.429 The 
continued suspension of the SADC Tribunal and the adoption of the Protocol on the Tribunal in 
the SADC which limit access to the Tribunal to inter-state disputes, violate the right of access to 
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courts. The right of access to courts is a fundamental human right which entitles one to have 
access to justice and have his/her case heard. It is therefore submitted that the current 
jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal and continued non-operation infringes the right of access to 
courts/justice and, by implication the protection of human rights. 
 
Where no remedy is available as a result of the continuing suspension of the Tribunal and the 
Zimbabwean national courts do not provide recourse, the final possibility is for litigants to 
approach other tribunals – such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights or the 
African Commission.430 However, it is not easy to follow this route in that individuals face a 
number of hurdles – including the exhaustion of local remedies and, in the case of the African 
Commission, the acceptance of their complaint by a simple majority of the members of the 
Commission.431 Although the recommendations of the African Commission are not binding on 
the parties in dispute and may not in effect be of great assistance to the complainant, the 
condemnation of the conduct complained of bears a moral force that may yield positive results 
such as compliance.432 Approaching the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is also 
dependent on member states making a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the court to 
receive individual complaints.433 The admission of an individual case is in the discretion of the 
court.434 A further difficulty is that certain of the member states – Tanzania, for example – 
belong to more than one sub-regional court,435 which means that the individual will have to 
choose the appropriate forum for his or her case. It is therefore clear that approaching alternate 
fora is not a simple solution. But this does not mean that it is impossible to do so. For example, 
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Luke Thembani and Ben Freeth approached the African Commission on behalf of Zimbabwean 
famers requesting an order compelling SADC Heads of State to allow the suspended SADC 
Tribunal to continue with its work.436 Their application was unsuccessful. Some of the SADC 
states sought to oppose the application based on “preliminary procedural objections” but the 
African Commission ruled the case admissible.437 This means that it is possible to take pending 
cases before other existing fora chosen by aggrieved parties who received no relief from the 
SADC Tribunal or whose judgments remains unenforced. The basis for this is that the Tribunal 
remains dysfunctional despite the 2014 Protocol, which has only been signed by nine SADC 
member states so far. It has also not been ratified by any state to date.438 The question of a 
remedy is very important in any litigation because “without an effective remedy a right is largely 
worthless”.439 In Dawda Jawara v The Gambia, the African Commission said:  
A remedy is considered available if the petitioner can pursue it without impediment, it 
is deemed effective if it offers a prospect of success, and it is found sufficient if it is 
capable of redressing the complaint.
440
 
 
Even though the African Commission and Enonghong were referring to local remedies, it is 
submitted that on a sub-regional or any other level, the remedy must be available. Failing this it 
would make no sense to approach a supranational court whose orders would be worthless 
and/or unenforceable. 
 
Another factor that deserves attention is that, as things stands, the “new” SADC Tribunal will 
deal with inter-state disputes only. This will be a serious defect in the SADC legal system. An 
example of a better approach is that of the ECOWAS system which provides direct access for 
individuals to the ECOWAS CCJ.441 It has been said that the ECOWAS CCJ is unique among 
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human rights courts in that it grants direct access to individuals without requiring them first to 
submit their complaints to a quasi-judicial institution for screening or recommendations (if the 
complaints are found to be admissible).442 However, the East African Court of Justice also 
allows individuals access to the court without requiring them to first exhaust local remedies.443  It 
is indeed unusual for a sub-regional court to grant direct access to individuals without requiring 
the parties first to exhaust local remedies. It is nonetheless submitted that individuals should 
always exhaust local remedies444 and only approach sub-regional courts as a matter of last 
resort where local remedies do not provide redress. In fact, it would appear that the SADC 
Tribunal is the only sub-regional court in Africa which does not provide for direct access for 
individuals. This prevents individuals within the SADC region from approaching a court where 
local remedies are incapable of providing redress. It is therefore submitted that the SADC 
member states should consider extending access to the future Tribunal to matters involving 
disputes between member states, individuals, and non-governmental organisations.  
 
In the event that SADC member states decide that individuals will not have access to the new 
SADC Tribunal, the issue of reciprocity may play an important role. One could possibly argue 
that State A could then (on behalf of an injured citizen of State B) take State B (who violated the 
individual’s right) to the SADC Tribunal. This is only possible where State A and State B are 
both parties to a human rights treaty and where the right that was violated has the status of jus 
cogens – for example, torture.445  
 
9 LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND ECOWAS CCJ 
The ECOWAS CCJ and the European Court of Justice have been chosen from other sub-
regional and regional tribunals to provide guidance on the future SADC Tribunal. The basis for 
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this choice lies in their unique mechanisms for the enforcement of their decisions. Additionally, 
compliance with their judgments has been high compared to other tribunals. 
 
The ECJ has been successful in enforcing European Union law against “recalcitrant 
governments”.446 Governments regularly comply with ECJ decisions because of, inter alia, the 
willingness of member states to accept the authority of the court and the fear of being 
sanctioned.447 It is because of this level of compliance that the ECJ is regarded as the most 
successful of the sub-regional courts which has met with little resistance from member states.448 
This high level of compliance does not suggest that the ECJ did not experience problems of 
non-compliance in its early years of operation.449 How the ECJ deals with issues of compliance 
may, however, be instructive in the SADC context. 
 
Instances of non-compliance with the judgments of the ECJ may be categorised as “pre-
litigation non-compliance” and “post-litigation non-compliance”.450 The former entails a situation 
where there has been an alleged breach of the European community law, but the existence of 
the violation is yet to be determined by the ECJ.451 The latter refers to a situation where the ECJ 
has heard a case and issued a judgment452 but a member state fails to comply with the 
judgment.453 If there is non-compliance, a member state, after reporting the matter to the 
European Commission for non-compliance, may take the case to the ECJ if the act of non-
compliance continues.454 The ECJ has the discretion to impose a lump-sum penalty on the party 
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concerned.455 The focus of enforcement relevant to this discussion is that envisaged in the EU 
Treaty where the oversight and enforcement mechanisms have proved successful.  
 
Article 260 of the EU Treaty is specifically designed to address the issue of post-litigation non-
compliance, and gives the ECJ the power to require member states to take necessary 
measures to implement the court’s decisions.456 In addition, articles 258 and 259 of the EU 
Treaty empower the European Commission to take measures, inter alia, to monitor compliance 
with the judgments of the ECJ and report member states who fail to comply to the court. The 
European Commission has the power to recommend a penalty to the ECJ to be imposed on a 
member state that has failed to implement a decision of the court.457 The European Commission 
first gives the member state concerned an opportunity to make its observations about the 
judgment, before a decision to report it to the ECJ is taken.458 These unique provisions, which 
are absent from the SADC Treaty, essentially empower the European Commission to promote 
compliance with the EU Treaty by investigating, inter alia, acts of non-compliance with the 
judgments of the ECJ and reporting these to the court with a specified penalty that must be paid 
by the member state concerned.  
 
In addition, the European Commission enjoys support from member states to enable it to 
discharge its mandate.459 The ECJ even enjoys political support. This emerges from the fact that 
member states have extended the ECJ’s powers to include the imposition of financial sanctions 
in order to compel member states to comply with its judgments.460  
 
There are three observations that can be made from the practice of the ECJ.  
 The powers of the ECJ include financial sanctions. We also find this in the SADC 
Tribunal processes in that the Summit is empowered to take appropriate action. The 
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phrase “appropriate action” is broad and can be read to mean any form of sanction, 
including those of a financial nature.  
 The European Commission assists the ECJ by reporting (and investigating) acts of non-
compliance to the ECJ. The SADC Tribunal lacks this mechanism. Instead, acts of non-
compliance are reported by successful litigants to the Tribunal and the Tribunal must 
report to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate action.  
 Lastly, and importantly, the ECJ and the European Commission enjoy political support 
from member states. The suspension of the SADC Tribunal is a clear indication that this 
is not the case in the SADC region.  
 
The ECOWAS CCJ has also experienced non-compliance with its human rights decisions 
against member states.461 Some sixty per cent of its decisions have not been complied with.462 
Although this may appear high, if it is compared to other sub-regions, compliance with the 
decisions of the ECOWAS CCJ may be regarded as above average.463 Unlike the suspended 
SADC Tribunal, under the ECOWAS regime individuals do not have standing to bring cases 
before the court to report acts of non-compliance. Instead, acts of non-compliance are brought 
to the attention of the Authority of Heads of State or Government via the court’s officers, such as 
judges, who publicly pressure governments to comply with the court’s decisions.464 The 
Authority of Heads of State or Government have the power to impose sanctions – such as the 
withdrawal of voting rights, economic sanctions, and suspension from the community – against 
a state that fails to comply with the decisions of the court. These measures have, however, not 
yet been taken. Under the 2005 Supplementary Protocol on the court, member states are 
required to appoint national authorities who will primarily be responsible for enforcing the 
judgments of the court. This feature is also absent from the SADC regime. To this end, the 
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governments of Nigeria, Guinea, and Niger have appointed such authorities.465 This is a 
significant step as sub-regional courts do not have officials to execute judgments of the courts.  
 
Another notable feature of the ECOWAS system is the Commission of the Economic 
Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS Commission) which was established in 2007.466 In 
terms of article 14 of the Supplementary Act, a member state or the President of the ECOWAS 
Commission may institute a procedure for sanctions against a member state that fails to fulfil its 
treaty obligations. The ECOWAS Commission then prepares reports of non-compliance and 
submits these to the political organs of the Community for consideration and further action. The 
President of the ECOWAS Commission has on several occasions called upon member states to 
comply with the decisions of the ECOWAS CCJ.467 To this end, it has been suggested that the 
President of the ECOWAS Commission is better placed “to give life to follow-up 
mechanisms”.468 
 
The Supplementary Act was enacted primarily to reinforce states’ obligations to comply with the 
decisions of the ECOWAS CCJ.469 The Supplementary Act was also promulgated to give effect 
to article 77 of the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States which 
deals with sanctions against member states who fail to honour their treaty obligations.470 The 
Preamble to the Supplementary Act provides, inter alia, that member states recall that 
ECOWAS has created “supra-national institutions whose decisions are binding and enforceable 
in full and directly both in its institutions and in member states”.471 The Supplementary Act 
further defines obligations owed to the community as, inter alia, the decisions of the ECOWAS 
CCJ.472 Importantly, the Supplementary Act expressly provides that the protection and respect 
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for human rights, democracy and the rule of law are obligations owed by member states under 
ECOWAS community law.473 These provisions show a remarkable development as the Revised 
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, 1993, was not clear as to what 
constitutes obligations owed to the Community by member states.474 In fact, the Revised 
ECOWAS Treaty lists the recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights 
and the “promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance” as principles (as 
opposed to obligations, which are now clear in the Supplementary Act) that member states have 
undertaken to observe.475 The adoption of the Supplementary Act is therefore useful in that it 
also clarifies important provisions relating to human rights and the nature of the obligations of 
member states. The SADC Treaty may, therefore, draw inspiration from the ECOWAS CCJ in 
order to clarify some of the contested provisions relating to human rights obligations.  
 
The ECJ and ECOWAS CCJ mechanisms above are commendable and offer guidance for the 
new SADC Tribunal. It is essential for SADC member states to support the institutions they have 
created in order to achieve the objectives set out in the Treaty. The support that the ECOWAS 
CCJ and the ECJ receive from their member states is something that the SADC region should 
emulate in order to strengthen institutions that ought to protect democracy and uphold the rule 
of law.   
 
10 CONCLUSION 
In light of the above exposition, it is submitted that the challenges regarding the operation of the 
SADC Treaty, the Tribunal Protocol, the Agreement Amending the Treaty, the Amended 
Tribunal Protocol, and the establishment of the Tribunal appear unfounded. In addition, it is also 
clear that the main cause of all challenges facing the Tribunal have emanated from the 
Tribunal’s decision to rule against Zimbabwe for its violation of human rights. Furthermore, 
these challenges have been politically motivated arguments were aimed at paralysing the 
Tribunal. 
 
There are various reasons for non-compliance with the judgments of international courts 
including the political approach of the country and the political will of the state to adhere to its 
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international obligations.476 Countries with systems of good governance are likely to implement 
decisions of international courts; those with an unstable political climate are not.  
 
It is submitted that compliance with human rights decisions of international courts should first be 
achieved through diplomatic means as they are, inter alia, less confrontational and the parties to 
the dispute contribute to the outcome. However, where these do not produce positive results, 
there must be international pressure, including sanctions, in order to coerce the recalcitrant 
state to honour its treaty obligations.   
 
Compliance with the pending judgments of the Tribunal should be finalised through non-judicial 
means such as negotiated settlements. SADC member states should willingly respect and 
comply with the decisions of the new Tribunal. As a supplementary measure in order to ensure 
full compliance, the Tribunal should learn from the ECOWAS CCJ and the ECJ by establishing 
a body that will monitor compliance with its decision. Such a body should also be given powers 
to recommend and/or impose sanctions.  
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1 INTRODUCTION  
This main purpose of this study, as indicated in Chapter 1, has been to establish whether the 
suspended SADC Tribunal enjoyed jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights issues and, if so, how 
its judgments should be enforced and what impact the enforcement of these judgments will 
have on state sovereignty. This Chapter deals with the main findings of the study.  
 
In order to answer the research question, I considered the relevant jurisprudence of the SADC 
Tribunal itself, the International Court of Justice, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, and 
the East African Court of Justice. Reference to these institutions was important for the study 
because these courts have dealt with the doctrine of implied powers. Importantly, the East 
African Court of Justice and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice operate at a sub-
regional level and within the African context. It was, therefore, imperative to ascertain how they 
have been empowered to deal with human rights cases (including how they have broadened 
their mandates to deal with human rights where their constitutive documents are silent). The 
study of the concept of state sovereignty and its path since the Second World War, was also 
essential in establishing how the judgments of other international, sub-regional, and regional 
tribunals, such as the European Court of Justice, have been enforced in the context of 
international law. The relationship between international law and the national law of member 
states; the relationship between international law and SADC Community law; and the 
relationship between the national law of member states and SADC Community law was also 
essential in order to explore which legal order should prevail in cases of conflict.  
 
2 JURISDICTION OF THE SADC TRIBUNAL 
Jurisdiction of sub-regional tribunals such as the SADC Tribunal refers to the power or 
competence of an organisation to adjudicate over a legal matter. The constitutive document of 
the organisation plays a significant role, as it gives adjudicatory power to such an organisation 
and determines the extent to which that power can be exercised. Where such powers are broad 
and/or vague, the tribunal concerned may resort to the doctrine of implied powers. There are 
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two schools of thought in this regard: the proponents of the doctrine of implied powers; and 
those supporting the doctrine of express powers.  
 
2.1  Express and implied powers 
Express powers denote those powers which are contained in the treaty establishing the tribunal. 
According to the proponents of express powers, only powers that are contained in the founding 
document can be exercised by a particular tribunal.  
 
Implied powers, on the other hand, are those powers not provided for in the founding document 
of the body involved, but which may be assumed provided that they are necessary for the 
organisation to fulfil its mandate. It is important at this point to highlight that the source of the 
suspended SADC Tribunal’s jurisdiction is the Protocol on the Tribunal and Rules Thereof 
(SADC Protocol on the Tribunal). The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC Treaty) is a key document regarding member states’ obligations in the SADC region. 
The SADC Tribunal Protocol does not expressly provide that the Tribunal can adjudicate human 
rights cases. In addition, the SADC Treaty is not clear as to member states’ obligations 
concerning human rights issues. These factors were the source of the challenge to the 
Tribunal’s competence to decide cases involving allegations of human rights violations. In Mike 
Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe477 the Tribunal found that, based on 
SADC member states’ undertaking to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, the 
rule of law, and democracy, it enjoyed jurisdiction over matters involving human rights. It is 
submitted that the Tribunal acted within its mandate when it resorted to the doctrine of implied 
powers as this was necessary to ensure that member states respect their treaty obligations, 
including the protection of human rights. The Tribunal correctly invoked implied powers through 
its interpretative powers when it interpreted the SADC Treaty in order to resolve the uncertainty 
as to whether it had the competence to deal with cases involving human rights violations. It 
further correctly relied on the principles – in the SADC Treaty – of democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law to establish its human rights powers. It is a well-settled principle in international 
law that where the constitutive document – such as the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on 
the Tribunal – is silent or unclear on certain aspects such as the obligations of member states, 
and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate allegations of violation of human rights, the 
Tribunal may resort to implied powers. Implied powers are not merely invoked under 
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international law. Before an organisation can resort to implied powers, it must settle the critical 
question of whether the exercise of implied powers is necessary for the fulfilment of the 
organisation’s object and purpose as embodied in the Treaty. If the answer is in the affirmative, 
implied powers are can be claimed. This was the case with the SADC Tribunal because the rule 
of law, human rights and democracy would be compromised where individuals’ rights within 
SADC are not protected. The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice endorsed this 
position in 1949 and has continued to do so in subsequent advisory opinions as discussed in 
Chapter 2 of the study.  
 
The jurisprudence of the East African Community of Justice explored in Chapter 2, also reflects 
the exercise of the doctrine of implied powers to assert jurisdiction in a case involving violations 
of human rights.  The Court, in my view, correctly indicated that it would not shy away from 
exercising jurisdiction through the interpretation of the constitutive document (the Treaty 
Establishing the East African Community). Again, this approach falls within the ambit of implied 
powers as confirmed by the International Court of Justice.  
 
Finally, the law of the treaties is also clear in that a treaty must be interpreted in light of its object 
and purpose. In addition, a treaty must be read in its entirety, including its preamble, when a 
certain aspect is unclear in order to try to establish its true meaning. The principle of good faith 
in treaty interpretation also applies. These qualifications are important in order to ensure that 
judicial organs address, as far as possible, issues within the confines of treaty objectives. The 
reliance of the SADC Tribunal on the Preamble to the SADC Treaty together with the provisions 
of the SADC Treaty was therefore essential in order to establish the obligations of the member 
states when it comes to the protection of human rights. 
 
The above findings are important and instructive for the new SADC Tribunal if it is to avoid the 
problems that led to the suspension of the Tribunal. It is submitted that the obligations of 
member states and the jurisdiction over human rights in the new SADC Tribunal should be 
clearly stated. The proposal for the enactment of new provisions addressing these issues is 
offered in the recommendations below, as the 2014 Protocol is largely similar to the 2000 
Protocol and does not offer solutions for many of the problems illuminated in this study.  These 
recommendations take the form of new provisions in the proposed Supplementary Protocol to 
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the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community and a Revised Protocol on the 
Tribunal and Rules Thereof. 
 
3 STATE SOVEREIGNTY  
Sovereignty is one of the fundamental principles of international law. The principle of state 
sovereignty formed one of the important pillars of traditional international law in terms of which 
the state was regarded as enjoying absolute and uncontrolled power as embodied in the Treaty 
of Westphalia of 1648, which saw the end of the Thirty Years War in Europe. A state could, 
therefore, do anything it wished free from external interference. International law dealt only with 
inter-state relations as states were the sole subjects of international law. This meant that even 
when a particular state committed gross violations of human rights against its citizens, this was 
regarded as a purely domestic matter in which no one could intervene. In addition, senior 
government officials, such as heads of state, were accountable to no one for crimes they 
committed against their people. 
 
The end of the Second World War ushered in an era of development in the international legal 
system. The emergence of human rights norms and movements affected the meaning and 
context in which state sovereignty is today understood. Individuals are also regarded as 
subjects who possess rights under international law. The emergence of regional and sub-
regional organisations have also played a major role in contemporary international law. These 
developments, which limit state sovereignty, are briefly addressed below. 
 
3.1 International level 
The adoption of the Charter of the United Nations marked a new global order as the 
international community committed itself to the protection of human rights and maintenance of 
universal peace and security. To this end, the United Nations tasked its Security Council with 
this enormous global responsibility. The Security Council has the power to intervene in any state 
to realise the aims contained in the Charter of the United Nations such as the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Indeed, this has been done in countries such as Libya and 
elsewhere. In addition, the Security Council has established international tribunals such as the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the 
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Special Tribunal for the Sierra Leone to prosecute individuals, including heads of state, who 
have committed heinous crimes. 
 
In addition, numerous human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) have been adopted. Certain of the provisions of the UDHR – such as the 
prohibition of torture – have attained the status of jus cogens and prohibit the torture any person 
wherever perpetrated. Further, certain states have ratified the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which require states 
to protect and promote human rights. There are also mechanisms under various treaties which 
monitor compliance with treaty obligations. As a result, it can be said that human rights 
agreements are directly enforceable between the parties to a particular instrument, and that a 
state party has a reciprocal duty towards other state parties to fulfil its obligations under the 
agreements. It is therefore submitted that the principle of reciprocity should apply to these 
treaties.   
 
The prohibition of certain crimes such as genocide has the status of jus cogens and there is an 
erga omnes obligation not to commit such crime. These obligations automatically bind states. 
They are regarded as peremptory norms from which no state may derogate. These norms also 
allow any state to request a particular state to refrain from violating these norms. There is no 
doubt, therefore, that these norms limit state sovereignty in that one state may call upon another 
state to respect human rights or refrain from committing heinous human rights violations, such 
as genocide. 
 
Humanitarian intervention undertaken by states in another state’s jurisdiction in order to save 
civilians has also eroded the once absolute doctrine of sovereignty. As a result, it has received 
attention from scholars of international law, because such intervention is often undertaken 
without the approval of the Security Council. There have been humanitarian interventions in 
countries such as Liberia by the Economic Community of West African States in the 1990s. 
Further, there was also an intervention in Kosovo by NATO forces and intervention in Chad by 
Pan-African Peacekeeping Force of the then Organisation of African Union (OAU) (now AU). 
This is an indication that a state can no longer treat it inhabitants as objects, as the entire 
international community has an interest in the protection of human rights. It is therefore clear 
that intervention on humanitarian grounds limits state sovereignty. Further, the responsibility to 
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protect imposes a duty on a state to prevent the massacre of its citizens and also empowers 
other states to act where a state fails to protect its own people. 
 
It is also submitted that as the UN SC has been tasked with the responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security, state sovereignty has been eroded and may not be invoked to 
justify conduct that compromises international peace. 
 
3.2 Regional level 
Groups of states have come together on a regional level and created communities in order to 
pursue and achieve certain common interests, such as the maintenance of peace and security. 
This process is known as regionalism and is recognised by the Charter of the United Nations. 
Regionalism is closely-related to the process of globalisation, in that there is an increasing 
interconnection and interdependence among states. Indeed, states need each other for the 
achievement of the common good such as the protection of human rights and economic 
relations. Therefore, in order for regionalism to operate effectively, there must be cooperation 
among states. The AU is an example of a regional body created to, inter alia, promote and 
protect human rights. As discussed in Chapter 3, the clear emphasis on the protection and 
promotion of human rights in the constitutive documents of the AU, marks a shift from its 
predecessor, the OAU, which placed greater emphasis on non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of another member state. In addition, the OAU made no reference to human rights. The 
AU has the authority to intervene in other states to prevent crimes and promote peace. Article 
4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU 2000 provides for “the right of the Union to intervene in a 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. The AU has, for example, 
intervened in the Comoros Islands to assist a government that was unconstitutionally removed 
from office to re-establish control over the territory. This form of intervention is not provided for 
in the Constitutive Act of the AU. However, this intervention indicates that factors that have the 
potential to create instability within the region are the concern for everyone, and that a state 
cannot not rely on state sovereignty to prevent intervention.   
3.3 Sub-regional level 
At this level, a primary focus of this study, SADC member states created the SADC, inter alia, to 
observe the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Through becoming state 
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parties to the SADC Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol, it is submitted that SADC member states 
relinquished a certain portion of their sovereignty. The transfer of power to regional and 
international organisations is a clear indication that sovereignty can no longer be viewed from 
the perspective of the earlier theorists such as Jeann Bodin and Hugo Grotious, as indivisible. 
Without member states relinquishing a certain part of their sovereignty, it is submitted that the  
SADC would be unable to achieve its objectives, as any member state may act contrary to the 
provisions of the Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol without fear of the consequences.  
 
In light of the above exposition, it is submitted that SADC countries have relinquished some 
aspects of their sovereignty and must abide by the obligations flowing from these instruments. 
In addition, it is submitted that none of the SADC member states may invoke state sovereignty 
in order to evade its treaty obligations (such as enforcement of the decisions of the Tribunal). 
 
The denial of access for individuals to the “new” SADC Tribunal is unfortunate and a defect 
when compared to the ECOWAS CCJ and the East African Court of Justice. The SADC 
Tribunal was the custodian of human rights for SADC citizens, in particular where domestic 
mechanisms were unavailable, or available but ineffective in that they did not provide redress. In 
addition, the study has revealed that there are no provisions in the Treaty or the Tribunal 
Protocol which allow the Summit to suspend the Tribunal. Accordingly, it is submitted that the 
Summit’s decision was unlawful. It is further submitted that the Summit should learn from other 
sub-regional courts that allow individuals to bring cases before them and reconsider its decision 
to suspend the operation of the Tribunal. It will be for the benefit of SADC citizens to have 
access to the envisaged SADC Tribunal. 
 
4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW, REGIONAL LAW (SADC 
COMMUNITY LAW) AND NATIONAL LAW 
4.1 Monism and dualism 
This study has revealed that the reception of international law into municipal law depends on 
how a particular country’s constitution provides for the incorporation of treaty law into national 
law. Even though the monist and dualist theories assist in ascertaining how treaty law is 
transformed into national laws, they do not help in determining the hierarchy between 
international law, SADC law, and national law. In this regard the European Union legal system 
provides useful guidance on the nature of the relationship between community law and national 
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law of the member states. It is submitted that the principle of direct applicability and direct effect 
should be applied in the SADC legal order in order to allow citizens of SADC member states to 
invoke the provisions of the SADC community law before national courts. In addition, the SADC 
legal order should be superior to the legal systems of member states.  
 
It is conceded that this will have an impact on state sovereignty and may be met with resistance. 
However, for the reasons stated in Chapter 4, this will prevent a situation in which SADC 
Community law is unjustly challenged and/or applied at the whim of the member states. It is 
submitted that SADC member states must respect the autonomous character of the SADC legal 
order. Additionally, the supremacy of the SADC Community law will ensure its uniform 
application. As was alluded to earlier, it is submitted that by becoming members of the SADC, 
member states have relinquished aspects of their sovereignty and should therefore be willing to 
abide by the SADC legal order.  
 
5 COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF (SUB)-REGIONAL JUDGMENTS 
There has been general non-compliance with the human rights decisions of the SADC Tribunal. 
This is not a problem exclusive to the Tribunal but also faces, for example, the ECOWAS CCJ. 
An example of a tribunal that has a good record of compliance with its judgments is the 
European Court of Justice. Even though the ECOWAS CCJ has a non-compliance rate of some 
sixty per cent, its record remains better than that in other sub-regions.478 The good practice that 
can be drawn from ECOWAS is that member states fully support the functioning of the Court. 
This is something that appears to be lacking among SADC leaders. In addition, the European 
Court of Justice has a body (European Commission) to monitor compliance with the judgments 
of the Court. The European Commission reports acts of non-compliance to the Court and also 
has the power to impose financial fines to foster compliance.  
Similarly, in ECOWAS member states are required to appoint a national authority that will be 
responsible for monitoring compliance with the Court’s decisions. Although this has not yet 
happened in all ECOWAS states, it is submitted that this is a sound initiative as it relieves a 
successful litigant of the need to institute other legal proceedings for reporting non-compliance 
with a court decision. This is the case within the SADC system. A successful litigant must 
institute a further legal action to report non-compliance with a Tribunal decision. Unfortunately, 
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none of these mechanisms exists within the SADC legal order in order to support the SADC 
Tribunal, especially with the enforcement of its decisions. It is submitted that the good practice 
from the European Court of Justice and the ECOWAS CCJ are something that should be 
emulated by the envisaged “new” Tribunal. 
 
The SADC Tribunal has no police force or sheriff to execute its judgments. It can only receive 
and hear a case – and this is where its involvement ends. It can only deal with matters of non-
compliance by reporting them to the Summit. If the Summit does nothing, the Tribunal’s hands 
are tied. The Summit is a body tasked with the enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions and it 
has the power to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal 
are complied with. Given the current hostility towards the Tribunal regarding human rights 
jurisdiction and access by individuals, it is submitted that compliance with the unenforced 
decisions of the Tribunal should be achieved through diplomatic means in which both parties to 
the dispute contribute to the outcome. This will, it is hoped, assist in arriving at a point at which 
member states will support the SADC Tribunal and willingly implement its decisions. This will, 
however, ultimately depend on the political will of member states. 
 
6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
To prevent further legal uncertainty between the SADC legal system and the national legal 
systems of its member states, it is submitted that clear provisions governing the proper 
functioning of the new SADC Tribunal be adopted. The basis for this is that the 2014 Protocol 
does not provide solutions to the current problems. Instead, it curtails the powers of the Tribunal 
to inter-states disputes only. The recommended provisions (below) attempt to address and 
prevent the problems encountered by the suspended SADC Tribunal. Therefore, for the 
effective functioning of the SADC Community legal order, it is submitted that a Supplementary 
Protocol to the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community and a Revised Protocol 
on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community should be adopted which will 
include the following provisions: 
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6.1  Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community 
  
6.1.1  Article 1: Obligations of Member States 
(1)  Each Member State to this Supplementary Protocol has the obligation to respect, 
protect and promote the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law 
in their territories. 
 
6.1.2 Article 2: Incorporation of Community law into national law 
(1) Each member state undertakes to incorporate the provisions of this treaty and the 
Revised Protocol on the SADC Tribunal into its national laws within six months of 
ratification of the Treaty.   
 
6.1.3 Article 3:  Autonomous legal order and supranationality 
(1)    The SADC Community legal system is an autonomous legal order. 
(2) The SADC Community legal system is superior to the legal systems of member 
states and in case of irreconcilable differences, SADC Community law shall take 
precedence over conflicting provisions in the national systems of member states. 
 
6.1.4 Article 4: Applicability of SADC law in member states 
(1)  Member states, individuals and NGOs shall have access to the Tribunal and may 
invoke the provisions of SADC Community law directly before the domestic courts 
of their national states, and domestic courts are obliged to consider and apply 
community law. 
 
6.2  Revised Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community 
 
6.2.1  Article 1: Access to the Tribunal 
(1)  Individuals and NGOs shall have access to the Tribunal provided that local 
remedies where accessible, available and effective have been exhausted. 
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6.2.2 Article 2: Jurisdiction 
(1) The Southern African Development Community Tribunal shall have jurisdiction 
over disputes between natural or legal persons and Member States arising from 
the Treaty, its Protocols, and other instruments of the Community or international 
law. 
(2) The Tribunal’s jurisdiction under/in terms of article 2(1) includes the power and 
competence to determine complaints of the violation of human rights that occur in 
the territory of any Member State. 
 
6.2.3 Article 3: Immunity  
(1) There shall be no civil or criminal immunity accorded to any person, including 
heads of state, for gross violations of human rights. 
 
6.2.4 Article 4: Judgments of the SADC Tribunal in Member States 
(1) The judgments of the SADC Tribunal shall take precedence over and be 
enforceable by the judgments of national courts. 
 
6.2.5 Article 5: Advisory Opinions 
(1)  The Tribunal shall give advisory opinions on such matters as the Summit or 
Council may refer to it. 
 
6.2.6 Article 6: Establishment of body to monitor compliance with the rulings of the SADC 
Tribunal 
 
(1) Parties to this agreement agree to establish a SADC Committee to be termed the 
SADC Monitoring Committee, to monitor compliance with the rulings of the SADC 
Tribunal  within 90 days of the entry into force of this agreement; 
202 
 
 
 
(2) The SADC Monitoring Committee shall have the power to recommend sanctions to 
the Summit against any Member State of the SADC Treaty and the SADC Tribunal 
who refuses to comply with a decision of the SADC Tribunal; 
(3) The SADC Monitoring Committee shall be represented in the deliberations of the 
Summit and shall present its report on compliance with the decisions of the SADC 
Tribunal. 
 
6.2.7  Article 7: Establishment of Registrar for enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions 
(1) Parties to this Agreement agree to establish a Registrar in their respect countries 
who shall be responsible for monitoring compliance with the decisions of the SADC 
Tribunal; and 
(2) The Registrar shall report acts of compliance and/or non-compliance to the SADC 
Monitoring Committee. 
 
7           CONCLUSION 
It is clear that certain of the proposed provisions will impact on the state sovereignty of member 
states, which has been a politically-sensitive issue for many African states due to their colonial 
history. Although I acknowledge the political impediments in realising the above 
recommendations, it is submitted that for the sake of regionalism, economic integration, the rule 
of law, democracy and human rights, SADC Heads of State or Government should seriously 
consider these proposals. Ultimately, the success and proper functioning of the (newly 
established) SADC Tribunal will be dependent on the political will of all SADC members.  
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ANNEXURE A 
 
DECISIONS COMPLIED AND NOT-COMPLIED WITH 
 
√ = complied with. 
X = not complied with.  
 
Fick and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe (SADC (T) 01/2010); [2010] SADCT 8 (16 July 
2010) 
 
X 
 
Mondlane v SADC Secretariat (SADC (T) 07/2009); [2010] SADCT 3 (5 February 2010) 
 
√ 
 
Kanyama v SADC Secretariat (SADC (T) 05/2009); [2010] SADCT 1 (29 January 2010) 
 
√ 
 
Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and Others v Kingdom of Lesotho (SADC (T) 04/2009); 
[2010] SADCT 4 (11 June 2010) (Currently under arbitration.) 
 
X 
 
Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) 03/2009); [2009] SADCT 1 (5 June 2009) 
(Contempt of court ruling.)  
 
X 
 
Kethusegile-Juru v Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC 
(T) 02/2009); [2010] SADCT 7 (11 June 2010)  
 
√ 
 
Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007); [2008] SADCT 2 (28 
November 2008) (Main decision.)  
 
X 
 
Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/07); [2007] SADCT 1 
(13 December 2007) (Interim ruling.) 
X 
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Gideon Stephanus Theron and 7 Others v Zimbabwe Case no 2 of 2008 (Application to 
intervene in Campbell case; relief granted.) 
 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Republic of Zimbabwe (SADC (T) 05/2008); [2009] 
SADCT 2 (1 January 2009) (Application brought by incorrect party on behalf of people 
claiming to have been victims of violence. The Court ordered that the application be 
amended as it was in the interests of justice.) 
 
United Republic of Tanzania v Cimexpan (Mauritius) Ltd and Others (SADC (T) 01/2009) [2010] 
SADCT 5 (11 June 2010) (Case dismissed since the applicant did not exhaust local remedies 
and failed to prove that he was tortured) 
CASES DISMISSED, DECLARATORY ORDERS, REFERRALS TO THE AFRICAN 
COMMISSION AND CASES UNDER ARBITRATION 
Tembani v Republic of Zimbabwe (SADC (T) 07/2008); [2009] SADCT 3 (1 August 2009) st 2009) 
(Application to intervene dismissed.) 
 
Campbell v Zimbabwe (Contempt of court) (SADC (T) 11/2008) (Non-compliance with 
declaratory order.) 
 
United Peoples’ Party of Zimbabwe v SADC and Others (SADC (T) 12/2008); [2009] 
SADCT 4 (14 August 2009) (Application dismissed.) 
 
 
Bach's Transport (Pty) Ltd v Democratic Republic of Congo (SADC (T) 14/2008); [2010] 
SADCT 6 (11 June 2010) (Assessment of damages by the Registrar is pending.) 
 
Albert Fungai Mutize and Others v Campbell and Others (SADC (T) 08/2008) (Application 
dismissed for late filing and as it was a dispute between individuals over which the SADC 
Tribunal lacks jurisdiction.) 
 
Luke Tembani v Republic of Zimbabwe Case no 7 of 2008 (The case was also lodged with 
the African Commission for reference to the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights but 
was dismissed.) 
 
Kethusegile-Juru v Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC 
(T) 02/2009); [2010] SADCT 2 (5 February 2010) (Preliminary objections dismissed.) 
 
Gondo and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe Case no 5 of 2008 (Preliminary objection 
abandoned by Zimbabwe, set aside/legal costs order.) 
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Nixon Chirinda and Others v Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and Others (09/08); [2008] SADCT 1 
(17 September 2008) (Application to intervene dismissed) 
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